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ABSTRACT 
The use of external knowledge, through open and collaborative projects with 
external partners, enables firms to effectively and efficiently solve their innovation 
problems, thereby generating greater innovation performance. Yet many open 
and collaborative innovation projects have failed to complete their objectives as 
initially planned. Scholars have tried to examine this problem by studying the 
governance mechanism of collaboration process in both formation and execution 
phases of projects. While these studies have provided important insights, still little 
is understood about the nature of collaboration dynamics and the attributes of 
projects affecting governance mechanisms. In response, this dissertation seeks to 
establish a comprehensive and clarifying view of open and collaborative 
innovation governance through addressing the following overall question: How do 
firms govern the collaboration process with external partners to increase the 
likelihood that their open and collaborative innovation projects are successfully 
completed? Three specific research questions are framed to answer the overall 
question: 1) How do firms manage the dynamics of collaboration process with 
external sources to successfully complete their open and collaborative innovation 
projects? 2) Does the use of a formalized joint technology-development process 
help to increase the likelihood that an open innovation project with external 
sources is successfully completed? 3) Which open innovation modes do managers 
choose for projects characterized by different levels of complexity and 
‘hiddenness’ of knowledge? We approach these questions with combining a cross-
case systematic analysis of qualitative cases on open and collaborative projects 
and a survey study. The results of this study demonstrate that partnering firms 
need to regulate the knowledge sharing-protecting tension in collaboration 
processes to successfully complete joint projects. Moreover, I introduce an 
alternative form of formalization into the collaboration process, in addition to 
formal intellectual property (IP) control, to regulate the knowledge sharing-
protecting tension. Finally, the results indicate that project attributes, specifically 
complexity and hiddenness of required knowledge, affects the selection of 
governance mechanisms in open and collaborative projects. 
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Chapter 1: General Introduction of Thesis 
1.1 Relevance of the Topic and Overall research 
Objective 
“Open and collaborative innovation is growing into a mainstream phenomenon of 
increasing business relevance in large firms, but mastering and managing it is a 
challenge”. Sabine Brunswicker, Former Head of Open Innovation at the 
Fraunhofer Society. 
The topic of open and collaborative innovation has received substantial research 
attention in the management literature consistently over the last 10 years. An 
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extensive body of literature on inter-organizational collaboration (IOC) and open 
innovation (OI) has devoted considerable attention to show that firms can 
purposively transcend their organizational boundaries to improve their innovation 
activities through conscious use of inflows and outflows of knowledge in a 
cooperative relationship with external partners (Browning, Beyer, & Shetler, 1995; 
Brunswicker & Vanhaverbeke, 2015; Chesbrough, 2003; Faems, Janssens, Madhok, 
& Van Looy, 2008; Faems, Van Looy, & Debackere, 2005; Laursen & Salter, 2006; 
West & Bogers, 2014). A recently completed survey of large firms in the United 
States and Europe reports that OI is the pre-eminent mechanism adopted by large 
firms for improving internal innovation. 78% of firms in our sample have engaged 
in OI; the financial support for OI has also clearly increased for 61% of survey 
respondents over the last two years (Brunswicker, Chesbrough, & Bagherzadeh, 
2016). 
Open and collaborative innovation can be enacted in a variety of contexts with a 
range of external partners, such as customers, suppliers, universities, competitors, 
and start-ups (Chesbrough & Brunswicker, 2014; Faems et al., 2005; Foss, Laursen, 
& Pedersen, 2011; Laursen & Salter, 2006). To capitalize on the knowledge of 
these external partners, firms use a variety of mechanisms. Alliances (Faems et al., 
2008; Franco & Haase, 2015), joint ventures (Ariño & De La Torre, 1998), consortia 
(Browning et al., 1995), networks (Jarvenpaa & Välikangas, 2014), licensing 
agreements (Li-Ying & Wang, 2015), user communities (Von Hippel, 2001), and 
innovation contests, or innovation crowdsourcing (Afuah & Tucci, 2012; Malhotra 
& Majchrzak, 2014) are examples of mechanisms that firms apply in order to 
access, generate, channel and organize external knowledge. Scholars have 
presented empirical evidence that tapping into external knowledge allows firms to 
improve their ability to solve their innovation problems in a more effective and 
efficient way, thereby leading to greater innovation performance (Browning et al., 
1995; Doz, 1996; Foss et al., 2011; Laursen & Salter, 2006; Ness, 2009). For 
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example, the partnership between DreamWorks, an animation technology leader, 
and Hewlett-Packard resulted in a groundbreaking new technology for rendering 
films (Brunswicker, Bagherzadeh, & Lamb, 2016). Also, recent case study on the 
Lilly Open Innovation Drug Discovery (OIDD) platform depicts they are tapping into 
the knowledge of a large number of scientists and researchers to successfully 
explore new molecule types with the specific biological activity in a more open 
manner. This OIDD platform gained for Lilly access to a significant amount of 
previously inaccessible chemical diversity. It also has allowed for the identification 
of many scientists and researchers doing great work that were previously 
unknown to Lilly, thereby supporting Lilly’s internal research teams, which are 
focused on the development of new drugs and biopharmaceuticals (Brunswicker 
et al., 2016). 
As much promise as openness and collaboration can bring to innovation potential, 
far too many collaborations have been documented as failure cases (Ariño & De La 
Torre, 1998; De Rond & Bouchikhi, 2004; Faems et al., 2008; Park & Ungson, 
2001). For instance, research on international joint venture termination shows 
that approximately 90% of collaborations are unexpectedly terminated earlier 
than reaching the initially planned goals (Makino, Chan, Isobe, & Beamish, 2007). 
An equity joint venture (JV) between two companies active in the chemical and 
cleaning-products industries, intending to develop a new ecological cleaning liquid 
for the U.S. and Asian markets, was unsuccessful and unfruitful as “the partners 
announced in September their decision to dissolve the JV as of December 1993” 
(Ariño & De La Torre, 1998: 319). De Rond and Buchikhi (2004) report how the IOC 
partners’ different and opposing views about compounds-developing technology, 
led to tensions between them, thereby stopping the collaboration before 
completing the partnership’s initial goals. Similarly, recent OI case studies show 
that unexpected tensions arising from partner differences, such as conflicting 
interests, views, goals, etc., during the collaboration, if not understood and 
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accommodated effectively, can delay the project in achieving its predefined 
objectives, and even stop the project prematurely (Brunswicker et al., 2016). 
Collaboration process can and should be better managed, resulting in fewer 
failures and greater levels of innovation. Consequently, managing the 
collaboration with external partners to successfully complete the collaboration, 
while vital to progress innovation, is currently quite challenging, even fraught with 
high risk for failure. I argue that the main question needing to be addressed to 
advance the cause of innovation on the literature of OI and IOC has shifted from 
‘open and collaborative’ versus ‘closed’ innovation towards the appropriate 
governance mechanisms for guiding collaboration processes to successful 
innovation outcomes. ‘Governance mechanism’ is defined as a set of managerial 
and coordination activities adopted by partners to organize collaboration process 
including communication channels between the partners, decision making 
processes, roles and processes required for collaboration, incentive structures 
used to motivate involved partners, and property rights control (Grandori, 1997 
Faems et al., 2008 Nickerson & Zenger, 2004).  
The formation phase in collaboration refers to the point when initial agreements 
have been established and the partners are expected to start active work towards 
joint objectives. A number of authors have argued that the governance of 
collaboration processes after the formation phase is a critical mechanism to study 
why some open and collaborative projects (henceforth “collaborative project”) 
succeed while others fail. (Das & Teng, 2000; De Rond & Bouchikhi, 2004; Doz, 
1996; Greve, Baum, Mitsuhashi, & Rowley, 2010). These authors have 
concentrated upon the role of specific factors affecting the governance, such as 
partners’ expectation about efficiency of collaboration (Doz, 1996) or performance 
approach. But such a narrow focus can result in a constrained understanding of 
the governance of collaboration process itself. Moreover, other scholars argue 
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that selection of the governance mechanism for collaborative projects in the 
formation phase can play a crucial role in project successes. Most studies have 
targeted firm-level and industry-level characteristics as determinants of 
governance mechanism (van de Vrande, Vanhaverbeke, & Duysters, 2009). These 
studies provide us with limited understanding, ignoring particular attributes of the 
project itself (Felin & Zenger, 2014). 
Thus, there is a need for a more comprehensive and holistic view to study the 
governance of collaboration process. The main objective of this dissertation is to 
create such a comprehensive view, in order to advance our understanding of open 
and collaborative innovation governance. This dissertation aims to address the 
following overall question: How do firms govern the collaboration process with 
external partners to increase the likelihood that their open and collaborative 
innovation projects are successfully completed? 
1.2 Theoretical Background 
To address the overall research objective driving my research in this dissertation, 
the current section provides an overview of the theoretical background. This 
overview analyzes the current literature on interorganizational collaboration 
dynamics, knowledge sharing-protecting tension in collaborative projects, and 
project attributes and their role in governance mechanism selection to frame 
specific research questions as the foundations for the following chapters. 
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1.2.1 Interorganizaitonal Collaboration Dynamics 
Despite the research interest in the governance of open and collaborative 
innovation, current studies have provided only a limited understanding of the 
nature of governance by focusing primarily on static initial factors affecting the 
governance mechanism, such as contractual interface structure and expectation of 
performance, rather than explicitly studying the dynamics that occur during 
collaboration and analyzing how these dynamics affect governance and outcomes.   
Numerous studies in the IOC and OI literature have argued for a focus on 
collaboration dynamics as an important building block in understanding the 
governance of collaboration process and why some collaborative projects with the 
same initial conditions thrive and others underperform (Ariño & De La Torre, 1998; 
Das & Teng, 2000; Doz, 1996; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). Ring and Van de Ven 
(1994) suggest that certain dynamics occur at different stages of a collaborative 
project that can affect the governance of collaboration. Similarly, evolutionary 
phases of collaborative projects are highlighted as a critical factor affecting 
governance (Doz, 1996). For example, Ariño and De la Torre (1998) and Doz (1996) 
suggest that collaborative projects require continuous learning about outcome 
discrepancies, referring to failures to achieve expected value from the 
collaboration. Then, the appropriate governance mechanism should be applied to 
respond to the outcome discrepancies; otherwise, performance failure can stop 
the collaboration. Ness (2009) shows when alliance performance and value 
disappear for the partners and they fail to reach their initially planned goals, they 
reduce their contributions and commitments to project. Another study indicates 
that since the collaboration requires discourse and the individuals may have little 
prior joint working experience, misunderstandings may arise, creating the need for 
unexpected modifications of governance to support effective communications 
(Hardy, Lawrence, & Grant, 2005). Faems et al., (2008) argue that firm attention to 
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the dynamics of collaboration is needed to enable the partners to adopt an 
appropriate governance mechanism characterized by the formalization of levels of 
monitoring, task division, and information flows. They show that, over time, the 
partners in an R&D alliance gradually adapted the governance mechanism by 
increasing the number of technical meetings to involve more people from each 
partnered firm in joint problem definition and solution generation in order to 
effectively respond to increasing technical problems. Moreover, Das and Teng 
(2000) argue, tensions between competition and cooperation give rise to 
imbalances in behaviors of partners to operate the joint collaboration; thus, a 
proper governance mechanism is required to accommodate to changes in 
tensions.   
In sum, these studies highlight the critical effect of dynamics occurring during the 
course of collaborative projects upon understanding the governance mechanism 
of collaborative projects. Also, they argue that the source of the dynamics, 
originally promoted by Das and Teng (2002), has a critical effect on how the 
governance mechanism can be framed. Although these studies have provided 
important insights, each of them only focuses on a single case related to specific 
form of collaborative project among various forms, including alliances, research 
and development projects, buyer-supplier agreements, networks, joint-ventures, 
and consortia. It seems there is a need to create a comprehensive understanding, 
based on multiple cases, of the nature of dynamics over time, the sources for 
these dynamics, and the effects of these dynamics on project performance among 
different forms of collaboration. This comprehensive view provides a strong 
foundation to understand relevant factors with crucial effect on the governance of 
collaborative projects. 
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1.2.2 Knowledge Sharing-Protecting Tension in Collaborative 
Projects  
Partners in collaborative projects tend to facilitate flexible dialogue and 
interaction among involved actors. This greater flexibility results in knowledge 
sharing between the partners, defined as making knowledge accessible for 
involved individuals and actors from each partner firm within the collaborative 
projects (Davenport & Prusak, 1998 Rezazadeh Mehrizi & Bontis, 2009). This 
knowledge sharing leads to expanded capacity for re-conceptualize problems and 
synthesize different knowledge areas relevant to the project, thereby increasing 
the probability of project successes (Browning et al., 1995; Faems et al., 2008). For 
example, Buchel (2000: 652) reports how flexible dialogue among interacting 
individuals from different partner firms was supported as they were allowed to 
“directly call up their counterpart and resolve any differences in understanding”. 
Similarly, in the SEMATECH consortium, partnered firms encouraged flexible 
interaction between involved individuals by adopting “a structure and method 
emphasizing joint problem solving through meetings pervade the organization” 
(Browning et al., 1995: 117). 
Although such flexible interactions support more collaboration between partners, 
it exposes the partner firms to opportunistic risk from unintended over-sharing of 
knowledge where a partner pursues its own goals at the expense of the partner’s 
or joint goals and knowledge (Ariño & De La Torre, 1998; Faems, Janssens, & Van 
Looy, 2010; Heiman & Nickerson, 2004). This creates a fear of opportunistic risk as 
valuable knowledge is subject to potential expropriation by partners who may 
abuse unintended shared knowledge for their own benefits and interests (Faems 
et al., 2010 Heiman & Nickerson, 2004) which may harm the partner firms by 
losing their intellectual properties and competitive position (Jarvenpaa & 
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Majchrzak, 2016). Therefore, this fear of opportunistic risk gives rise to defensive 
behavior of partner firms and unwillingness to collaborate (De Rond & Bouchikhi, 
2004; Jarvenpaa & Majchrzak, 2016; Jarvenpaa & Välikangas, 2014) for knowledge 
protection, defined as safeguard against the expropriation of knowledge and the 
hazard of opportunism (Heiman & Nickerson, 2004). For example, in collaboration 
between an imaging company (Graph) and a stock-quoted inkjet technology 
company (Jet), Jet management explicitly asked their engineers “not to share 
information on technological problems due to the fear of unintended knowledge 
spillovers and losing command over the project” (Faems et al., 2008: 1063). 
According to the dialectical view, there is inherent tension between the need to 
share and the need to protect due to two opposing and contradictory needs that 
compete with each other in collaborative projects (Poole & Van de Ven, 1989 Van 
de Ven, 1992). This knowledge sharing-protecting tension is caused by the 
presence of contradiction between sharing and protecting of knowledge and the 
efforts to resolve such contradiction (Das & Teng, 2000). Das and Teng (2000) 
argue that tension between sharing and protecting results in imbalances in 
behaviors of partners for joint collaboration. The partners need to effectively 
respond to this tension. A recent cross-case systematic analysis of qualitative cases 
on IOCs show that, in successful collaborative projects, the partners are able to 
manage the simultaneous sharing and protecting of knowledge (Majchrzak, 
Jarvenpaa, & Bagherzadeh, 2015). Therefore, knowledge sharing-protecting 
tension should be regulated to support collaboration among partners to 
successfully complete the joint initially planned objectives (Bogers, 2011; Heiman 
& Nickerson, 2004; Jarvenpaa & Majchrzak, 2016). 
One potential solution to regulate this tension is to introduce some form of 
formalization into the collaboration process (Majchrzak et al., 2015). The type of 
formalization receiving the most attention in the open and collaborative 
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innovation literature is legal formalization, such as contracts around IP control 
(Cassiman & Veugelers, 2002; Laursen & Salter, 2014). However, these types of 
formalization may not address more specific activities of the partners, thus, the 
partners may share IP-related knowledge that they should not sharing while they 
are collaborating (Jarvenpaa & Majchrzak, 2016). As a result, in addition to formal 
legal IP control, an alternative conceptualization for formalizing of collaborative 
process is required. This alternative conceptualization can introduce formality into 
the joint collaboration process (also called “joint technology development 
process” in this dissertation) itself by specifying activities and evaluation criteria 
that should be followed by the parties for completing the collaborative project. 
Introducing formality into the joint technology development process decreases 
the uncertainty about required knowledge that should be shared for furthering 
project goals (Avadikyan, Llerena, Matt, Rozan, & Wolff, 2001; Vlaar, Van den 
Bosch, & Volberda, 2006). This formality can create a predictable guidelines about 
what should be shared and what should be protected (Jarvenpaa & Majchrzak, 
2016). This predictability stimulates the partners for self-monitoring and 
regulation of knowledge sharing and protecting tension during the joint projects to 
avoid the opportunistic risk. As a result, flexible interaction between the parties 
without losing critical knowledge is supported, thus increasing the likelihood of 
success of open and collaborative innovation projects.  
1.2.3 Governance Mechanism and Collaborative Project 
Attributes  
Partners can apply various governance mechanisms including partnerships, 
licensing agreements, communities, innovation contests, and innovation 
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crowdsourcing for their collaborative projects (Felin & Zenger, 2014). In light of 
the wide variety of governance mechanisms, a key issue for firms is selecting of 
appropriate mechanism. Most existing advice on selection of governance 
mechanism takes a firm-level perspective. Some studies suggest that particular 
firm-level and industry-level characteristics, such as firm size or environmental 
uncertainty, are critical contingencies for the effectiveness of particular 
governance mechanism (van de Vrande et al., 2009). However, advice drawn from 
such studies can mislead our understanding of adoption appropriate governance 
mechanism as the attributes of project constitute the effectiveness of a particular 
mechanism (Afuah & Tucci, 2012; Bianchi, Cavaliere, Chiaroni, Frattini, & Chiesa, 
2011 Chiaroni, Chiesa, & Frattini, 2009 Felin & Zenger, 2014; Salter, Criscuolo, & 
Ter Wal, 2014). For example, Bianchi et al. (2011) and Chiaroni et al. (2009) show 
that the governance mechanisms that firms select to manage their relationship 
with their external partners in open innovation projects vary along the two stages 
of bio-pharmaceutical R&D process (i.e., drug discovery and drug development), 
because each stage is characterized by different needs for exploration and 
exploitation of knowledge. Based on the problem solving perspective, complex 
problems, in which the solution depends upon a large number of highly 
interdependent tasks, elements, or knowledge sets that make complex problems 
less decomposable (Fernandes & Simon, 1999), need extensive dialogue and 
knowledge exchange to ensure sufficient understanding to progress to an 
appropriate solution (Nickerson & Zenger, 2004). For example, in a technological 
partnership to develop a new technology for rendering movies, the technological 
problem was complex. This technological problem was comprised of different 
elements and knowledge sets related to data storage, cloud computing, and 
animation technologies, and these elements are interdependent and should be 
considered at the same time to develop a successful technological solution 
(Brunswicker et al., 2016).  
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For such complex problems, governance mechanisms that support knowledge 
exchange and dialogue may lead to greater project outcomes. Thus, partnerships, 
in which trusted knowledge exchange is possible, can be the appropriate 
mechanism (Felin & Zenger, 2014). In contrast, simple problems usually require 
little knowledge sharing and integration (Nickerson & Zenger, 2004). Thus, 
licensing agreements or competitive innovation contests, as those create strong 
incentive effects, can be adopted as proper mechanism. 
Although scholars have started to consider problem attributes as important 
factors affecting the selection of governance mechanism, there is still lack of 
understanding. Particularly, there is no strong empirical evidence regarding the 
role of problem attributes in the extant literature on open and collaborative 
innovation. Thus, a comparative cross-project analysis is needed to have a more 
integrated and nuanced advice on the relationship between micro-level project 
attributes and different governance mechanisms.  
Based on the recent more theoretical and comparative discussion of governance 
mode for open innovation (Felin & Zenger, 2014), two main attributes of problem, 
including problem complexity and hiddenness of required knowledge, are 
considered in this dissertation. In addition of these two problem attributes, the 
tacitness or noncodifiability of problem (Heiman & Nickerson, 2004) and 
modularity of problem are also considered as problem attributes that can affect 
the selection of search approach in the literature (Afuah & Tucci, 2012). 
Hiddenness of required knowledge is defined in terms of the degree to which the 
sources or locations of knowledge deemed relevant to develop a solution for the 
problem at hand are known to a firm and project team (Felin & Zenger, 2014; 
Fernandes & Simon, 1999). In other words, firms and project teams have no idea 
which external partners may have the relevant knowledge required for solving 
their innovation problem. For example, as an open innovation manager at Bosch 
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described “we knew that there were technological [solutions] to fulfill our 
technical requirements” to develop a non- electrochemical energy storage 
technology but we had no idea about the optimal and best solutions and where 
we could find them (Brunswicker et al., 2016).   
1.3 Specific Research Questions: Addressing the Overall 
Research Objective 
The main objective of this dissertation is to advance our understanding of how 
firms govern the collaboration process with external partners in order to 
successfully complete the joint collaborative project. Three specific research 
objectives are framed to address this overall objective.  
The first objective is understating the nature of dynamics in collaborative projects 
and how these dynamics affect governance mechanism to have successful 
outcomes. Thus, I seek to answer the following question (Research question 1) to 
address the first objective: How do firms manage the dynamics of collaboration 
process with external sources to successfully complete their open and collaborative 
innovation projects? 
The second objective is to examine the role of introducing formality into the joint 
collaboration process (i.e., joint technology development process) with the aim of 
managing the knowledge sharing-protecting tension to have successful outcomes. 
This is addressed by research question 2: Does the use of a formalized joint 
technology development process help to increase the likelihood that an open 
innovation project with external sources is successfully completed?   
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The final objective is to explore how the governance mechanism of open and 
collaborative project (is called “open innovation mode” in this dissertation as well) 
is affected by two problem attributes namely, problem complexity and hiddenness 
of knowledge. Research question 3 addresses this final objective: Which open 
innovation modes do managers choose for projects characterized by different 
levels of complexity and hiddenness of knowledge?  
1.4 Structure of Dissertation 
This dissertation is a monograph based on a three-article format. Each of the three 
articles1 aims to address one of the interconnected questions derived from the 
overall research objective. The first article (Chapter 2) is a systematic analysis of 
the research literature on qualitative cases describing dynamics of collaborative 
projects to understand the nature of dynamics and their effects on governance 
and project performance (Research question 1). The second article (Chapter 3), an 
empirical survey-based study, is built based on one of the main implications of the 
findings from this review to understand the role of collaboration process 
formalization in the regulation of knowledge sharing-protecting tension (Research 
question 2). Also, the question addressed by the third article (Chapter 4) is derived 
by a relevant implication of the findings of the second article to explore the role of 
project attributes (i.e., complexity and hiddenness of required knowledge) in 
governance selection. Finally, last chapter provides an integrated overview of 
findings, theoretical and managerial implications, limitations, and future 
                                                        
1 Each article has its own abstract, introduction, research gap, question addressed, literature 
review, methodology, results, and discussion parts. References are reported at the end of 
respective chapters.   
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researches. A summary of the structure of dissertation and relationship between 
three articles is presented in Figure 1.1. In the following sections, I will briefly 
explain the content and main implications of each article as well as the 
relationship between all three articles. 
 
1.4.1 Article I: A Review of Interorganizational Collaboration 
Dynamics 
In the first article (Chapter 2), in order to better understand the governance of the 
collaboration process and its effect on performance, a cross-case systematic 
analysis of dynamics is conducted across different forms of open and collaborative 
innovations such as alliances, joint ventures, consortia, and networks. Only 
longitudinal qualitative cases of collaborative projects are included in this article to 
capture the nature of the dynamics. There is now an accumulated wealth of 
longitudinal studies on collaborative projects that explore processes and dynamics 
of collaboration2. Conducting this systematic review serves a crucial purpose for 
this dissertation. It summarizes what is known about how collaborative project 
characteristics change over time (e.g., interaction style dynamics, decision making 
control dynamics, and organizational structure dynamics), the sources for 
dynamics of characteristic (e.g., between-partner differences), patterns of 
dynamics, and the effect of these patterns on project performance, thereby 
identifying relevant factors related to governance of collaborative process that can 
drive the other two articles (Chapter 3 and 4). Thus, this review provides a strong 
foundation for this dissertation to develop deeper insight into how firms govern 
the collaboration process to successfully complete their collaborative projects.
                                                        
2 22 projects published in the top-tier journals, such as Academy of Management Journal, Journal 
of Management Studies, etc., are included in the study. 
  
 
 
Overall research question: How do firms govern the collaboration process with external partners to increase the likelihood that their open and collaborative  
innovation projects are successfully completed? 
Chapter 2 (Article I): A systematic analysis of the research literature on 
case studies describing IOCs dynamics  
 
Main implication: In successful IOCs, the knowledge sharing and protecting  
tension is more likely to be regulated by introducing formality into the 
collaboration process.   
Chapter 3 (Article II): An empirical survey-based study to examine the role of 
introducing formality into the collaboration process in managing knowledge  
sharing and knowledge protecting tension toward successful outcomes.  
 
Main implication: The problem attribute (i.e., complexity) affects the  
importance of process formality in collaborative projects, indicating that  
formalization is a project-specific concept. Thus, to study and building theory  
related to governance mechanism of collaborative projects, we need to consider 
 the role of problem attributes. 
  
Chapter 4 (Article III): A mixed method empirical study  
(survey and qualitative case study) to examine how the  
governance mechanism of a collaborative project is affected by  
problem attributes namely, problem complexity and  
hiddenness of knowledge).  
Chapter 5: General conclusion, implications, and future research 
Figure 1.1: Structure of the Dissertation 16 | P
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One of the main implications of the findings from this review is the presence of 
simultaneous cooperative (refers to open knowledge exchange and sharing among 
the partners in the collaborative projects) and competitive (refers to limited and 
constrained exchange and sharing of knowledge) interaction style between the 
partners. Moreover, this review shows the presence of duality in changes in 
interaction style over time in collaborative projects, meaning both changes of 
increased competitive interaction over time, and changes in increased cooperative 
interaction over time. For example, over time in a research and development 
collaborative project, the two partners increasingly shared sensitive technological 
information (Faems et al., 2008). In contrast, Ness (2009) reports how changes in a 
goal led to highly contentious interaction style and less knowledge sharing over 
time in an alliance while initially the relationship was dominated by cooperative 
style and information sharing. This systematic review shows that the shift from 
competitive to cooperative (more knowledge sharing between partners over time) 
is primarily caused by allowing project technical teams to have control over the 
decision as the team-based decision making can increase flexible dialog and 
interaction among involved technical staff from all partners.  
Comparing change in interaction style between successful and unsuccessful cases 
shows that successful collaborative projects are more likely to have an increased 
use of cooperative interaction style and knowledge sharing over time, coexisting 
with competitive style and hiding knowledge. Thus, the two interaction styles (i.e., 
simultaneous sharing and hiding of knowledge) appears to be required to ensure 
effective knowledge sharing to successfully complete the joint project and at the 
same time protecting knowledge from potential partner opportunistic behavior. In 
other words, in successful projects, the partners are able to manage the 
simultaneous knowledge sharing and protecting (i.e., regulating knowledge 
sharing and protecting tension). Based on this review, knowledge sharing and 
protecting tension seems to be regulated by the introduction of procedural 
18 | Page 
 
formality to collaboration process (i.e., formalization and standardization of roles 
and processes of collaborative project) to have successful outcomes. Thus, 
increased knowledge sharing between the partners over time is attributable to 
team-based decision making and the introduction of process formalization. At 
first, the presence of both procedural formality and team decision making in 
collaborative projects seems to be a paradox between formality and informality 
(team-based decision making). However, instead of a paradox, I believe that 
involved teams of technical staff in decision making may particularly require such 
formality due to the syndrome that individuals working within collaborative 
projects must simultaneously both trust and distrust their partners to protect 
themselves from opportunism. The formal procedures make the team-based 
decision making more feasible by reducing the possibility of opportunism. This 
important finding highlights the need to examine the role of procedural formality 
in the regulation of knowledge sharing and protecting tension that arises from the 
simultaneous need to trust and distrust of partners in the collaborative projects.  
The second article aims to deepen our understanding of this main finding based on 
a survey-based empirical study.  
1.4.2 Article II: How to Manage the Downside of Deep 
Engagement with External Sources in Open Innovation 
Projects 
The second article (Chapter 3) is focused on studying the role of introducing 
formality into the collaboration process for managing knowledge sharing and 
knowledge protecting tension toward successful outcomes. This article is an 
empirical study based on a sample of 82 open innovation projects collected from 
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large firms in the United States and Europe through survey. The results clearly 
indicate that in order to manage the knowledge sharing-protecting tension, 
process formality seems to have a positive effect on projects outcomes. 
Likewise, the results of this article show that the positive relation between the 
level of formalization and project performance is made even stronger when the 
problem being solved is more complex. This indicates that as collaborative projects 
undertake more complex problems, the importance of process formality in 
creating successful innovation outcomes increases. The findings of this article 
clearly show that the problem attribute (i.e., complexity) affects the importance of 
process formality in collaborative projects, indicating that formalization is a 
project-specific concept. The main implication of this finding is that only focusing 
on firm level characteristics (firm-level aggregated data) may lead to incomplete 
understanding (Du, Leten, & Vanhaverbeke, 2014). Thus, this implication suggests 
that for studying and building theory related to open and collaborative innovation 
particularly, adopting governance mechanism for collaborative projects, we have 
to consider not only industry- (van de Vrande et al., 2009) and firm-level 
characteristics, but also the role of problem attributes (Bianchi et al., 2011 
Chiaroni et al., 2009 Felin & Zenger, 2014). The third article (Chapter 4) enhances 
our understanding of how the governance mechanism of open and collaborative 
project is affected by problem attributes. 
1.4.3 Article III: What’s Your ‘Open Innovation Mode’? 
Problem Types and Open Innovation Governance Modes 
The main focus of the third article (Chapter 4) is on understanding the appropriate 
governance mechanism of collaboration with external partners (called open 
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innovation mode in this article) based on problem attributes. In this article, a two-
step approach is taken by combining a survey-based study (survey database of 104 
open innovation projects in large firms in Europe and the United States) with 
multiple case study analysis (6 open innovation projects from large firms). The 
results clearly reveal that the problem type is associated with a particular open-
innovation mode. Market and contractual modes (such as licensing) are associated 
with simple problems for which the required solution knowledge can also be easily 
identified by firms. The open innovation platform (such as contests, 
intermediaries, tournaments) is a proper mode in which to solve simple problems 
with unknown required knowledge. In such cases, firms may use the crowd to 
identify hidden knowledge sources. Partnerships (such as alliances and joint 
ventures) seem to be an appropriate mode for complex problems for which the 
required solution is known for firms. Moreover, the results of this study show that 
the selection of open innovation modes is affected by the interaction of the two 
attributes as well. For example, for simple problems (type 1 and 2) they can adopt 
either open innovation markets or open innovation platforms. But, open 
innovation market is preferred for problem type 1 as the location of knowledge for 
solving problem is known for project teams so that they can make a contract with 
external partners to solve their problem. By contrast, for problem type 2, project 
teams have no idea about the location of the required knowledge. As a result, they 
prefer to engage in open innovation platforms to access a wide range of potential 
external sources. Two different open innovation modes are adopted for the simple 
problem based on the level of hiddenness. Thus, the two attributes should be 
considered at the same time (the interaction between them) to select the 
appropriate open innovation mode. 
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1.5 Contribution of Dissertation 
Taken together, the three articles of this dissertation aim to provide a 
comprehensive and holistic understanding of governance of open and 
collaborative innovation by studying the nature of collaboration dynamics and 
their role in governance mechanisms for project successes, the role of procedural 
formality in regulation of the knowledge sharing-protecting tension, and the role 
of problem attributes (i.e., complexity and hiddenness of required knowledge) in 
selection of governance mechanisms of collaborative projects. Findings of this 
dissertation have relevant theoretical contributions for extant literature on IOC 
and OI.  
This dissertation has theoretical implication for research literature on IOCs 
dynamics with findings dualities in IOC characteristics (such as interaction style 
between partners and decision making control) as important descriptors of 
dynamics affecting governance of collaboration. The results presented in this 
study also have implications for coopetition literature (Bengtsson & Kock, 2000; 
Bengtsson, Wilson, Bengtsson, Eriksson, & Wincent, 2010; Ritala & Hurmelinna-
Laukkanen, 2009) by suggesting how the tension between cooperation and 
competition can be regulated toward successful outcomes by introducing 
procedural formality and using teams of technical staff for decision making. This 
dissertation suggests that process formalization may support the legal 
formalization related to IP control (Cassiman & Veugelers, 2002; Laursen & Salter, 
2014)  to reduce the concern over knowledge sharing and opportunistic behavior 
of external partners. Moreover, my findings have contribution to self-regulatory 
theory (Jarvenpaa & Majchrzak, 2016), arguing the importance of flexible 
interaction among involved individuals from partners for regulating sharing and 
protecting tensions, with the suggestion of introducing formality to support this 
flexible interaction in which decisions about sharing and protecting are made by 
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individuals. Similarly, the process formality presented makes critical contributions 
to research on relational mechanisms for governing collaborative projects (Ring & 
Van de Ven, 1992, 1994) with the suggestion that  process formality can help 
building trust (i.e., relational governance) by reducing the opportunistic risk of 
knowledge sharing. Many studies have indicated that developing a dynamic 
capability is required for firms interested in collaborative innovation to succeed 
(Jarvenpaa & Majchrzak, 2016; Schepker, Oh, Martynov, & Poppo, 2014). The 
current research suggests what such a dynamic capability looks like. Finally, this 
dissertation shows that in studying and building theory on the governance of 
collaboration with partners to make use of external knowledge, we need to 
consider to micro-level variables such as project attributes as well (West, Salter, 
Vanhaverbeke, & Chesbrough, 2014).  
1.6 Presentation and Scholarly Contribution 
Three articles of this dissertation are in different stages of publication as 
summarized in Table 1.1. The first article, co-authored with Dr. Ann Majchrzak and 
Dr. Sirkka L. Jarvenpa, was published in the Journal of Management (with Impact 
Factor 2015: 6.071 and first Quartile) in July 2015. The second article, co-authored 
with Dr. Ann Majchrzak and Dr. Sabine Brunswicker, has been submitted to the 
Open and User Innovation Conference (OUI) 2016 - Harvard Business School 
(under review). The final article, written with Dr. Sabine Brunswicker, was revised 
and resubmitted (under the second round of review) to the California 
Management Review (CMR) in late February 2016.  
   
 
 
Table 1.1: Presentation and Scholarly Contribution 
Title Authorship Journal Status Conference and Seminar Presentations 
Article I: A Review of 
Interorganizational 
Collaboration Dynamics  
 
Ann Majchrzak,  
Sirkka L. Jarvenpa, & 
Mehdi Bagherzadeh 
Journal of Management 
(JOM) (Impact Factor  
2015: 6.071  
Ranking: Business 3/115 
and 4* in the ABS journal 
ranking) 
Published (July 
2015,Vol, 41, 5: PP. 
1338-1360) 
- Presented at a research seminar at  
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona 
(UAB), Barcelona, Spain 
- Presented at a research seminar at 
NOVA School of Business and Economics, 
Lisbon, Portugal 
 
Article II: How to 
Manage the Downside of 
Deep Engagement with 
External Sources in Open 
Innovation Projects 
Mehdi Bagherzadeh, 
Ann Majchrzak & 
Sabine Brunswicker   
 
Targeted for Organization 
Science 
Submitted to the  
Open and User 
Innovation 
Conference (OUI) 
2016, Harvard 
Business School, 
Boston (under 
review) 
 
Article III: What’s Your 
‘Open Innovation 
Mode’? Problem Types 
and Open Innovation 
Governance Modes 
 
Mehdi Bagherzadeh 
&  Sabine 
Brunswicker  
 
California Management 
Review (CMR) (Impact 
Factor  
2015: 1.667 
And top 45 financial 
journals, and 3 in the ABS 
journal ranking) 
Revised and 
resubmitted in late 
February (under the 
second round of 
review) 
- Initial version presented at the 2nd 
Annual World Open Innovation 
Conference (WOIC) 2015 (awarded a top 
four best student paper)  
- A modified version presented at the 
DRUID Academy Conference 2016, France   
- Latest version presented at the 
Barcelona Research Workshop, May 2016, 
IESE Business School 
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Chapter 2: A Review of Interorganizational 
Collaboration Dynamics3 
2.1 Abstract  
A selected review of the research literature on qualitative case studies describing 
interorganizational collaborations (IOCs) yielded 22 longitudinal cases that address 
dynamics, or changes, that occur during IOCs. We systematically review the cases 
                                                        
3 This article was published in the Journal of Management (JOM): Majchrzak, A., Jarvenpaa, S. L., & 
Bagherzadeh, M. (2015). “A Review of Interorganizational Collaboration Dynamics”, Journal of 
Management, 41(5), 1338-1360.  
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for the sources and effects of these IOC dynamics on outcomes. We find six 
distinct patterns of IOC dynamics varying in complexity from a simple binary loop 
to multiloop recursive flows. We also find that the more complex dynamic 
patterns are associated with successful outcomes. This review highlights directions 
for future research with the aim to advance the literature on IOC dynamics. 
2.2 Introduction  
Interorganizational collaboration (IOC) is defined as “a cooperative, inter-
organizational relationship that is negotiated in an ongoing communicative 
process, and which relies on neither market nor hierarchical mechanisms of 
control” (Hardy, Phillips, & Lawrence, 2003: 323). There have been many calls in 
the IOC literature for a focus on dynamics of IOCs to explain why IOCs with the 
same characteristics thrive and others underperform (Das & Teng, 2000; De Rond 
& Bouchikhi, 2004; Greve, Baum, Mitsuhashi, & Rowley, 2010; Park & Ungson, 
2001. Despite these calls, this is the first review we know of that provides a 
crosscase systematic analysis of the nature of these dynamics across different 
forms of IOCs, such as alliances, joint ventures, consortia, network, and buyer-
supplier arrangements. The review focuses on dynamics that occur during IOCs, 
their sources, and how these dynamics affect outcomes. We define IOC dynamics 
generally here (with more details provided in the next section) as changes in the 
conditions (e.g., goals), processes (e.g., organizational structure), or mechanisms 
(e.g., interaction style) of an IOC. Our focus is beyond the initial conditions 
(sometimes referred to as the formation, initiation, or “start-up” phase) of IOCs as 
these aspects have already been reviewed (Schepker, Oh, Martynov, & Poppo, 
2014). Instead, we examine dynamics as IOCs execute or function (Das & Teng, 
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2002; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994) after the initial contracts have been established. 
We are exclusively interested in dynamics pertaining to IOCs. This approach yields 
a focused and bounded review on IOC dynamics. 
This review is intended to complement the many reviews that focus on specific 
forms of IOCs, such as alliance partnerships and joint ventures (e.g., Brouthers & 
Hennart, 2007; Shi,Sun, & Prescott, 2012; Spekman, Forbes, Isabella, & MacAvoy, 
1998; Wassmer, 2010),buyer-supplier agreements (e.g., McCutcheon & Stuart, 
2000), networks (e.g., Phelps, Heidl,& Wadhwa, 2012; Provan, Fish, & Sydow, 
2007), and research-and-development consortia (e.g., Eisner, Rahman, & Korn, 
2009). Additionally, this review is intended to complement reviews of prevailing 
theoretical perspectives, since the dynamic patterns identified in this paper can 
provide suggestions for providing dynamic elements for a range of extant theories. 
While the discussion of specific theoretical suggestions is beyond the scope of the 
current work, such theories as structuration (Sydow & Windeler, 1998, 2003), 
relational (Ring & Van de Ven, 1992), agency (Geringer & Woodcock, 1995), and 
transactional (Williamson, 1991) theories can benefit from increased attention to 
dynamics. 
Our review indicates that IOCs are exceedingly unstable. We found instability to be 
present in a variety of situations. We found that instability may surface as IOCs 
start with certain goals and contracts that need to be renegotiated (e.g., Doz, 
1996; Faems, Janssens, Madhok, & Van Looy, 2008). Instability may arise as people 
assigned to IOCs are replaced (e.g., Ariño & De la Torre, 1998; Browning, Beyer, & 
Shetler, 1995) or leave to join competitor partner firms (De Rond & Bouchikhi, 
2004). Instability can also come about as partner firms withdraw from the IOC 
because of government regulations (White, 2005). When strategic needs of each 
firm begin to overlap, a discourse can change from collaborative to competitive 
(e.g., Ariño & De la Torre, 1998; Buchel, 2000; Doz, 1996). Or alternatively, the 
discourse can take a form of more cooperative interactions as mutual 
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understanding and trust evolve in the collaboration (e.g., Ness, 2009; Ness & 
Haugland, 2005). 
Importantly, the instability can produce successful IOC outcomes. The review 
suggests that instability, rather than being associated with improper design and 
planning or poor management (Franko, 1971; Parkhe, 1996), is an inherent 
characteristic of successful IOCs. Moreover, whereas extant literature has 
suggested that dynamics occur at the boundaries between evolutionary phases of 
IOCs (Ariño & De la Torre, 1998; Doz, 1996; Jay, 2013; Reuer & Ariño, 2002; Ring & 
Van de Ven, 1994), this review demonstrates that dynamics are found to occur 
continuously. Finally, the review discovers different patterns of dynamics as IOCs 
respond to different sources of change. Some of these patterns are associated 
with successful IOC outcomes, and others are associated with unsuccessful IOC 
outcomes. 
This review comes at a critical point in the management literature. There is broad 
recognition in the literature that environments, organizations, and 
interorganizational relationships are dynamic. However, there has not been an in-
depth review of the patterns of dynamics within IOCs. Moreover, there is much we 
can learn by examining such dynamics across different forms of IOCs. This review 
summarizes what is known about how IOCs change over time, thereby identifying 
directions for future theorizing. 
2.3 Definition of Dynamics 
We define dynamics broadly as any change in the form or state of the IOC over 
time (Van de Ven & Poole, 1995). Our broad definition allows us to examine a 
variety of more specific dynamics defined in the IOC literature, including: self-
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reinforcing processes and feedback cycles (Browning et al., 1995; Salk & Shenkar, 
2001); relationships of social structures across multiple levels of analysis (Berends, 
van Burg, & van Raaij, 2011); generative mechanisms that cause observed events 
to happen (Buchel, 2000); changes in contractual interface structures (Faems et 
al., 2008), and tensions and dialectics with recursive interplay (De Rond & 
Bouchikhi, 2004; Jay, 2013; Vlaar, Van Den Bosch, & Volberda, 2007; White, 2005). 
To capture these variations in definitions of dynamics, we examined longitudinal 
case studies of IOCs for two forms of dynamics: a) dynamics as a change in an IOC 
characteristic, and b) dynamics as patterns of relationships between sources of 
change, and changes in the IOC characteristics.   
Dynamics as Changes in IOC Characteristics: As IOCs execute their plans, 
characteristics of the IOCs may change in some way. These shifts can be 
qualitative or quantitative. Qualitative shifts may be changes in form, function, or 
emphasis placed on a particular characteristic, such as a change in how decisions 
are made in the IOC. Quantitative shifts refer to increases or decreases in an 
existing characteristic of an IOC, where the shift could occur in linear or non-linear 
ways, such as sudden jumps versus gradual increments. For example, an increasing 
number of new job roles for an IOC indicate a quantitative shift in the number of 
roles. 
Dynamics as Patterns of Relationships between Sources and IOC Characteristics: 
Several models of IOCs proposed by scholars mention that IOCs involve feedback 
cycles between sources of change and effects of changes on the IOCs (De Rond & 
Bouchikhi, 2004; Jay 2013; Vlaar et al., 2007; White 2005). Such a dynamic is 
indicated by change in one IOC characteristic attributable to a particular source, 
with the possibility that the change in the IOC characteristic leads to subsequent 
changes to the source or other IOC characteristics. 
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2.4 Approach 
This review of research on dynamics of IOCs included research-based case studies 
(as opposed to teaching cases) submitted to peer review for methodological rigor. 
Only case studies which had been published or pre-published as forthcoming 
articles in the following general management journals were included: Academy of 
Management Journal, Administrative Science Quarterly, Journal of Management, 
Journal of Management Studies, Management Science, Organization Science, 
Organization Studies, and Strategic Management Journal. These journals have a 
high five-year impact citation factor and are known for their rigorous peer review 
process (Podsakoff, Mackensize, Bachrach, & Podsakoff, 2005; Podsakoff, 
MacKenzie, Podsakoff, & Bachrach, 2008). 
We first screened for articles describing case studies which had been published 
from January 1980 to January 2014 in these journals. We initially limited the 
search to the following keywords: alliances, joint ventures, buyer-supplier, 
licensing, trade association, consortia, interorganizational, co-creation, co-
branding, product development, outsourcing, collaboration, merger, network, 
interfirm, partnership, joint project, and constellation. These keywords are derived 
from a list of inter-organizational relationship forms in Barringer & Harrison (2000) 
and Parmigiani & Rivera-Santos (2011). We also added several search terms, 
including partnership, virtual collaboration, and co-creation. This search yielded 
more than 100 qualitative articles. This compilation excluded quantitative articles 
that statistically examined a single or narrow set of IOC characteristics. 
We then reviewed the 100 qualitative studies to identify those with a longitudinal 
perspective, defined as “research emphasiz[ing] the study of change and 
contain[ing] at minimum three repeated observations on at least one of the 
substantive constructs of interest” (Ployhart & Vandenberg, 2010: 97). We 
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included only cases in which the IOC had progressed beyond the initiation or 
formation stage. In addition, only organizationally motivated IOCs were included, 
excluding IOCs motivated purely for interpersonal advice and friendship. This step 
reduced our sample to a total of 24 articles that contained qualitative case studies 
describing the longitudinal events of an IOC, for periods ranging from 2 years to 30 
years. Several articles contained multiple case studies, yielding 36 longitudinal 
case studies. However, of the 36 cases, only 22 had sufficient detail about the 
dynamics of the case to allow analysis. Therefore, our final sample consisted of 22 
longitudinal cases of dynamics in IOCs. 
For each of the 22 cases, we then examined the cases for the two forms of 
dynamics: changes to IOC characteristics, and patterns of relationships between 
sources and IOC characteristics. We did not predefine categories for 
characteristics that had changed, the form of the changes (such as qualitative or 
quantitative), sources of the changes, or the patterns of relationships between 
sources and changes. Instead, we inductively developed axial codes that we 
introduce as our findings. Our determination of what was changed, sources, and 
patterns were based exclusively on how each case researcher presented the case 
and findings of the case. In addition, we coded for whether the case researcher 
indicated that the case had succeeded or failed, allowing us to explore if dynamics 
were related to IOC outcomes. Of the 22 cases, in 21 cases, the case researchers 
indicated the case was a success or failure. Success was indicated in one of two 
ways: the IOC continued as of the completion of the research, or the IOC had 
achieved its intended outcomes. Failure was indicated as the IOC ending 
prematurely.  
The coding for the 22 cases is listed in Table 2.1. From Table 2.1, three findings 
emerged. Finding 1 focused on the nature of the changes to IOC characteristics, 
Finding 2 focused on the nature of the sources of those changes, and Finding 3 
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focused on the patterns of relationships between sources and IOC characteristics. 
To explore patterns of relationships between sources and IOC characteristics, we 
engaged in additional analysis, which will be explained as part of Finding 3. 
2.5 Finding 1: Multifaceted Dynamics in Each of Six IOC 
Characteristics  
The review identified six characteristics of IOCs that change during the course of 
an IOC, after the initiation or formation stage: (a) IOC goal; (b) IOC contract frame 
(transactional and/or relational); (c) interaction style between the IOC partners 
(competitive and/or cooperative), (d) decision-making control (i.e., how decisions 
about the IOC were made); (e) IOC organizational structure, such as roles and 
procedures; and (f) composition of the actors (organizations and/or individuals) 
involved in the IOC. Changes in more than one IOC characteristic were often 
observed in the cases. Below we define each change as well as provide an example 
for the change, referring to the author and case number in Table 2.1. 
2.5.1 Goal Dynamics 
IOC goal dynamics are changes to the explicit mission or goals established for the 
collaboration. Dynamics were qualitative shifts and adjustments in goals for the 
IOC among partners. Changes in goals were coded according to the case 
researchers’ use of words, such as ”[the IOC partners] widened their cooperation 
over time to include the complete range of civilian products” (Doz, 1996: 69, Case 
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2) and “[the IOC partners decided to] stop the other part of [the] project” (Ness, 
2009: 465, Case 20).  
Changes in goal dynamics include adding a new goal (e.g., Browning et al., 1995, 
Case 1; Boddy, Macbeth, & Wagner, 2000, Case 3; Doz, 1996, Case 2; White, 2005, 
Case 18) or dropping or replacing the original goal (e.g., Ariño & De la Torre, 1998, 
Case 16; De Rond & Bouchikhi, 2004, Case 17; Ness, 2009, Case 20). Adding a new 
goal is exemplified in the SEMATECH consortium case in which the initial goal of 
developing new manufacturing technologies was augmented with a new goal of 
improving the quality of suppliers’ products and services (Browning et al., 1995, 
Case 1). Goal replacement was exemplified in an IOC between a small biotech firm 
and a large pharmaceutical company that initially focused on the discovery of 
novel chemical compounds but was later changed to technology transfer (De Rond 
& Bouchikhi, 2004, Case 17). 
 
 
2.5.2 Contract Frame Dynamics 
An IOC contract frame refers to the formal (i.e., transactional) and informal (i.e., 
relational) elements in the interorganizational agreements that establish the 
nature of the collaboration among the partners, including knowledge-transfer 
methods, intellectual property provisions, shared risks, and mutual benefits. The 
transactional elements mitigate threats from opportunistic behavior when a 
partner pursues its own goals; relational elements focus on maximizing joint 
benefits from a close trusted and interdependent relationship (Poppo & Zenger, 
2002). Both transactional and relational elements exist simultaneously in IOCs but 
at varying degrees of emphasis. We define dynamics for this characteristic as 
changes in this emphasis. Changes in emphasis are based on the case researchers’ 
own words, such as ”loss of trust” (Ariño & De la Torre, 1998: 322, Case 16) and 
“increased interpartner trust” (Inkpen & Pien, 2006: 801, Case 7). 
  
Table 2.1: Changes to IOC Characteristics, Sources for Dynamics, Patterns of Dynamics and Outcomes 
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We found changes in emphasis on both relational and transactional frames. 
Increased emphasis on relational elements was exemplified in a number of cases 
(Boddy et al., 2000, Case 3; Browning et al., 1995, Case 1; Inkpen & Pien, 2006, 
Case 7; Ness & Haugland, 2005, Case 6; Vlaar et al., 2007, Case 8; White, 2005, 
Case 18). One such example is the Esthetique- L’Oreal IOC, where initially, “the 
relationship between the two firms was transaction based and relied extensively 
on a formal contract” (Ness, 2009: 460, Case 10), “but over time, governance 
became increasingly relational,” coexisting with the transactional elements (Ness, 
2009: 458, Case 10). Increased emphasis on transactional elements of the contract 
framing over time is exemplified in the COOP-Lilleborg supplier retailer 
relationship, in which both partners had initially begun the IOC based on trust and 
value creation for both parties (relational emphasis), but as the relationship 
evolved, the transactional aspects of the contract became increasingly important, 
since COOP emphasized its interests at the expense of Lilleborg, with additional 
transactional elements (price/incentive items) added to the relational contract 
(Ness, 2009, Case 20). 
2.5.3 Interaction Style Dynamics 
Interaction style refers to the emphasis placed in how interactions were 
conducted between the technical staff from each of the partner firms tasked with 
fulfilling the goal. The interactions were described by case researchers in terms of 
behaviors involved in sharing information and engaging in dialogue. The behaviors 
were determined by the case researchers’ use of such words as “open sharing of 
information without hidden agendas” (Ness, 2009: 463, Case 20) and “[the] kind of 
information would not be shared” (White, 2005: 1402, Case 18).  
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Two different behavioral forms were identified from the cases: competitive 
behaviors, in which the partners had limited and constrained information sharing, 
and cooperative behaviors, in which the partners had open information sharing. 
While both forms are likely to be in place within any particular IOC, we focused 
only on a form that the case researchers indicated had changed during the IOC. 
We found evidence of cooperative behaviors being increasingly emphasized over 
time, competitive behaviors being increasingly emphasized over time, and 
emphasis on both cooperative and competitive behaviors changing over time. An 
increased use of cooperative behaviors is exemplified in a research-and-
development alliance; the two partners increasingly shared “sensitive 
technological information” related to their joint goal (Faems et al., 2008: 1071, 
Case 9). An increased use of competitive behaviors over time is exemplified in the 
COOP-Lilleborg IOC, where the partners initially interacted in a cooperative style 
but then, as the IOC evolved, engaged in less cooperative interaction and 
information sharing (Ness, 2009, Case 20). A case in which changes to both 
behaviors occurred is the EHPT joint venture between HP and Ericsson: Some 
technical teams became more open and direct in their actions over time, and 
other teams became increasingly competitive (Buchel, 2000, Case 22). 
2.5.4 Decision-Making Control Dynamics 
Decision-making control refers to whether most of the decisions about how work 
is organized within the IOC are made by top-level managers in the IOC and/or by 
lower-level IOC teams of technical staff. Dynamics refers to whether decision-
making control changes in the IOC over time. Changes in decision-making control 
could involve top managers of the IOC initially making the decisions and then 
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increasingly allowing IOC technical teams to gain control over the decisions, or IOC 
top managers increasingly exerting control over the decisions formerly made by 
IOC technical teams. Changes in decision-making control were determined by the 
case researchers’ use of such statements as “more personnel from each firm 
became involved in reviewing and approving the projects” (Mayer & Argyres, 
2004: 401, Case 5). 
An example of increased decision-making control provided to the IOC technical 
team over time is the case study of SEMATECH (Browning et al., 1995, Case 1). 
Initially, a strong hierarchical structure persisted in which the consortium 
executives made most decisions. Over time, however, SEMATECH partner firms 
increasingly relied on the technical teams’ group-based understandings and 
decisions, which were then reported to the upper management. An example of 
the opposite change is in the IOC between COOP and Lilleborg, in which decision-
making control was initially delegated to technical-level working groups, but over 
time, executive level project managers from each partner firm made the decisions 
about the projects (Ness, 2009, Case 20). 
2.5.5 Organizational Structure Dynamics 
IOC organizational structure dynamics refers to the degree of formalization and 
standardization of roles and processes of IOCs. Dynamics in structure can refer to 
shifts toward and away from increased structure. Shifts in IOC organizational 
structure were coded based on such statements used by case researchers as 
development of “new organizational processes” for the IOC (Doz, 1996: 69, Case 2) 
and the partners “created new roles” that increasingly structured interactions 
(Boddy et al., 2000: 1011, Case 3). 
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We identified from the cases no mention of reduced structure over time, only 
increased structure over time. Increased structure included the creation of a new 
role or procedure to be used by the IOC. For example, in Doz (1996: 69, Case 2), 
the GE-SNECMA alliance developed a “set of new organizational processes” to 
facilitate involvement of both partner firms in IOC. Additionally, some IOCs 
gradually became more structured over time by increasing the number of 
structured processes and roles. For example, Boddy et al. (2000, Case 3) describe 
how a supply chain partnership between an electronics company and a supplier of 
plastic moldings (plastic enclosure) became more structured over time by adding 
and implementing more and more new roles, processes, and procedures not 
previously existing in the IOC, including logistics processes and procedures, a 
tooling engineer, a sales coordinator, a supplier engineer, and a buyer planner to 
facilitate information flow and work flow between the partner firms. 
2.5.6 Actor Composition Dynamics 
Actor composition refers to membership in the IOC partner organizations and key 
individuals in the IOC collaboration. Dynamics refers to adding new actors or 
excluding existing actors. Changes in managers (e.g., Salk & Shenkar, 2001, Case 4) 
and partner firms (Berends et al., 2011, Case 11; White, 2005, Case 18) were 
described. Examples of cases of adding new actors include the SEMATECH 
consortium, where new senior managers were brought in to replace existing ones 
(Browning et al., 1995, Case 1), and the IOC for development of a new aircraft 
material in which some partner firms, such as Akzo, Alcoa, and 3M, were added to 
the IOC (Berends et al., 2011, Case 11). Examples of actors leaving include the 
NedCar joint venture, in which the “Dutch government had to give up [by pulling 
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out from the IOC] as a result of [an] EU ruling” (White, 2005: 1403, Case 18) and 
the case in Ariño and De la Torre (1998: 317, Case 16) where three members of 
the [joint venture] executive board retired from their respective companies [and 
left the partnership].” 
2.5.7 Changes in IOC Characteristics and Relationship to 
Outcomes 
In sum, based on the data in Table 2.1, six characteristics of IOCs were found to 
change at some point after the formation stage. The changes were clustered 
neither at the beginning nor at the end of the collaboration. Changes in multiple 
directions were observed, with IOC goals being added or deleted, changes 
observed in emphasis in both relational and transactional contract frames, 
decision-making control delegated to technical teams as well as pulled back up to 
the executive IOC level, interactions being increasingly competitive and 
cooperative, and actors being added and replaced. Only with the IOC 
characteristic of structure was there a single direction reported, of increasing 
structure. Thus, we conclude from this review of changes in IOC characteristics 
that in an IOC, changes in any of the six characteristics, in different directions, may 
happen. This suggests that not only is there considerable instability in the IOC 
characteristics over time, but the instability is multifaceted in nature. 
Table 2.1 also indicates which cases were considered successful and which failed. 
Comparing changes for those succeeding versus failing indicate that cases with 
successful outcomes were more likely to experience change in more 
characteristics. Moreover, for these successful cases, the direction of these 
changes tended to include (a) increased use of technical teambased control over 
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decision making; (b) increasingly structuring the IOC with new roles, processes, 
and routines; (c) increasingly emphasizing cooperative interaction styles; and (d) 
an increased emphasis on a relational-based contract frame. Thus, there appears 
to be a pattern of changes associated with successfully enacted IOCs. We turn next 
to sources of these changes in IOC characteristics. 
2.6 Finding 2: Multiple Sources for Dynamics of IOC 
Characteristics  
Case researchers provided causes when changes in IOC characteristics occurred. 
We iteratively searched for similarities and differences in these causes. Three 
categories of causes emerged, (a) between-partner differences, (b) external 
sources, and (c) within-IOC sources, where changes that occur within IOCs have 
subsequent effects on the IOC. 
2.6.1 Between-Partner Differences 
Each partner to an IOC has its own interests, goals, cultures, and practices, with 
these differences often in opposition of each other (Das & Teng, 2002). For 
example, in one case, one partner had a strong culture of openness, while another 
partner had a strong culture of protectionism (Browning et al., 1995, Case 1). 
Partners had different practices in how problems were solved, how data were 
formatted, which criteria were used to evaluate potential solutions, which 
knowledge bases were considered credible, which product development process 
was followed, how decisions were documented, and how the others in home 
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organizations were involved in the IOC (e.g., Boddy et al., 2000, Case 3; Ness, 
2009, Case 10). While partners may be unlikely to intentionally harm other 
partners within an IOC, partner interests may not coincide; in one case, a partner 
preferred to develop new technology, and the other partner preferred to minimize 
development and move quickly to commercialization (Buchel, 2000, Case 22). 
These differences between partners were repeatedly mentioned as the reason 
why an IOC characteristic changed. The differences were rarely depicted as 
conflict; rather, the differences were depicted instead as potential precursors to 
conflict: If the differences were not managed well, conflict might erupt. 
To manage between-partner differences, several changes in IOC characteristics 
were mentioned. In several cases, partner differences were managed by increasing 
IOC structures so that new roles and procedures superseded existing roles and 
procedures. For example, in a supply chain partnering, “the two firms had radically 
different histories” and backgrounds (Boddy et al., 2000: 1010, Case 3): One firm 
was a research-based firm in a dynamic industry, and the other one was an 
established engineering firm. The differences between the partners required 
changes in the IOC structure, including adding new roles, processes, and routines 
specific to the IOC in order to facilitate work flow between partners. In other 
cases, partner differences were managed by giving technical IOC teams more 
decision-making control to resolve interpartner differences (e.g., Boddy et al., 
2000, Case 3; Doz, 1996, Case 2; Mayer & Argyres, 2004, Case 5). In one case, 
partner differences were managed with an increasing reliance on top 
management executive councils to resolve the differences (Ness, 2009, Case 20). 
In some cases, partner differences led to conflict between the partners, which 
resulted in greater emphasis on competitive interaction style or transactional 
elements (e.g., De Rond & Bouchikhi, 2004, Case 17; Doz, 1996, Case 14; Faems et 
al., 2008, Case 19; Ness, 2009, Case 20, Case 21). 
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2.6.2 External Sources 
Case researchers mentioned a variety of sources external to their IOCs that 
contributed to changes in IOC characteristics. These included changes in 
regulations (Ness & Haugland, 2005, Case 6; White, 2005, Case 18), changes in 
market and industry competitiveness (e.g., Boddy et al., 2000, Case 3; Browning et 
al., 1995, Case 1; Doz, 1996, Case 2), technological uncertainty (e.g., Faems et al., 
2008, Case 9; Mayer & Argyres, 2004, Case 5), and events experienced by one of 
the partner firms’ own organization that ended up having ramifications for the IOC 
(e.g., Ariño & De la Torre, 1998, Case 16; Berends et al., 2011, Case 11; De Rond & 
Bouchikhi, 2004, Case 17; White, 2005, Case 18). An example of the impact of 
increased market technological uncertainty on an IOC was in the alliance between 
a small biotech firm and a large pharmaceutical company, in which the two 
partners found it necessary to include functions not initially anticipated (e.g., 
manufacturing) because of the uncertain and unpredictable development process 
(Doz, 1996, Case 14). Examples of events occurring within one firm’ s own 
organization that had subsequent implications for changes in the IOC included 
strategic reorientations of a partner during the IOC (Berends et al., 2011, Case 11), 
a partner firm changing senior executives (Ariño & De la Torre, 1998, Case 16; De 
Rond & Bouchikhi, 2004, Case, 17), key actors leaving the firm (De Rond & 
Bouchikhi, 2004, Case 17), and a change in ownership of a partner firm (White, 
2005, Case 18). 
2.6.3 Within-IOC Sources 
A final category includes sources that arose within the IOC that produced changes 
to IOC characteristics. Two within-IOC sources surfaced. The first was changes in 
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IOC characteristics themselves that produced changes in other IOC characteristics. 
The SEMATECH consortium provides one example. The dominant contract frame 
initially was transactional; over time, the interaction style became more 
cooperative as the technical teams became acquainted and also standard 
technical terms and process were added. This led to a greater emphasis on the 
relational elements in the framing of the IOC (Browning et al., 1995, Case 1). The 
second within-IOC source was referred to by case researchers as performance 
failures. Example performance failures included the failure to reach initially 
planned goals or provide expected value to partner firms (Berends et al., 2011, 
Case 11; Doz, 1996, Case 14; Jay, 2013, Case 12; Ness, 2009, Case 20), the failure 
to move the project forward as expected (Inkpen & Pien, 2006, Case 7), and 
achieving less success than the initial expectation (Ariño & De la Torre, 1998, Case 
16). 
2.6.4 Sources Affecting Changes in IOC Characteristics and 
Relationship to Outcomes 
In sum, sources affecting IOC changes included between-partner differences, 
external sources, and within-IOC sources. Together, the sources create the 
possibility of a multitude of sources contributing to changes in IOC characteristics. 
Some of these sources are continuously experienced throughout the duration of 
the IOC, such as partner differences, while other sources are more event driven, 
such as changes in a partner firm’s senior executive causing a change in who 
directs the IOC. Moreover, the same source in different cases had vastly different 
effects on IOC characteristics. For example, in different cases, partner differences 
were found to both increase and decrease technical team-based decision making. 
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As another example, a new role was created or a new goal was added to IOCs due 
to performance failures. Thus, a variety of relationships emerge between sources 
of change and the changes to IOC characteristics. IOCs appear to be so dynamic 
that changes can occur from a variety of directions, having a variety of effects. 
We compared the successful and unsuccessful cases for the different sources of 
changes in IOC characteristics. For some sources, there were differences. Cases 
with unsuccessful outcomes were more likely to have changes in the external 
environment, suggesting that it is difficult for IOCs to survive environmental shifts. 
In successful cases, differences between partner firms were more likely to be the 
source of changes in IOC characteristics, presumably to manage the differences so 
that they would not evolve into conflict. Finally, of note is that performance 
failures within the IOC did not differentiate between successful and unsuccessful 
cases, suggesting that the presence of a performance failure is not an early 
indicator of a later IOC failure. 
2.7 Finding 3: Six Patterns of Dynamics 
Having identified six changes to IOC characteristics, and three different categories 
of sources contributing to these changes of IOC characteristics, in this section of 
our review, we examine the patterns of relationships in more dynamic detail, 
looking at the feedback loops that occur. For each of the cases, we diagrammed 
the logic of the case researchers in depicting what initial source appeared to 
initiate a change in an IOC characteristic, whether subsequent effects were 
involved, and whether additional sources of further changes emerged over time. 
From this examination, we were able to identify six distinct patterns of dynamics. 
The six dynamics are (a) a single change in IOC characteristic, in which there is a 
single cause and effect that is isolated from the remainder of any other changes to 
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the IOC; (b) a binary loop, in which there is a recursive feedback loop between 
changes in two IOC characteristics, (c) parallel multisource effect, in which multiple 
sources cause a change in the one specific characteristic of interaction style; (d) 
positive multicharacteristic loop, in which a source initiates a positive three-
characteristic loop; (e) negative multicharacteristic loop, in which a source initiates 
a negative three-characteristic loop; and (f) multiloop flow, wherein more than 
one multicharacteristic loop interact. The dynamics differ in whether a recursive 
loop exists between IOC characteristics once a change has been initiated by a 
source, whether one or more sources start the recursive loops, whether the self-
reinforcing loops are in a positive or negative direction, the number of sources 
that initiate the effect, the number of IOC characteristics involved in the loop, and 
the number of loops occurring in the IOC. As such, we identify dimensions of 
dynamics that have not heretofore been identified, such as the breadth of the 
dynamics (i.e., number of IOC characteristics involved), the direction (i.e., positive 
or negative), whether recursion is involved, multiplicity of initiating sources, and 
the extent of recursion (number of loops). Figure 2.1 presents a depiction of the 
six dynamic patterns. More than one pattern was seen for some cases since 
different patterns captured different dynamics in different parts of the IOC. 
2.7.1 Single Change in an IOC Characteristic 
In some cases (Cases 12, 16, 18, 20, 21, and 22), external sources produced single 
changes in an IOC characteristic. Importantly, these changes were not propagated 
to changes in other IOC characteristics. For example, in Ariño and De la Torre 
(1998, Case 16), participants’ retirement from their respective companies (as an 
external event unrelated to the IOC) led to changes in the actor composition of the 
joint venture, without having any other effects to other IOC characteristics 
reported by the case researchers. 
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Figure 2.1: Patterns of Dynamics (Δ = change; + = positive effect; – = negative effect.) 
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2.7.2 Binary Loop 
In several cases (Cases 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, and 22), the cause-effect dynamic was 
initiated by multiple sources. The effect was limited to a single loop between two 
IOC characteristics with no outflows affecting other IOC characteristics. This two-
characteristic loop flow was initiated either as a result of partner differences (e.g., 
Doz, 1996, Case 14, Case 15; Faems et al., 2008, Case 19) or as changes in the IOC 
actor composition (De Rond & Bouchikhi, 2004, Case 17). These sources resulted in 
changes to the IOC characteristic of interaction style (moving from more emphasis 
on cooperative to more emphasis on competitive). These changes in emphasis in 
interaction style then affected changes in the IOC contract frame (moving from 
more emphasis on a relational frame to more emphasis on a transactional frame), 
which then further affected changes in the IOC interaction style, continuing this 
loop. For example, in an alliance, partner differences in culture, expectations, and 
skills led to little trusting of each other, changing an initial emphasis on a 
cooperative interaction style to a competitive emphasis (Doz, 1996, Case 14). This 
increased competitive emphasis caused changes in the contract frame from 
relational to transactional, which in turn led to a further decreased emphasis on a 
cooperative interaction style. 
2.7.3 Parallel Multisource Effect on Single IOC Characteristic 
Several cases (e.g., Cases 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 13, and 18) focused on changes 
in one IOC characteristic of interaction style. The dynamic between the source and 
effect indicated that while the effect was a singular change in interaction style, the 
sources were many, simultaneous, and often operating in parallel. Changes in 
interaction style were primarily attributable to simultaneous changes in at least 
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two of the following three IOC characteristics: decision-making control, IOC 
organizational structure, and actor composition. 
For example, in the alliance between Esthetique and L’Oreal (described by Ness, 
2009: 461, Case 10), the two partners tried to “reduce conflict and improve 
interactions by relying on standard operating procedures.” Adding new standard 
procedures and thus reducing the conflict level allowed the interactions between 
them to become less competitive and more cooperative than they previously had 
been. However, they still had conflicts because the behavior of the director for 
distribution in L’Oreal (as one of the key actors in the IOC) had negative influences 
on the level of cooperation. Consequently, the director for selective distribution 
was replaced, and cooperation increased between the two partners. Thus, the 
positive effect of introducing new standard procedures on cooperative interaction 
was strengthened by replacing the director. In addition, several joint product 
meetings and joint activities for decision making took place in the alliance, thereby 
increasing cooperation between the two partners. 
2.7.4 Positive Multicharacteristic Loop 
In several cases, a loop of three IOC characteristics that continuously evolved and 
positively reinforced each other was identified (Cases 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 
and 18). This loop involved one of two sets of characteristics: (a) changes in the 
three characteristics of decision-making control, interaction style, and contract 
frame or (b) changes in the three characteristics of IOC organizational structure, 
interaction style, and contract frame. In some cases, only one of these loops was 
present, and we only found four cases in which both of these loops were present. 
Both loops were generally triggered by recognition of betweenpartner differences. 
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In the first type of positive multicharacteristic loops, team-based control over 
decision making increased, which led to greater use of cooperative interactions, 
which in turn gave rise to greater reliance on a relational-based contract frame 
and, consequently, greater use of team-based control, thus continuing the loop. 
For example, in an alliance between an imaging company and a stock-quoted 
inkjet printer technology, partner firms increasingly relied on team-based decision 
making for technical problems by organizing technical meetings to involve more 
people from each partnered firm in joint problem definition and joint problem 
solving (increased IOC team decision making control; Faems et al., 2008, Case 9). 
This allowed the partner firms to have more intensive information sharing and 
more cooperation, which led to greater reliance on more relational elements (i.e., 
mutual trust) over time since they had a mutual understanding of technology 
problems and each other’s competencies. This increased trust led partners to 
engage in even more team-based decision making such that a positive self-
reinforcing loop of more team-based control over decision making, a more 
cooperative interaction style, and increased reliance on relational-based contract 
frame emerged. 
In the second type of positive self-reinforcing feedback loop, a more structured 
IOC (by adding new roles, processes, and routines) reduced tensions between the 
partner firms, leading to increased cooperation between them. As a result of 
extensive cooperation, greater emphasis was placed on a relational-based 
contract frame, which allowed the partners to be able to negotiate adding new 
roles, processes, and routines to the IOC, thus increasing the structure and 
continuing the positive loop. This positive self-reinforcing loop then was between 
more structure, more cooperative interaction, and increased emphasis on a 
relational-based contract frame. For example, in the SEMATECH consortium, new 
formal processes and roles (more structured collaboration) were implemented to 
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facilitate interaction between partners. Increased interaction promoted a more 
cooperative interaction style among the partners, which in turn was an input to 
increased reliance on a relational-based contract frame. Moreover, this relational 
based contract frame had an effect on adding new roles and processes to pave the 
way for more information exchange and cooperation. A positive selfreinforcing 
loop between more structured, greater cooperative interaction style, and 
increased reliance on a relational-based contract frame took place for the 
SEMATECH consortium (Browning et al., 1995, Case 1). 
2.7.5 Negative Multicharacteristic Loop 
In one case, the COOP-Lilleborg alliance (Ness, 2009, Case 20), a loop of three IOC 
characteristics that continuously evolved but negatively influenced each other was 
identified. Here the changes in the three characteristics were the same as above: 
decision-making control, interaction style, and contract frame. Also, as above, the 
changes to characteristics were initiated by between-partner differences. In this 
pattern, however, the between-partner differences had devolved into conflict 
between the partners, which led to increasing emphasis on top management 
control (instead of teams) over decision making, which, because each partner’s 
value was now being questioned, led to increased emphasis on interaction styles 
that were more competitive than cooperative. Increased reliance on competitive 
interactions in turn decreased reliance on the relational contract frame, as “trust 
and norms were weakened” (Ness, 2009: 465). Decreased reliance on the 
relational contract frame led to even more decisions being made by top 
management control over decision making, thus continuing the negative loop. 
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2.7.6 Multiloop Flows 
In some cases (Cases 1, 2, 5, and 10), more than one recursive loop occurred 
between sources and effects during the IOC. These loops interacted, creating a 
more complex pattern of dynamics. In the GE-SNECMA alliance, for example, there 
were two recursive loops: one between increased team-based control over 
decision making, more cooperative interactions, and greater reliance on a 
relational contract frame; and the other recursive loop between more structured 
IOC, more cooperative interaction, and increased reliance on the relational 
elements of contract frame. These two loops were triggered by differences 
between partners in cultures and practices. In this alliance, the partners had 
sufficient overlapping experience and skill in working together at the outset, and 
they also developed new organizational structures for mitigating conflicts in the 
IOC: “They were fortunate enough to start the alliance with the definition of new 
organizational roles” (Doz, 1996: 78, Case 2). Also, partner firms increasingly relied 
on team-based decision making. These new structures and increased IOC team 
decision making control contributed to increased information sharing and 
cooperation in the IOC, which results in increased emphasis on a relational-based 
contract frame. In addition, the relational-based collaboration between the 
partners allowed the partners to become more adaptive and flexible for adding  
new more formal processes.  
2.7.7 Dynamic Patterns and Relationship to Outcomes 
In sum, we found evidence of several different dynamic patterns, including binary 
loops, positive multicharacteristic loops, negative multicharacteristic loops, and 
multiloop flows, as well as evidence of single changes that were disconnected 
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from the other IOC characteristics and hence not integrated into the system of 
dynamics in the IOC. More than one pattern is seen for some cases in which three-
characteristic loops and multiple loops are triggered by between-partner 
differences and parallel effects of changes in other parts of the IOC (parallel 
simultaneous effects). Finally, the dimensions on which these patterns varied 
indicate specific ways in which dynamics in IOCs take place and can be further 
studied. That is, a deeper understanding of dynamics can result from an 
examination of the breadth of the dynamics (i.e., number of IOC characteristics 
involved), the direction (i.e., positive or negative), whether recursion is involved, 
multiplicity of initiating sources, and the extent of recursion (number of loops). 
Were the patterns of dynamics related to outcomes? We juxtaposed the different 
dynamic patterns on whether the outcome of the IOC was judged by case 
researchers to be successful or unsuccessful. We found that IOCs considered 
unsuccessful by the case researchers had single changes that were disconnected 
from the other IOC characteristics, binary loops, and negative three-characteristic 
loops. In contrast, successful cases had positive multicharacteristic loops, parallel 
multisource changes, and multiple loops. This suggests that more successful cases 
are those with more recursions, signifying IOCs that have developed more ways to 
accommodate change iteratively. Iterations are particularly helpful as any single 
passage through the loop may accommodate only very small or modest amounts 
of positive change. 
2.8 Implications and Future Research Directions 
A first implication of the findings from this review is that despite the extensive 
variability in how IOC characteristics changed over time, and the sources and 
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patterns of these changes, we found a clear distinction in the dynamics associated 
with the cases in which successful outcomes were documented compared to the 
cases in which unsuccessful outcomes were documented. We discovered three 
distinctions. First, cases with successful outcomes were more likely to experience 
change in more characteristics. Second, in successful cases, these changes were 
often proactively initiated because of differences between partners in interests, 
organizational cultures, and practices. Finally, more successful cases experienced 
dynamic patterns with more complex feedback loops having subsequent effects 
on other IOC characteristics throughout the collaboration. 
Examining the six patterns of dynamics leads to five elements of a dynamic that 
warrants description because they differentiate between successful and 
unsuccessful IOCs. These five descriptors of the patterns include (a) breadth of 
dynamics, (b) direction, (c) whether recursion is involved, (d) multiplicity of 
initiating sources, and (e) the extent of recursion. As more longitudinal research 
cases accumulate with future research, the relative contribution of each of these 
five on the outcomes can be assessed. These five descriptors provide direction on 
how to study dynamics. Rather than treating dynamics as an indivisible complex 
system, the descriptors can provide parameters for studying the multifaceted 
nature of dynamics. Consequently, the five descriptors provide a means to study 
IOCs over time as integrated complex systems (e.g., Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; 
Page, 2009) rather than being studied from the perspective of a single function or 
a characteristic (such as contractual frames or organizational structures). These 
five descriptors provide research questions deserving attention in future studies. 
Does the regularity of the feedback loops and time between changes affect IOC 
outcomes, as has been found for changes over time within a firm (Klarner & 
Raisch, 2013)? Are successful IOCs more likely to keep or intentionally allow 
changes in one characteristic to affect changes in other characteristics? How does 
the recursion stop, since continuous recursion would be counterproductive? Is 
there a synergistic effect that is required among the sources so that changes 
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caused by the sources are in concert, or is conflict between the downstream 
effects of sources of change likely to foster innovative dynamic patterns? 
A third implication is the presence of dualities in changes in IOC characteristics. In 
some IOCs, for example, both increased differentiation (as an increased number of 
new roles) and decreased differentiation (as increased use of teams to make 
decisions) occurred. In other IOCs, interaction style between the IOC partners 
became increasingly cooperative over time, coexisting with competitive behaviors. 
The two interaction styles seemed to be needed to ensure effective knowledge 
sharing while maintaining alertness and visibility to potential partner opportunistic 
behaviors. Similarly, in some cases, the relational elements of the IOC contract 
frame became increasingly important as IOC evolves, coexisting with the 
transactional elements. These three dualities suggest dualism as another 
descriptor of dynamics, echoing perspectives of others in non-IOC contexts 
(Farjoun, 2010; Gebert, Boerner, & Kearney, 2010; Smith & Lewis, 2011). To 
leverage such duality, both sides of the duality need to be examined so that 
subtleties of how IOCs manage dynamics are not lost. 
The coopetition literature has examined firms that simultaneously cooperate and 
compete with each other (Ang, 2008; Bengtsson, Eriksson, & Wincent, 2010; 
Bengtsson & Kock, 2000; Hau & Evangelista, 2007; Ritala & Hurmelinna-
Laukkanen, 2009; Zineldin, 2004). The IOC dynamics depicted here can be used to 
examine how coopetition unfolds over time, a needed research focus (Gnyawali & 
Park, 2011). From this review, coopetition appears to be managed with changes in 
decision-making control, changes in organizational structure, changes in 
interaction style, and changes in the contract frame as the coopetiting partners 
execute their plans. The alternative patterns of dynamics found in this review 
further suggest that the duality between competition and cooperation becomes 
expressed in a dynamic pattern. Which of the six dynamic patterns describes 
successfully coopetitive partners requires further research. For example, 
Bengtsson and Kock (2000) found that firms in a coopetitive relationship shared 
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knowledge in the joint product development activities but hid knowledge from 
each other about activities closer to the customer. The review reported here 
suggests that this hiding and sharing of knowledge may have evolved over time as 
changes occurred in decision-making control and the contract frame. These 
changes, along with the introduction of new routines, processes, and roles may 
have helped to manage the balance of competitive and cooperative interaction 
styles. Through examination of the dynamic pattern of the coopetitive 
arrangement over time, how this complex arrangement evolves over time can be 
more richly understood.  
Progress in understanding IOC dynamics requires methodological advancements. 
The relationship of dynamics to IOC outcomes suggests the need for rigorous 
research specifically focused on identifying key descriptive elements of the 
dynamics and the different conditions under which these dynamic descriptive 
elements are likely to occur. We inferred the dynamic patterns from what case 
researchers reported, recording no dynamics if the authors did not mention the 
change (e.g., goal change). Findings based on omission of data are always 
circumspect (Yin, 1994). Hence, future qualitative IOC researchers are encouraged 
to reveal more clearly not just the content of changes but the patterns that those 
changes take. 
An understanding of dynamics cannot be achieved solely with further qualitative 
analyses. Computational experiments and simulations (Burton, Obel, & De Sanctis, 
2011) are needed to allow examination of the feedback loops. Simulations allow 
examining the temporal cause-effect relationships of intertwined learning 
processes not just in the short term but in the long term, over a large number of 
time periods, and across levels (Anderson & Lewis, 2014). Simulations can be 
particularly valuable in teasing out the “core rigidity” disruptions caused by the 
different sources and characteristics found in this review as well as in identifying 
which changes in IOCs are adaptive in positively or negatively impacting 
performance and at what rate over time. Simulations can help predict which form 
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of change is more likely to occur under different conditions as well as responses to 
extreme events. 
Sequence analysis methods are another way to develop fine-grained models of 
temporal or spatially related cause-effect relationships in process flows (Abbott, 
1990; Abbott & Tsay, 2000). Sequence analysis strives to find if preferred 
outcomes are associated with particular sequences of activities or events. It can 
also measure the elapsed times in terms of events of activities. This technique can 
also help explain events such as why one pattern changed to another one. 
Sequence analysis techniques with applicability to IOCs have been used recently to 
describe firm performance over time (Klarner & Raisch, 2013). 
In conclusion, even with a relative dearth of articles in the review, we were able to 
develop an understanding of dynamics that occur and effect outcomes in IOCs. 
The review identified several patterns of dynamics, ranging from qualitative shifts 
to quantitative effects, from recursive loops to multiple interacting loops, relating 
these to outcomes. Future studies should test and discover alternative patterns of 
dynamics in IOCs. 
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Chapter 3: How to Manage the Downside of Deep 
Engagement with External Sources in Open 
Innovation Projects4  
 
 
3.1 Abstract 
There is a conundrum when a firm engages deeply with external sources in its 
open innovation projects. This conundrum is related to the simultaneous activities 
                                                        
4 This article has been submitted to the Open and User Innovation Conference (OUI) 2016 - 
Harvard Business School (under review). Bagherzadeh, M., Majchrzak, A., & Brunswicker, S. “How 
to Manage the downside of Deep Engagement with External Sources in Open Innovation Projects ” 
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of knowledge sharing and knowledge protecting. Many studies about open 
innovation have focused on the role of legal formalization in the context of 
intellectual property (IP) control. But legal formalization around IP may not 
address more specific activities of the parties such as tacit knowledge of involved 
individuals that may lead to revealing too much knowledge. In this study, we 
introduce formality into the joint technology development process itself, an 
alternative form of formalization, to manage this conundrum. Moreover, we argue 
that as the firm attempts to solve more complex problems, the importance of the 
formal joint process increases. We test our argument based on a sample of 82 
open innovation projects collected from large firms in the United States and 
Europe. Our results clearly indicate that to manage the conundrum of 
simultaneously engaging in knowledge sharing and knowledge protecting, 
formalizing the joint technology development process seems to have a positive 
effect on projects outcomes that gets stronger as the problem becomes complex. 
We contribute to external sourcing literature by suggesting that the process 
formalization may support the legal formalization of IP control to manage the 
knowledge sharing and protecting tension. Moreover, we make important 
theoretical contributions to literature regarding relational mechanisms in 
interorganizational collaborations through our assertion that the combination of 
formality and informality between the partners seems to be required to increase 
the likelihood of success of open innovation projects without the loss of critical 
intellectual property. 
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3.2 Introduction 
If you want to have a fast success in developing a new technological solution with 
external partners, you need to support dialogue, discussion and actual 
collaborative development of a solution in which deep-level of knowledge 
exchange and integration among the partners happen especially, it is more crucial 
when you want to tackle a complex problem area. But it creates a risk of 
knowledge leakage to external partners. (A Chief Innovation Officer) 
There is a conundrum in the firm’s use of external sources in its open innovation 
projects. Many studies about open innovation have argued that firms should 
deeply engage in external sources to solve their innovation problems (Chesbrough, 
2003; Faems, Janssens, Madhok, & Van Looy, 2008; Laursen & Salter, 2006). As 
problems become more complex, there may be an even greater need to deeply 
engage in external sources (Felin & Zenger, 2014). Deep engagement refers to 
flexible interactive dialogue among the parties to be able to reconceptualize 
problems and solutions in order to increase the possibility of innovation (Faems et 
al., 2008). But, the conundrum is that such flexible interactions with external 
sources expose the firm to opportunistic risk from unintentional knowledge 
sharing or sharing too much knowledge (Heiman & Nickerson, 2004; Jarvenpaa & 
Majchrzak, 2016). This fear of potential opportunistic risk can result in the firm 
taking a defensive behavior by the parties and becoming unwilling to collaborate, 
which in turn can slow down a project in achieving its intended goals and even 
stop a project prematurely (Jarvenpaa & Välikangas, 2014; Majchrzak, Jarvenpaa, 
& Bagherzadeh, 2015). This paper aims to address this knowledge sharing and 
knowledge protecting conundrum. 
One potential solution to this conundrum is to introduce some form of 
formalization into the engagement (Majchrzak et al., 2015). The type of 
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formalization receiving the most attention in the open innovation literature is 
legal formalization, such as contracts around IP control (Cassiman & Veugelers, 
2002; Laursen & Salter, 2014). However, these types of formalization may not 
address more specific activities of the parties, which may lead to revealing too 
much knowledge (Berends, Van Burg, & Van Raaij, 2011; Jarvenpaa & Majchrzak, 
2016). As a result, the parties may share IP-related knowledge that they should 
not sharing while they are deeply interacting. 
An alternative conceptualization for formalizing the engagement is to introduce 
formality into the engaged joint technology development process itself. Formality 
of the joint technology development process is defined as specifying and enforcing 
technological activities that are supposed to be followed by the parties to jointly 
develop a technology in the form of procedures, manuals, and roles (Vlaar, Van 
Den Bosch, & Volberda, 2007). Such specified processes could include, for 
example, how often the technology development is reviewed by senior 
management for its progress in achieving a predefined goal (Faems et al., 2008; 
Majchrzak et al., 2015).  
For example, Jarvenpaa and Majchrzak (2008) found that a primary mechanism 
used by security guards to protect knowledge in security-related 
interorganizational collaborations is to break down knowledge into smaller pieces 
and allow different partners to have only some of the knowledge. Others have 
similarly theorized and conducted research on the value of knowledge 
segmentation during interorganizational collaborations (Faems, Janssens, & Van 
Looy, 2010; Jarvenpaa & Majchrzak, 2016; Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies, 1998). 
Therefore, formalizing the joint technology development process may keep the 
parties from sharing too much knowledge with one particular external source 
during the technology development process (Avadikyan, Llerena, Matt, Rozan, & 
Wolff, 2001; Faems et al., 2008; Vlaar, Van den Bosch, & Volberda, 2006). With 
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built-in and frequent senior management reviews, it may be possible to ascertain 
as soon as possible when highly sensitive knowledge has been shared with 
external parties in order to take appropriate action (Jarvenpaa & Majchrzak, 
2016). Moreover, as the formal technology development process is applied to a 
new open innovation partnership with a new partnership, knowledge needing to 
be shared and knowledge needing to be protected can be clarified, thereby 
alerting the parties to the need for self-monitoring and regulation of knowledge 
sharing during the joint technology development process. As the innovation 
problem becomes more complex, greater flexible interaction and knowledge 
sharing among the parties is required (Felin & Zenger, 2014). This increases the 
possibility of sharing too much knowledge unintentionally compared to the 
interactions required to solve a less complex problem. Thus, as projects undertake 
more complex problems, the importance of formal joint technology development 
practices for managing the deep interaction increases. The concern over 
knowledge sharing and opportunistic risk can slow down an open innovation 
project and even end it prematurely. Therefore, when an open innovation project 
successfully reaches its initially planned goals, this risk is more likely to be 
managed before creating problem for the project. Therefore, we ask the following 
research questions: Does the use of a formalized joint technology development 
process help to increase the likelihood that an open innovation project with 
external sources is successfully completed? And if so, what role does problem 
complexity play in this process? 
We approach these questions with a sample of 82 open innovation projects 
collected from large firms in the United States and Europe. With project-level 
data, we are able to assess the degree of process formalization used within the 
project in more detail compared to the more traditional level of firm-aggregated 
data often used in open innovation research (Felin & Zenger, 2014; Laursen & 
Salter, 2006; Laursen & Salter, 2014). We find that to manage the conundrum of 
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deep engagement with external sources, formalizing the joint technology 
development has a monotonically positive effect on project outcomes, and that 
this positive effect of formalization becomes more pronounced as the technology 
problem serving as the impetus for the open innovation becomes more complex.   
3.3 Theoretical Model and Hypothesis Development  
In this section, we develop two hypotheses related to a firm’s deep interaction 
with external sources in their open innovation project and the role of joint 
technology development process and problem complexity in project performance. 
The theoretical model of this study and related hypotheses are presented in Figure 
3.1.  
Figure 3.1: The Theoretical Model  
 
 
 
 
 
Deep engagement and project performance: The mediating role of the process 
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Deep engagement is defined in terms of the extent to which firms interact 
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research and development project, Evonik deeply engaged in a diverse set of 
external sources, including potential customers in the electronics industry, 
universities and research centers, and equipment suppliers by spending a lot of 
time with them for making use of their knowledge to develop a new technology 
(Brunswicker, Bagherzadeh, & Lamb, 2016). Many scholars present empirical 
evidence that deep engagement in external sources allows firms to solve their 
innovation problems in a more effective and efficient way, thereby leading to a 
greater innovation performance (Faems et al., 2008; Foss, Laursen, & Pedersen, 
2011; Laursen & Salter, 2006; Ness, 2009). 
To support deep engagement, partners facilitate flexible interactive dialogue to 
reconceptualize problems and synthesize different knowledge areas relevant to 
novel solutions to increase the probability of project successes (Browning, Beyer, 
& Shetler, 1995; Jarvenpaa & Majchrzak, 2016). For example, in a research and 
development collaboration project, partner firms organized technical meetings 
among involved individuals from each partner firm in order to have more intensive 
and interactive dialogue to build a mutual understanding of technology problems 
(Faems et al., 2008). 
Such flexible interaction increases the potential risk of opportunistic behavior as 
valuable knowledge is subject to potential expropriation by partners who may 
abuse unintended shared knowledge for their own benefits and interests (Faems 
et al., 2010 Heiman & Nickerson, 2004) which may harm the partner firms by 
losing their intellectual properties and competitive position (Jarvenpaa & 
Majchrzak, 2016). Thus this leads to taking a defensive behavior by the parties and 
an unwillingness to cooperate (Majchrzak et al., 2015). For example, in an R&D 
collaboration project, one of partnering firms explicitly asked their engineers “not 
to share information on technological problems with Graph due to the fear of 
unintended knowledge spillovers and losing command over the project” (Faems et 
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al., 2008: 1063). Therefore, partners need to regulate the tension between sharing 
and protecting in deep engagement, thereby allowing flexible interaction for 
successful innovation outcome without the loss of critical knowledge (Bogers, 
2011; Heiman & Nickerson, 2004; Majchrzak et al., 2015). 
Jarvenpaa and Majchrzak (2008) found, in a national security interorganizational 
collaboration, breaking down knowledge into segmented pieces and sharing only 
some of the knowledge with the partners is used by security professionals to 
manage the knowledge sharing-protecting tension (Jarvenpaa & Majchrzak, 2008). 
Likewise, other researchers focusing on sharing-protecting tension have studied 
the value of knowledge segmentation (Faems et al., 2010; Jarvenpaa & Välikangas, 
2014; Lewicki et al., 1998) and selective sharing, “sharing part of the firm’s 
knowledge”, (Jarvenpaa & Välikangas, 2014: 68) for regulating this tension in 
collaborative projects. Recent theorizing about the sharing and protecting tension 
argue that knowledge segmentation, defined as “breaking down knowledge into 
segmented pieces, with each different piece of knowledge shared in a different 
way”, is required to regulate this tension in interorganizational collaborations 
(Jarvenpaa & Majchrzak, 2016: 11). An example of knowledge segmentation for 
managing sharing and protecting is related to the joint venture between Boeing 
and the Japanese in building Boeing 777. Boeing performed knowledge 
segmentation by which significant amounts of technical information was shared, 
but simultaneously Boeing protected some of its technical knowledge by “limiting 
the access of Japanese engineers to secure areas within Boeing” (Lewicki et al., 
1998: 447). As another example, in an alliance, the partners segmented 
knowledge by defining partner-specific task domains for the collaboration through 
which “the need to share sensitive information was reduced and the risk of 
unintended knowledge spillovers was mitigated” (Faems et al., 2010: 13). Through 
knowledge segmentation, the parties are likely to effectively respond to the 
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sharing and protecting tension, thereby having their flexible interaction to ensure 
project successes without losing sensitive knowledge.   
For the involved actors to effectively segment the knowledge in the interactive 
engagement, awareness of which knowledge that is required to be shared in order 
to ensure project success is needed. The uncertainty about what knowledge 
should be shared and what knowledge should be protected complicates the 
knowledge segmentation for individuals who “need to make in-the-moment 
decisions” about which knowledge to share with the parties without losing the 
critical knowledge (Jarvenpaa & Majchrzak, 2016: 23). This uncertainty that 
involved actors have can result either in a fear of knowledge sharing, even sharing 
knowledge that needs to be shared, or enacting too much and unintended sharing, 
complicating the regulation of knowledge sharing and protecting. For example, in 
the SEMATECH consortium, individuals should “confer with their companies about 
what they would share at SEMATECH, sometimes by calling home [organizations] 
at breaks during meetings to inquire about sharing a particular piece of 
information” due to lack of standard operating process and different views among 
partners about knowledge needing to be shared (Browning et al., 1995: 135). In 
this example, this uncertainty made their collaboration unproductive, which in 
turn slowed down the consortium in reaching its initially planned goals.  
One recommendation for supporting knowledge segmentation is to specify a 
formal process, including a set of required technological activities and evaluation 
criteria such as technological specifications, that the parties can follow (Lewicki et 
al., 1998). We argue that introducing formality into the joint technology 
development process decreases the uncertainty about required knowledge that 
should be shared for furthering project goals (Avadikyan et al., 2001; Vlaar et al., 
2006). Formalization of the joint technology development process is defined as 
specifying and enforcing technological activities that are supposed to be followed 
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by the parties to jointly develop a technology in the form of procedures, manuals, 
and roles (Vlaar et al., 2007). Formalizing the joint technology development 
process forces the parties to explicitly articulate technological specifications and 
knowledge sets required for developing and completing the technology (Faems et 
al., 2008; Vlaar et al., 2006). Process formalization ensures that the required 
knowledge is well-defined in the project, thereby reducing the uncertainty about 
what knowledge should be shared with the parties in the interaction, which in turn 
decreases conflicts among the parties. This articulation makes the interaction 
more predictable in terms of knowledge sharing. For example, in a collaborative 
project for designing a new small car, the partners developed a set of operating 
documents, roles, and manuals, including technological activities and specification 
that should be followed by each partner during the project (White, 2005). What 
knowledge was needed during the design process was clear. Thus, the partners 
were able to define “what kind of information would not be shared as part of 
collaboration” (White, 2005: 1402). They divided the knowledge related to 
technological specifications for car components and only shared for components 
that were common to the partners’ car models, and they protected for the 
remaining components. This clarity about the technological specification allowed 
the partners to have effective knowledge segmentation and to successfully reach 
the predefined objective without unintentional knowledge sharing. Moreover, 
such formalization enables individuals to focus their attention on the required 
technological specifications and knowledge sets that are needed to complete the 
project (Vlaar et al., 2006). This focus on required knowledge reduces the 
complexity of making in-the-moment decisions on what knowledge to share and 
what to protect, thus enabling them to complete effective knowledge 
segmentation. Ness (2009) illustrates how a set of formal technological guidelines, 
as a project handbook for use by the technical workers during the interaction in a 
collaborative joint project paved the way for information exchange between the 
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partners without sharing unintended knowledge. This formal project handbook 
focused individuals’ attention on the required knowledge to be shared in the 
interaction, therefore easing decision making on information exchange without 
losing critical knowledge. 
In summary, partners must cope with the knowledge sharing-protecting tension 
during deep engagement; otherwise this tension can slow down the collaborative 
project in successfully reaching its initially defined goals and even stopping it 
prematurely. The process formalization can create a predictable situation about 
what should be shared and what should be protected. This predictability 
stimulates the partners for self-monitoring and regulation of knowledge sharing 
and protecting tension during the joint projects to avoid the opportunistic risk. We 
suggest that process formalization creates a foundation for effective knowledge 
segmentation, thus supporting flexible interaction between the parties without 
losing critical knowledge. This flexible interaction allows the parties to more 
effectively reframe and reconceptualize problems and solutions, enhancing the 
probability of project success in reaching their predefined objectives. A recent 
review on interorganizational collaboration dynamics shows that successful 
collaborative projects do not appear to be accompanied by the knowledge sharing 
and protecting tension that is not regulated by the parties during the project 
(Majchrzak et al., 2015). Thus, when a joint collaborative project successfully 
achieves its goals, this tension is more likely to be effectively regulated before 
creating problems for the projects (Das & Teng, 2000; Jarvenpaa & Majchrzak, 
2016). Therefore, the following hypothesis can be developed:  
Hypothesis 1: Level of formalization of the joint technology development process 
mediates the relationship between depth of engagement with external sources and 
project performance. 
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Process formalization and project performance: The moderating role of problem 
complexity 
Problem complexity is defined in terms of the number of involved tasks, 
components, or knowledge sets and the degree of interdependency among them 
(Fernandes & Simon, 1999). Complex problems are comprised of a large number 
of highly interdependent tasks, elements, or knowledge sets that make complex 
problems less decomposable. For example, in a technological partnership to 
develop a new technology for rendering movies, the technological problem was 
complex. This technological problem was comprised of different elements and 
knowledge sets related to data storage, cloud computing, and animation 
technologies, and these elements are interdependent and should be considered at 
the same time to develop a successful technological solution (Brunswicker et al., 
2016).  
The problem solving perspective argues that depending on the problem 
complexity, different solution search approaches are needed (Nickerson & Zenger, 
2004). Nickerson and Zenger (2004: 621) differentiate between two different 
search approaches, directional5 and theory-driven, and state that “[theory driven] 
search is necessary when problems are complex” whereas “directional search is 
warranted when problems are decomposable [not complex]”. Theory-driven (also 
called cognitive search) is a search approach in which “an actor or a group of 
actors cognitively evaluate the probable consequences of design choices rather 
than relying solely on feedback after design choices are made” (Nickerson & 
Zenger, 2004: 621). Such a theory-driven search implies that the partners need to 
understand the interaction between involved tasks, find and synthesize different 
knowledge sets relevant to problem to shape a search theory and a cognitive map 
                                                        
5 This search approach is only “guided by feedback or experiences from prior trials” (Nickerson & 
Zenger, 2004: 620).       
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as a basis for the cognitive evaluation of the likely consequences of solution 
selections for guiding solutions search (Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000; Nickerson & 
Zenger, 2004). One way suggested for supporting an effective theory-driven 
search is to facilitate deep interaction and extensive knowledge sharing among the 
parties to ensure sufficient understanding of the problem (i.e., tasks and 
interaction among them) and make sure that all relevant knowledge sets are 
exchanged by the parties (Felin & Zenger, 2014). 
As a result, when the problem being solved is more complex, partners need 
greater flexible interaction and knowledge sharing during the project. For 
example, in a collaborative project for developing a complex new technology for 
rending films the partners engaged in mutual extensive knowledge exchange. As 
stated by an involved manager in this project, “without sharing knowledge and 
open communication between partners, I do not think we could have [a successful 
technological solution] from this collaboration” (Brunswicker et al., 2016). This 
greater flexible interaction and knowledge sharing for complex project increases 
the possibility of opportunistic risk of unintended knowledge sharing compared to 
projects having less complex problems. This greater possibility of opportunistic risk 
makes the knowledge segmentation more important in regulating knowledge 
sharing and protecting to ensure project successes. As a result, the importance of 
process formalization to enable successful completion of the project without 
losing critical knowledge increases when the problem is more complex. In sum, 
the positive relation between the level of process formalization and project 
performance is made even stronger when the problem becomes more complex, 
indicating that as projects take on more complex problems, the importance of 
formal process in creating successful innovations outcome increases. Thus, the 
following hypothesis can be developed: 
Hypothesis 2: Problem complexity moderates the relationship between level of 
formalized joint technology development process and project performance such 
that the relation is stronger with more complex problems.  
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3.4 Empirical Study  
3.4.1 Sample and Data Collection 
Most empirical quantitative studies on open innovation have been conducted at 
the firm level aggregated data (regularly using the Eurostat Community Innovation 
Survey-CIS-) with innovation performance measured at the firm level (Campbell & 
Cooper, 1999; Chesbrough & Brunswicker, 2014; Foss et al., 2011; Foss, Lyngsie, & 
Zahra, 2013; Laursen & Salter, 2006; Lhuillery & Pfister, 2009; Un, Cuervo‐Cazurra, 
& Asakawa, 2010). However, firms typically run innovation related activities 
through different projects (e.g., R&D projects) (Du, Leten, & Vanhaverbeke, 2014; 
Hobday, 2000; Sydow, Lindkvist, & DeFillippi, 2004). Innovation projects 
conducted in the same company can be either successful or less successful. Using 
firm level aggregated data makes the measurement of innovation performance, 
coming from heterogeneous projects, difficult (West, Salter, Vanhaverbeke, & 
Chesbrough, 2014). As a result, innovation performance should really be 
measured at the project level. Moreover, innovation projects have different 
attributes, even those managed in the same firm, that may differently affect the 
degree of joint process formalization. Faems et al. (2008) show the formalization 
level of behavioral monitoring is different in two joint projects conducted by the 
same partners. Others also reveal that degree of formalization is a project-specific 
variable (Kirsch, 1996; Kirsch, Ko, & Haney, 2010). In the current study, we argue 
that formalization is a project-specific variable. But, in many quantitative studies 
on open and collaborative innovation, formalization is almost always measured as 
an organizational level factor (Foss et al., 2011 Foss et al., 2013). The results of 
the paired-samples t-test show that there is significant difference in degree of 
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formalization between projects in the same firm in our sample, indicating that the 
formalization is unique to each project. 
In this study, we collected data on open innovation activities at the project level. 
Our sample includes large firms listed on the stock market with annual revenues of 
more than $250 million, total assets of more than $250 million, and more than 
1,000 employees in Europe and the United States (2445 large firms). Only large 
firms were selected to make sure that we could collect data at the project level. 
Small firms may not conduct project based innovation activities. Data collection 
was done via a global open innovation survey (using a questionnaire) between 
December 2014 and August 2015. Before sending the questionnaire out, we 
conducted a pilot test with one CEO, two CIOs, and two researchers working on 
open and collaborative innovation. The results of this pilot study gave rise to a few 
minor revisions of the initial questionnaire. 
We first collected the information of a minimum of two senior executives (e.g., 
CEOs, CIOs, CTOs, R&D Directors, Open Innovation Managers, etc.) from each firm 
as primary contacts including the name, email address, and phone number. Then, 
we sent them an email including the link of the survey. They were asked to select 
two open innovation projects6 (successful and less successful7) that they have 
completed within the last two years (we asked them to select recent projects to 
make sure that respondents are able to remember project activities to complete 
the survey). To minimize key-informant bias, we asked the primary contacts to 
                                                        
6 To make sure the respondents selected an open innovation project, we provided them with a 
definition of open innovation at the beginning of the survey. Open innovation implies that your 
organization makes purposive use of external know-how and capabilities and/or external paths to 
market, as your organization looks to accelerate internal innovation, and expand the markets for 
external use of internal innovation, respectively (Chesbrough, 2006)  
7 We provided the respondents with a definition about project success as follows: A successful 
open innovation project is a project that has successfully  supported the firm’s innovation strategy 
and targets, while a less successful project did not. 
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assign the most suitable respondent (e.g., project manager) to complete the 
survey based on the selected open innovation projects (Kumar, Stern, & Anderson, 
1993). To increase the response rate, we sent four reminder emails to those firms 
that did not complete the survey by the first email invitation. We also followed up 
by calling the contact persons. 
Finally, 121 large firms participated in our survey (response rate = 4.9 %.) Out of 
121 firms, 94 firms have engaged in open innovation. Only 59 firms (out of 94) 
completed the survey for one or two open innovation projects. We collected data 
on general firm characteristics from secondary data sources. The two-sample t-
test and the chi-square test were conducted to assess non-response bias. The 
results showed that our sample was not significantly different from the 
nonrespondent firms in terms of R&D expenditure, total revenue, total assets, 
number of employees, and industry group. 
In total, 59 firms completed the survey for 104 open innovation projects. 45 firms 
completed the survey for two open innovation projects (successful and less 
successful) and 14 firms only completed the survey for one project8. Having a pair 
of successful and less successful projects from the same firm enabled us to control 
for the organizational level factors such as organizational structure and culture 
that affect innovation. We had some missing values on the variables of interest. 
We performed the two-sample t-test and  the chi-square to test whether there 
were systematic differences in terms of other observed  variables in the study 
between projects with missing and without missing observations. No 
significant  differences were found. Moreover, a missing value did not depend on 
                                                        
8 We also compared early and late respondents based on key variables of this study by applying the 
ANOVA test. The results showed that there were no significant differences in terms of engagement 
with external sources, degree of formalization, and problem complexity, confirming there is no 
late-response bias.       
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the nature of variables and un observed values of the data set. As a result, 
variables are missing completely at random so that we  could exclude projects with 
missing values from the sample (Schafer & Graham, 2002).  Also, we checked for 
univariate (case-wise diagnostics) and bivariate (examining scatter plots) outliers 
(Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998). 22 projects (out of 104) were excluded 
from analysis because of a missing value (18 projects) for at least one of the 
variables of the study or for being outliers (four projects). Finally, our sample 
includes date from 82 open innovation projects from 59 different large firms.  
3.4.2 Measures 
To operationalize the constructs of our theoretical model, we applied measures 
from the existing literature based on the definitions adopted in this study. In this 
section, we briefly explain each measure.    
Depth of engagement with external sources: This construct refers to the extent to 
which firms interact intensively with different external sources to jointly complete 
an innovation project. Respondents were asked to indicate “how much of their 
time did the team members in the open innovation project spend to interact with 
external sources on average per week?” We followed previous studies on open 
and collaborative innovation for including customers, suppliers, competitors, 
universities, and start-ups as five different external sources (Brunswicker & 
Vanhaverbeke, 2015; Chesbrough & Brunswicker, 2014; Faems, Van Looy, & 
Debackere, 2005; Laursen & Salter, 2006). We asked respondents to provide a 
rough estimation about the time spent in the interaction with external sources 
based on a five-point scale: 1) No time at all, 2) Less than 25%, 3) Between 25% 
and 50%, 4) Between 50% and 75%, and 5) More than 75%. To measure the depth 
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of engagement, we developed an aggregate measure as the sum of the allocated 
time with the five different external sources. 
Formalization of the joint technology development process: This construct was 
operationalized based on three items adapted from Kirsch (1996) to measure the 
extent to which firms specify and enforce technological activities to be followed by 
partners to jointly develop a technology in the form of procedures, manuals, and 
roles. We asked respondents to assess the following three items for the project: 1) 
We had an understandable, written sequence of activities supposed to be 
followed by internal and external actors 2) We had a set of established 
documents such as procedures, manuals, etc., that could guide involved external 
and  internal actors and 3) External actors were required to know a set of existing 
documents to achieve the project  goal. All items were assessed on a seven point 
Likert scale (1, Strongly Disagree 7, Strongly Agree). To measure level of 
formalization, we calculated the average of three items. 
Problem complexity: It refers to the number of involved tasks, components, or 
knowledge sets to complete the project and the degree of interdependency 
among them (Fernandes & Simon, 1999). Consistent with our definition, 
respondents were asked to describe the problem being solved in the project based 
on two items: 1) It involved a large number of highly interdependent tasks (they 
could not be completed independently) and 2) New tasks and interdependencies 
between them emerged unexpectedly. Both items were assessed on a seven point 
Likert scale (1, Strongly Disagree 7, Strongly Agree). The average of two items was 
calculated to measure the problem complexity. 
Project performance: We operationalized performance based on three items 
related to technical, managerial, and financial dimensions of projects (Akgün, 
Lynn, & Byrne, 2006; Foss et al., 2011; van de Vrande, Vanhaverbeke, & Duysters, 
2009). The survey asked respondents to answer “to what extent did you achieve 
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the following performance measures relative to your stated objective?”. Three 
measures are: 1) Number of new technological opportunities successfully 
introduced 2) Market reputation from results of the project and 3) Revenue from 
results of the project. The measures were assessed based on a four-point scale 
including9: 1) Less than 25%, 2) Between 25% and 50%, 3) Between 50% and 75%, 
and 4) More than 75%. We averaged the values of the three measures to create 
project performance. To find empirical proof of the validity of the performance 
measure, we applied the two-sample t-test to check whether the performance is 
significantly different between successful and less successful projects. Significant 
differences were found between them, indicating the validity of our performance 
measures. 
3.4.3 Construct Analysis (Reliability, Validity, and Common 
Method Variance) 
We built content validity using measures from the extant literature and 
contributions of three senior managers and two researchers in the pilot test of 
questionnaire, for improving the questions (MacKenzie, Podsakoff, & Podsakoff, 
2011). We applied an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) to test the dimensionality 
of the multiple items, as well as convergent and discriminant validity. We used 
maximum likelihood extraction and varimax rotation methods 10. The results 
supported our proposed four-factor structure of items (total explained 
                                                        
9 We provided respondents with an answer option “Not used at all” as well. So, they were not 
forced to answer if they did not use any of these items for measuring performance. 
10We performed the EFA with using different extraction and rotation methods (such as unweighted 
least squares and promax rotation) to make sure that the results are reliable. We found the same 
results from all methods, indicating the reliability of results.     
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variance=58.98%). Also, all items had standardized factor loadings exceeding the 
suggested cut-off value of 0.5 with the exception of the first item of problem 
complexity, however, this item was also very close to the suggested threshold 
(Fornell & Larcker, 1981; Hair et al., 1998). Moreover, all items loaded on the 
intended factor and no item was found with cross-loading. All these results 
support convergent and discriminant validity of the constructs (Fornell & Larcker, 
1981). 
Reliability of the constructs was tested based on corrected item-total correlation 
and Cronbach’s alpha. The corrected item-total correlation was higher than the 
cut-off value of 0.25 for all items (Ranging from 0.47 to 0.6) (Nunnally & Bernstein, 
1994). Also, Cronbach’s alpha coefficients (0.7 and 0.75 for the formalization and 
performance respectively) exceeded the accepted threshold value of 0.7 (Nunnally 
& Bernstein, 1994). Overall, these results indicate an adequate reliability of the 
measures in this study. 
Table 3.1: Factor Analysis Results 
       Factor 1       Factor 2     Factor 3     Factor 4 
Problem complexity item 1 0.145 0.263 0.476 -0.070 
Problem complexity item 2 -0.054  0.009  0.990 0.128 
Formalization item 1 0.131 0.677 -0.035 -0.085 
Formalization item 2 0.220 0.699 0.133 0.174 
Formalization item 3 0.117 0.542 -0.190 0.073 
Performance item 1 0.591 0.202 -0.070 0.107 
Performance item 2 0.682 0.070 0.149 0.034 
Performance item 3 0.766 0.219 -0.141 0.127 
Depth of engagement 0.204 0.078 0.440 0.974 
Eigenvalue 2.853 1.505 1.251 0.960 
Percentage of variance explained 17.18 15.67 14.56 11.58 
 
Our data were gathered from a single informant for each project through self-
report survey. Therefore, our data is vulnerable to CMV (Podsakoff & Organ, 
1986). To reduce the problem of CMV, we separated the dependent and 
independent variables proximally and also by using various scales (Podsakoff, 
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MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). We put the performance measures after our 
independent variables in the questionnaire when we designed the survey 
following Foss et al., (2011). To test the potential for the results of this study to be 
explained by CMV, we conducted the Harman’s single-factor test as the most 
widely used and rigorous statistical test for assessing CMV (Podsakoff et al., 2003; 
Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). We conducted this test based on EFA (e.g., Flores, 
Zheng, Rau, & Thomas, 2012; Foss et al., 2011; Jarvenpaa & Majchrzak, 2008). We 
entered all of the variables (performance, depth of engagement, problem 
complexity, and formalization) into EFA analysis (applying a principle component 
method for extraction). Then, we assessed the results of the unrotated factor 
solution to see how many factors should be extracted to explain variance of all 
variables. The logic of this approach is that if we have a serious amount of CMV, 
EFA should provide us with a single-factor  structure or the first factor accounting 
for a majority of variance of the variables (Podsakoff et al., 2003; Podsakoff & 
Organ, 1986). Our EFA analysis did not result in a single-factor structure, rather, it 
proposed the four-factor  structure. Moreover, the first factor extracted only 
33.52% of variance of all the variables. Therefore,  the results of this test provide 
evidence that although there is likely some CMV (i.e., method-related effects), the 
effect is not large enough to bias the results of our study. 
3.4.4 Statistical Methods 
Descriptive statistics and correlations are shown in Table 3.2. We do not have high 
collinearity  among the main constructs, indicating that multicollinearity is not an 
issue in our subsequent analysis. We also checked the distribution of our variables 
based on the skewness and kurtosis. The skewness and kurtosis of all variables are 
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within -1.2 and +0.5, indicating that the variables are normally distributed (CDATA-
West, Finch, & Curran, 1995). As can be seen in Table 3.2, there is a significant 
positive relationship between depth of engagement and level of formalization 
(r=0.18 and p<0.1). 
Table 3.2: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations 
    Mean Standard 
deviation 
      1        2      3      4 
1- Problem complexity (1-7)   5.20 1.39 -      
2 - Formalization (1-7) 
4.83 1.34 
  
0.24** - 
  
3 - Depth of engagement (1-20) 4.76 2.16 0.10  0.18* -  
4 - Performance (1-4) 2.42 1.05 0.07   0.27** 0.25* - 
 = p<0.1, **= p<0.05 
We followed regression based mediation analysis outlined by Baron and Kenny 
(1986) to test the first hypothesis. According to this approach, process 
formalization level (M) can be considered as a mediator for the relationship 
between depth of engagement (X) and project performance (Y) when the 
following four conditions are satisfied: 1) There is a significant relationship 
between X and M 2) There is a significant relationship between X and Y 3) There 
is a significant relationship between M and Y and 4) The relationship between X 
and Y should become non significant or significantly smaller when we control for 
the effect of M. As shown in the correlation matrix (Table 3.2), there is a 
significant positive relationship between depth of engagement and level of 
formalization (r=0.18 and p<0.1), thereby supporting the first mediation condition. 
We performed a three-step OLS regression analysis to test the other three 
conditions of mediation effect. We first included control variables to control 
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possible confounding effects11 (Model I), and then we added the main effect, 
depth of engagement (Model II). The last model included our mediation effect, 
formalization. To check whether multicollinearity is an issue in our regression 
analysis, we calculated the Variance Inflation factor (VIF) for the variables. The VIF 
for variables in the first model ranged between 1.07 and 1.18, indicating that 
multicollinearity does not create a problem for our model. 
A hierarchical approach was used for entering the independent and control 
variables in the OLS regression analyses to test the moderating effect of problem 
complexity on the relationship between formalization level and project 
performance. In the first step, we included the control variables, then we entered 
level of formalization and problem complexity. Finally, the interaction term 
between formalization and problem complexity were added. Adding an interaction 
term creates multicollinearity problems due to correlation with main independent 
variables. To avoid this problem, we centered the values of complexity and 
formalization on their means prior to multiplying them (Jaccard, Wan, & Turrisi, 
1990). The VIF for variables in this model ranged between 1.06 and 1.21, 
indicating that multicollinearity is not a serious problem for our model. 
We also checked the homoscedasticity assumption for both regression analyses by 
plotting the residuals against the predicted  values of project performance 
(dependent variable) and independent variables (i.e., depth of 
engagement,  formalization, problem complexity, and the interaction term). No 
                                                        
11 We included the number of internal employees ‎(full time equivalent)‎formally assigned to work 
on the project. Larger projects (more internal employees) have more resources to invest in 
collaboration with external partners that may affect the project outcomes. Moreover, we included 
a dummy variable to see whether a project is directly controlled by the CEO or not. Projects that 
are controlled by top-level managers such as CEOs have a certain importance and may be more 
likely to be supported.       
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pattern was found in the plots supporting  the homoscedasticity assumption (Hair 
et al., 1998). 
3.4.5 Results 
The results of the three-step Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis 
testing the first hypothesis are shown in Table 3.3. Based on model I, CEO control 
over a project has a significant effect on project performance, indicating the 
importance of controlling for it in the model. Including depth of engagement 
(model II) added significant variance (5% - ∆F=3.882, p<0.1). Depth of engagement 
with external sources is significantly and positively associated with project 
performance (β=0.215 and p<0.1) as predicted by the previous literature (Foss et 
al., 2011; Laursen & Salter, 2006). This result also supports the second condition 
for the mediation effect analysis. Also, entering formalization level led to a 
significant increase in variance (5% - ∆F=4.506, p<0.05). We found a positive 
significant relationship between formalization level and project performance 
(β=0.227 and p<0.05), supporting the third condition of the mediation effect. 
Finally, model III shows that after including formalization level, the relationship 
between depth of engagement and project performance became nonsignificant 
(β=0.215 and p<0.1 to β=0.176 and p=0.11), supporting the last mediation 
condition. 
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Table 3.3: Results of OLS Regression Analysis for Project Performance (Mediation 
Analysis) 
Variables       Model I       Model II      Model III 
Number of internal employees  
(Ln) 
0.061 (0.118) 0.035 (0.116) 0.022 (0.114) 
CEO control over project 0.216*(0.281) 0.191 (0.278) 0.192* (0.272) 
Depth of engagement  0.215* (0.053) 0.176 (2.033) 
Formalization   0.227** (0.084) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.04 0.07 0.11 
F-statistic 2.522*    
∆R2  0.05 0.05 
F change  3.882* 4.506** 
Standardized coefficients are reported and standard errors in parentheses.  = p<0.1 * = p<0.05 
Taken together, these results indicate that the relationship between depth of 
engagement and project performance is fully mediated by the level of process 
formalization, thereby supporting the first hypothesis. Our finding suggests 
introducing formality into joint technology development process is the 
prerequisite for deep engagement with external sources in order to  successfully 
complete the open innovation project. 
The results of hierarchical regression analysis to test the moderating effects of 
problem complexity  are revealed in Table 3.4. According to the change in F 
between the steps, entering variables from one  step to the next (for all steps) 
added significant variance, indicating a better model fit.  Adding the interaction 
term between complexity and formalization in the third step led to a significant 
improvement in R-squared (∆R2=0.04, F change=3.671, p<0.1). The results show 
that there is a positive and significant association between the interaction 
term  and project performance (β=0.21 and p<0.1), supporting the second 
hypothesis. 
To show the moderating effects of problem complexity on the relationship 
between formalization  and project performance with more details, we plotted the 
level of formalization against project  performance for low and high levels of 
problem complexity (± 1 standard deviation around the  mean). Figure 3.2 clearly 
98 | Page 
 
shows, consistent with the second hypothesis, the strength of the 
relationship  between formalization and project performance is  significantly 
dependent on the complexity of  the problem being solved in the open 
innovation  project. That is, introducing formality into the joint  technology 
development process has a positive effect on project performance and this 
positive  effect gets stronger when the problem becomes more complex. 
Table 3.4: Results of Hierarchical OLS Regression Analysis for Project 
Performance (Moderation Analysis) 
Variables       Step I       Step II      Step III 
Number of internal employees (Ln) 0.061 (0.118) 0.048 (0.117) 0.51 (0.115) 
CEO control over project 0.216*(0.281) 0.218* (0.277) 0.253**(0.031) 
Problem complexity  -0.05 (0.086) -0.053 (0.084) 
Formalization  0.267** (0.086) 0.213* (0.087) 
Problem complexity × Formalization    0.210* (0.073) 
Adjusted R2 0.04 0.08 0.11 
F-statistic 2.522*    
∆R2  0.07 0.04 
F change  2.970* 3.671* 
Standardized coefficients are reported and standard errors in parentheses.  = p<0.1 * = p<0.05 
 
To show the moderating effects of problem complexity on the relationship 
between formalization  and project performance with more details, we plotted the 
level of formalization against project  performance for low and high levels of 
problem complexity (± 1 standard deviation around the  mean). Figure 3.2 clearly 
shows, consistent with the second hypothesis, the strength of the 
relationship  between formalization and project performance is  significantly 
dependent on the complexity of  the problem being solved in the open 
innovation  project. That is, introducing formality into the joint  technology 
development process has a positive effect on project performance and this 
positive  effect gets stronger when the problem becomes more complex. 
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Figure 3.2: Moderating Effects of Problem Complexity on the Relationship 
between Formalization and Project Performance 
 
Problem complexity 
                 Low 
                 High 
3.4.6 Robustness Analyses 
To check the robustness of the results, we tested our moderated mediation model 
based on Edwards and Lambert (2007) analytical framework that improved the 
causal steps process of mediation analysis (Baron & Kenny, 1986) applied in this 
study. We performed two regression models. By the first model (Edwards & 
Lambert, 2007: Equation 3), we tested the effect of depth of engagement on 
formalization level. In the second model (Edwards & Lambert, 2007: Equation 10), 
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we included depth of engagement, formalization, problem complexity, and the 
interaction term between problem complexity and formalization12. The result of 
first regression model showed that there is a positive and significant relationship 
between depth of engagement and level of formalization (β=0.18 and p<0.1). 
Based on the second model, we found that the direct relationship between depth 
of engagement and project performance was fully mediated by process 
formalization. Also, the interaction term between problem complexity and 
formalization significantly affected project performance (β=0.19 and p<0.1). Also, 
the additional part of variance of project performance explained by the interaction 
term was significant (∆R2=0.03, F change=2.963, p<0.1). Overall, we found results 
which were the same as those found based on Baron and Kenny’ (1986) approach 
(coefficients of the interaction and mediator changed slightly but remained 
significant), indicating the robustness of our results. 
Given the significant positive effect of CEO control on project performance 
(β=0.216 and p<0.1), we tested the two hypotheses with controlling for board of 
director control over project. No substantial change was found for the mediating 
effect of formalization (β=0.225 and p<0.05) and the moderator effects (β=0.211 
and p<0.1). Likewise, we examined our hypotheses by including equity control of 
partners13 in project as another control variable. We found support for both 
hypotheses again. The results did not change dramatically and the mediating 
effect (β=0.211 and p<0.1) and the interaction between problem complexity and 
formalization (β=0.169 and p<0.1) were significant. 
                                                        
12 We also had two control variables in the regression including number of employees and CEO 
control over project.    
13 We used a dummy variable indicating whether firms had equity control via a joint board and 
committee in interaction with their external partners.   
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Moreover, we checked whether problem complexity had moderating effects on 
the relationship between depth of engagement and level of formalization and no 
significant effect was found. This suggests that problem complexity only 
moderates the relationship between the mediating variable (i.e., formalization) 
and project performance.  
3.5 Discussion and Implications 
While the use of deep external sources is related to successful innovation 
outcomes as expected by the literature (Foss et al., 2011; Laursen & Salter, 2006), 
this relationship of deep sources to outcomes is affected by the use of formalized 
joint technology development process. Our findings clearly show that, in order to 
manage the knowledge sharing and protecting conundrum in deep external 
collaborations, introducing formality into joint technology development process 
has a positive effect on open innovation project performance. The theoretical 
implication of our findings is that process formalization (in addition to formal legal 
IP control) needs to have a role in developing theories of using external sources 
particularly, a role which has been virtually ignored in previous studies of engaging 
in external sources (Cassiman & Veugelers, 2002; Laursen & Salter, 2014). As a 
result, future research should pay additional attention to the process 
formalization that firms require in order to ensure that open innovation is likely to 
result in successful technology development without the loss of critical intellectual 
property.  
The establishment of formal IP protection may not address specific activities of 
individuals from the partners, which may lead to sharing IP-related knowledge 
that should not be shared in the interaction (Berends et al., 2011). External 
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partners particularly, competitors may innovate around existing IP relatively fast, 
even if formal IP control is applicable during the interaction (Laursen & Salter, 
2014). Relationships between individuals in the deep interaction play a key role in 
managing sharing and protecting as they involve in daily sharing of knowledge 
(Berends et al., 2011; Jarvenpaa & Majchrzak, 2016). Managing sharing and 
protecting of knowledge becomes complicated when exactly what knowledge 
should be shared is not clear for individuals. Our findings have important 
theoretical implications for research on using external sources by suggesting that 
process formalization may support the legal formalization around IP control to 
manage the concern over knowledge sharing and opportunistic risk in open 
innovation projects (Cassiman & Veugelers, 2002; Laursen & Salter, 2014) by 
reducing the ambiguity that individuals have in terms of what IP-related 
knowledge needs to be shared and what needs to be protected. 
Our findings have also important theoretical implications for individuals´ 
autonomy in the deep interaction with external partners. Berends et al. (2011) 
indicate that the more individuals have the autonomy to have interactions with 
external partners, the more the collaboration will have the risk of sharing 
knowledge that needs to be protected. Similarly, Laursen and Salter (2014) argue, 
protecting IP is not only related to applying formal control but also related to 
forcing individuals to receive permission from the legal team before engaging with 
external sources (i.e., less autonomy). The lack of autonomy of individuals in deep 
interaction can create crucial barriers for successful collaboration with external 
partners as deep interaction happens through individuals from the parties. Our 
findings suggest that providing individuals with sufficient autonomy in open 
innovation projects is possible by clarifying what IP-related knowledge is 
permissible to be shared and what should be protected by the process 
formalization, thereby effectively guiding and enabling individuals to self-monitor 
and regulation of knowledge sharing during the open innovation project.  
  103 | Page 
 
Our findings have important implications for interactive self-regulatory theory for 
sharing and protecting knowledge in interorganizational collaborations, arguing 
the crucial role that flexible collaboration process plays, between interacting 
individuals who engage in daily sharing and protecting knowledge, in regulation of 
the sharing-protecting tension (Jarvenpaa & Majchrzak, 2016). Our findings 
suggest that flexible interaction between individuals in open innovation projects is 
primarily possible not because it implies informal self-organized decision making 
about knowledge sharing and protecting in an ad-hoc fashion but instead that 
decisions that are made based on formalized joint processes. Open innovation 
projects may particularly require such process formality because of the syndrome 
that individuals functioning within projects must simultaneously both trust and 
distrust their parties to protect themselves from opportunistic risk (Doz, 1996; 
Lewicki et al., 1998). The formal joint technology development process reduces 
the possibility of opportunism due to clarity not only about what knowledge 
should be shared but also about what knowledge should be protected, making 
flexible interaction with the parties in open innovation projects more feasible 
(Salter, Criscuolo, & Ter Wal, 2014).  
Our findings also introduce process formalization as a critical dynamic capability 
that needs to be in place for open innovation projects to succeed, explaining how 
successfully an individual on the project is able to manage the tension between 
knowledge sharing and protecting in the flexible interactive collaboration. This 
capability may help the parties improve their sensing capabilities through involved 
individuals within the interaction with external sources for better interpreting and 
identification of required knowledge for sharing (Jarvenpaa & Majchrzak, 2016). 
Also, formalized process improves the seizing capability (i.e., “the process of acting 
on sensed emotions by dynamically using knowledge segmentation actions”) of 
the parties through facilitating knowledge-segmentation actions (Jarvenpaa & 
Majchrzak, 2016: 16). 
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The process formalization presented in this study has also important implications 
for the literature on relational mechanisms in interorganizational collaborations, 
putting great emphasis on the importance of informal elements in creating trust 
between partner organizations to ensure collaboration success (Ring & Van de 
Ven, 1992, 1994). At first, it seems that there is a paradox between our findings, 
introducing formality into the joint technology development process, and the 
importance of informality and trust based relationship between organizations. In 
any informal and trusted relationship, there is some degree of distrust between 
the partners due to the concern over knowledge sharing and opportunistic risk 
(Lewicki et al., 1998). Particularly trust and distrust coexist between individuals in 
the collaboration when they want to make a decision about what knowledge can 
be shared that will not create problems for the home organization (Jarvenpaa & 
Majchrzak, 2016; Majchrzak et al., 2015). We believe that, instead of becoming a 
paradox, process formalization can help the parties manage distrust, particularly 
between individuals in deep interaction, by reducing opportunistic risk. Process 
formalization can reduce opportunistic risk by avoiding the ambiguity that 
individuals face in terms of what knowledge can be shared and what should be 
protected. As a result, the combination of formality and informality between the 
partners seems to be required to ensure open-innovation project successes 
without the loss of critical knowledge. 
The effect of formalization on innovation activities and routines has been 
demonstrated in past research about innovation performance, but typically it has 
been examined in the context of internal innovation (Brunswicker & 
Vanhaverbeke, 2015; Du et al., 2014; Foss et al., 2011). Our study also contributes 
to this literature by arguing for the importance of the joint process formalization 
in adapting and even shaping formal process and routines internal to firms. Much 
of the literature on external search has focused on the critical role of formalization 
in the context of internal innovation to improve internal capabilities for managing 
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innovation (Brunswicker & Vanhaverbeke, 2015), integration of knowledge (Foss 
et al., 2011), etc. However, the possible influence of joint process between the 
parties on internal formalization has not been specifically studied in the literature. 
In other words, the role of joint process has been ignored as a determining factor 
in formalization of activities and routines internal to parties. Internal formalization 
can prevent the development and implementation of the joint process 
formalization particularly, when the internal processes are inconsistent with the 
joint process (Doz, 1996; Ness, 2009). For example, when home organizations’ 
formalized process have limited communication channels between individuals in 
open innovation projects to talk to each other to understand the technological 
specifications that should be followed, the implementation of joint process 
formalization as a critical dynamic capability is limited (Faems et al., 2008). Our 
study suggests that the internal innovation activities are better when formalized 
based on the joint process to support the implementation of the formalized joint 
process.   
Our findings clearly show that the problem attribute (i.e., complexity) affects the 
formalization of the joint development process, therefore we assert that 
formalization is a project-specific concept. Thus, only focusing on firm level 
characteristics (and aggregated data) may lead to incomplete understanding (Du 
et al., 2014; Felin & Zenger, 2014). Our study suggests that for studying and 
building theory using external sources particularly, formalization of joint 
technology development in open innovation projects, we have to consider not 
only industry (van de Vrande et al., 2009; Veugelers & Cassiman, 1999) and firm 
level characteristics, but also the role of projects attributes. 
Finally, our findings may help to explain why some open innovation projects fail, 
as documented in previous studies (Majchrzak et al., 2015). One implication is to 
examine the dialogue of the parties to determine how they are self-regulating. 
Another implication is studying how inconsistency between internal practices of 
the parties can limit the implementation of joint development process 
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formalization, thereby limiting the sensing and seizing capability of the 
collaboration (Jarvenpaa & Majchrzak, 2016).  
3.6 Limitations and Future Research Directions 
This study has several limitations. Our findings are based on cross-sectional data 
and causal relation is problematic to establish based on cross-sectional dataset. 
For example, capability to establish process formalization may affect firm’s 
decision to intensively interact with external sources in their open innovation 
projects (i.e., it is possible to have opposite direction between depth of 
engagement and process formalization). Future research applying longitudinal 
and/or experimental designs can be helpful in making causality between variables 
of this study clear. But, accessing senior managers to collect longitudinal data or 
run experiment is very difficult as they are very busy. Also firm policies prevent 
senior managers from participation in research studies because of confidentiality 
of information. Thus, running such a study for clarifying causality is very difficult. 
Moreover, we collected data from a single source (i.e., one respondent from each 
project completed the survey). Thus, this study is vulnerable to common method 
variance. Although we applied some strategies to reduce this problem when 
developing the questionnaire and tested CMV based on a statistical test, but to 
decrease potential common method variance a multi-source approach should be 
applied in the future studies. Another limitation of this study is that we did not 
directly measure whether firms completed their open innovation project without 
losing critical knowledge. We only relied on theoretical argument to explicate the 
role of process formalization in knowledge protecting, which in turn leads to 
project successes (Jarvenpaa & Majchrzak, 2016). As a result, we encourage future 
studies to directly measure the level of losing critical knowledge in open and 
collaborative projects. 
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Chapter 4: What’s‎Your‎‘Open‎Innovation‎Mode’?‎
Problem Types and Open Innovation 
Governance Modes14 
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4.1 Abstract  
Firms use a variety of governance modes to manage their open innovation 
projects, ranging from bilateral partnerships to open innovation communities. This 
paper examines how the choice of a particular mode is influenced by two project 
attributes: Problem complexity and hiddenness of knowledge. Using a dataset of 
104 open innovation projects, we compare different problem types and the 
preferred modes for them: markets, partnerships, platforms, or communities. The 
choice of market and platforms seems to be straightforward. However, using 
partnerships and communities is challenging. Our results guide managers in 
choosing the mode that ‘fits’ best with a particular problem type.    
4.2 Introduction 
Open innovation is becoming pervasive among large firms; they are increasing 
investments in both financial and managerial resources devoted to open 
innovation (Brunswicker, Chesbrough, & Bagherzadeh, 2016 Chesbrough & 
Brunswicker, 2014). There is quantitative and qualitative evidence that greater 
openness may increase a firm’s innovation capacity, that is, its ability to solve a 
firm’s central innovation problems effectively and efficiently (Felin & Zenger, 
2014; Jarvenpaa & Välikangas, 2014; Laursen & Salter, 2006; Majchrzak, 
Jarvenpaa, & Bagherzadeh, 2015). While this evidence may convince managers to 
shift from closed towards open innovation, it does not provide an answer to the 
question of which governance mode of open innovation is the best choice for a 
particular project or innovation problem. Indeed, open innovation comes in 
various governance modes (henceforth ‘modes’): Bilateral partnerships, licensing 
agreements, innovation contests, and innovation crowdsourcing are examples of 
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the various modes from which a manager may choose (Felin & Zenger, 2014; 
Malhotra & Majchrzak, 2014). 
When exploring existing cases studies on open innovation, we learned that in 
some cases managers prefer to use more traditional modes such as bilateral 
partnerships (Keil, Maula, Schildt, & Zahra, 2008), while in other cases they use 
more ‘novel’ modes such as open innovation contests or challenges (Malhotra & 
Majchrzak, 2014) that involve a large number of problem solvers, including 
‘strangers (Bahemia & Squire, 2010; Chesbrough, 2012). In light of this variety, a 
manager’s key decision shifts from the choice between open versus closed 
innovation to a choice among multiple modes with varying degrees of ‘openness’. 
For example, the open innovation modes that biotechnology and pharmaceutical 
companies select to use the knowledge of external partners in their open 
innovation projects vary along the two stages of bio-pharmaceutical R&D process, 
namely drug discovery and drug development (Bianchi, Cavaliere, Chiaroni, 
Frattini, & Chiesa, 2011 Chiaroni, Chiesa, & Frattini, 2009). Most of the existing 
advice on selecting the right open innovation modes takes a firm-level 
perspective. For example, some studies suggest that factors specific to a particular 
firm or industry, such as firm size or environmental uncertainty, are critical 
contingencies for the effectiveness of a particular open innovation mode (van de 
Vrande, Vanhaverbeke, & Duysters, 2009; Veugelers & Cassiman, 1999). However, 
advice drawn from such studies may mislead managers as it neglects the 
particularities of the problem that the firm wants to solve in a specific project. 
Indeed, the recent, more theoretically-driven discussion on open innovation 
suggests problem attributes determine the effectiveness of a particular mode 
(Felin & Zenger, 2014). One of these attributes is the complexity of the problem to 
be solved in a particular project. For complex technological problems many 
technical and market related factors interact in an unpredictable manner. To 
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understand these complex interdependencies, a transactional towards open 
innovation may be insufficient, as only with adequate dialogue and knowledge 
exchange can people grasp these complex interdependencies (Felin & Zenger, 
2014; Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000; Nickerson & Zenger, 2004). This might explain 
why managers often opt for traditional partnerships in which trusted knowledge 
exchange is possible  (Felin & Zenger, 2014). 
However, there is another project attribute, namely ‘hiddenness of knowledge’, 
that might explain why managers choose more novel modes such as open 
innovation contests and open innovation intermediaries, which have become 
more popular in recent years in the discussion of open innovation (Afuah & Tucci, 
2012; Jeppesen & Lakhani, 2010; Malhotra & Majchrzak, 2014). If a firm has little 
understanding about which technological area to explore for a solution or where 
the optimal solution is located, they might opt for modes that involve a large 
number of problem solvers. Open innovation challenges and contests bring more 
‘eyeballs’ to the problem by broadcasting the problem widely to a large pool of 
potential problem solvers (Malhotra & Majchrzak, 2014). This diverse crowd may 
provide access to hidden and unexpected ideas that the internal project team had 
not been aware of at the beginning of the project (Malhotra & Majchrzak, 2014). 
However, open innovation contests also require firms to communicate widely and 
raise additional management challenges, including how to design appropriate 
incentive structures and mechanisms for preventing loss of control over 
innovation-related know-how. So does the hiddenness of knowledge trigger 
managers to choose a contest over a partnership? 
In sum, the existing work on open innovation on the interplay between problem 
types and open innovation modes is fragmented and comparative cross-project 
analysis is needed to make an empirical claim about which is the right open 
innovation mode for a particular project. We need more integrated and nuanced 
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advice on the archetypes of open innovation modes and their fit with a particular 
innovation problem. To create such a nuanced view, this study asks the following 
questions: Which open innovation modes do managers choose for projects 
characterized by different levels of complexity and hiddenness of knowledge? We 
take a two-stage approach to answering this question by combining a survey study 
with a case study analysis. First, we explore data of 104 open innovation projects 
in large firms in the US and Europe collected in a global open innovation survey in 
2014 and 2015. We looked specifically at the contingent role of the project 
attributes, namely complexity and hiddenness of knowledge, in the choice of a 
particular open innovation mode. We complement this quantitative analysis with a 
case study analysis of six successful open innovation projects to gain deeper 
insight into the interplay between problem types and open innovation modes. 
Our findings show that firms use open innovation for four different problem 
archetypes. Our study reveals a clear link between a particular problem type and a 
manager’s choice among four open innovation modes: (1) Markets, (2) open 
innovation partnerships, (3) open innovation platforms, and (4) open innovation 
communities. These modes differ with respect to three governance dimensions: 
(1) the communication channels used to interact with external partners to support 
knowledge sharing, (2) the incentive structures used to motivate the external 
partners to engage in the problem solving process, and (3) and the control over IP 
to appropriate value from the problem solving process (Felin & Zenger, 2014). 
Thus, the four open innovation modes differ in terms of the degree of support for 
solution search. If the project is only challenging in one dimension, such as 
hiddenness of know-how, the choice to be made is clear: Projects with high 
hiddenness of know-how trigger the use of open innovation platforms that make 
use of diversity of sources for solution search. However, grand challenges, highly 
complex projects in which know-how is truly hidden, are puzzling. Our results have 
immediate managerial implications. They provide managers with a decision 
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framework to guide theoretically grounded and empirically supported decisions on 
how to choose the right open innovation mode for the problem at hand. 
4.3 Attributes of Open Innovation Project: A Problem 
Solving Perspective 
There are a variety of firm-level and industry-level attributes that are important 
when managing open innovation (van de Vrande et al., 2009; Veugelers & 
Cassiman, 1999). However, the recent work on open innovation calls for a project-
level and problem-centric view (Du, Leten, & Vanhaverbeke, 2014; Felin & Zenger, 
2014; Macher, 2006; Nickerson & Zenger, 2004). In essence, open innovation 
serve the firm’s interest in solving innovation problems in an effective and 
efficient way. Such open innovation projects may relate to different kinds of 
innovation problems. Felin and Zenger (2014), in their recent theoretical 
discussion on open innovation, suggest that depending on the nature of the 
problem, firms have to engage in different solution search approaches. They 
differentiate between two different search approaches: 1) directional search (also 
called trial and error search), which describes a search processes guided by 
feedback or experience through trial-and-error testing a various kinds of solutions 
and 2) theory-driven search (also called cognitive search), referring to a processes 
in which the problem solvers evaluate the results of potential solutions by 
analyzing the underlying mechanisms of why the solution would be potentially 
successful or not before the solution is actually implemented. Felin and Zenger 
(2014) state “[theory driven/cognitive] search is necessary when problems are 
complex” whereas “directional search is warranted when problems are 
decomposable [not complex]” (Nickerson & Zenger, 2004). Others argue that 
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“problems also differ in the degree to which the sources or location of knowledge 
deemed relevant are known to the manager” which require different search 
approaches (broad search and local search) (Felin & Zenger, 2014; Fernandes & 
Simon, 1999). It is argued that a broad search is needed when the location of 
knowledge is unknown to the project team. These theoretical contributions 
suggest that problem complexity and hiddenness of knowledge are two important 
problem attributes that make one of the search approaches more appropriate 
than the other. This theoretical discussion resonates with the broader literature 
on open innovation, which suggests these two project attributes are important 
when choosing a particular mode for a project. In addition of these two problem 
attributes, the tacitness or noncodifiability of problem (i.e., knowledge and 
information related to problem) is considered as another problem attribute that 
can affect the selection of search approach (Afuah & Tucci, 2012). Modularity of 
problem is also studied as another attribute that can play an important role in 
solution search (Afuah & Tucci, 2012). However modularity of problem is treated 
as a separate attribute, but it is highly related to complexity of problem. Most 
simple problems are easy to decompose and more modular. In the current study, 
we focus on the following two important problem attributes based on the recent 
more theoretical and comparative discussion of governance mode for open 
innovation (Felin & Zenger, 2014).     
4.3.1 Problem Complexity 
Problem complexity is defined based on the number of involved tasks, elements, 
or knowledge sets and the degree of interdependency among them  (Fernandes & 
Simon, 1999). In an abstract way, complex innovation problems imply that the 
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final technological solution is influenced by multiple factors. Complex problems 
are comprised of a large number of highly interdependent tasks, elements, and 
knowledge sets. Therefore, complex problem are difficult to decompose as one 
part of the solution, such as technology, might influence another part of the 
solution, and also the overall value of the solution (Fernandes & Simon, 1999). An 
example of a complex problem that one of the companies in our case studies was 
attempting to solve is related to developing a new process technology for the 
elimination of vacuum-based processes in the production of electronic devices 
including many technical and market related factors interact in an unpredictable 
manner. Another complex problem from our case studies is related to developing 
a new technology for rendering movies, which requires different interdependent 
knowledge sets such as cloud computing and animation technologies. 
4.3.2 Hiddenness of knowledge 
The hiddenness of knowledge is defined in terms of the degree to which the 
sources or locations of knowledge deemed relevant to develop a solution for the 
problem at hand are known to a firm and project team (Felin & Zenger, 2014; 
Fernandes & Simon, 1999). Sometimes, firms and project teams do not know 
which external parties have the relevant knowledge and ability to solve a firm’s 
innovation problem. This hiddenness of knowledge creates many difficulties in 
solving innovation problems as firms are not able to start a collaboration or 
contract until they have identified the individual or company with whom the 
relevant solution knowledge lies. An example of hidden knowledge from our case 
studies is related to Pfizer project related to design a tech-enabled locker for 
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distributing prefilled syringes. This project required really novel solution concepts. 
However, the novel and optimal solutions were unknown for Pfizer. 
4.4 Open Innovation Modes for Solving Innovation 
Problems 
As mentioned earlier, firms can choose from a variety of modes to govern the 
problem solving process (Chesbrough & Brunswicker, 2014). While some firms still 
opt for more traditional modes such as alliance partnerships, joint ventures (Keil 
et al., 2008), and licensing contracts (Arora & Fosfuri, 2003; Li-Ying & Wang, 2015), 
others make use of the crowd (Afuah & Tucci, 2012; Kathan, Hutter, Füller, & 
Hautz, 2015; Malhotra & Majchrzak, 2014) to solve an innovation problem. For 
example, General Electric (GE) launched the Ecoimagination challenge and invited 
creative entrepreneurs, small businesses, and creative thinkers via an open call to 
submit their ideas and solutions for a particular clean-tech problem (Chesbrough, 
2012). 
In this study, we build upon Felin and Zenger (2014) and differentiate four 
archetypes of open innovation modes: (1) Markets, (2) open innovation 
partnerships, (3) open innovation platforms, and (4) open innovation 
communities. These archetypes differ in terms of three governance dimensions: 
(1) the communication channels used to interact with external partners to support 
knowledge sharing, (2) the incentive structures used to motivate the external 
partners to engage in the problem solving process, and (3) and the control over IP 
to appropriate value from the problem solving process (Felin & Zenger, 2014 
(Brunswicker, Bagherzadeh, & Lamb, 2016). Table 4.1 provides an overview of four 
122 | Page 
 
different modes in terms these three governance dimensions, which we will 
discuss in more detail below. 
 
Table 4.1: Comparative Analysis of Open Innovation Modes based on Three 
Governance Dimensions 
 
Markets Partnerships 
Open 
Innovation 
Platforms 
Firm’s‎Open‎
Innovation 
Communities 
Th
re
e 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 
d
im
en
si
o
n
s 
Communication 
channels 
Limited Strong Limited but 
wide 
Strong and wide 
Incentives Medium to 
highpowered  
incentives 
High-
powered, 
cooperative 
Moderate 
incentives 
Low to 
moderate 
incentives 
Control rights 
over technology 
and knowledge 
(IP) 
Usually high 
(and 
externally 
owned) 
Negotiable 
between firm 
and external 
partners 
Varied Varied 
4.4.1 Markets 
When engaging in markets and contracts, firms engage in transactional 
arrangements, usually with a single partner who owns a particular technology 
(Dahlander & Gann, 2010). Due to the contractual relationships, the external 
partner appropriates immediate value from their solution, and the control over 
intellectual property (IP) is usually quite transparent (Aghion & Tirole, 1994). Thus, 
the incentives to engage in the open innovation project are high. Also, compared 
to open innovation partnerships and communities (which will be discussed later), 
this mode implies little communication between the project team and the external 
partner. As a result, the exchange of knowledge is usually relatively low in a 
contractual relationship. Further, the diversity of sources involved is low. 
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4.4.2 Open Innovation Partnerships 
As a more collaborative category of mode, firms engage in a more open and 
interactive process of solving an innovation problem when opting for a 
partnership mode (Felin & Zenger, 2014). In partnerships, the allocation of control 
rights over existing and emerging technologies and knowledge is negotiable  
(Leiponen, 2008), ensuring effective value appropriation coming from joint 
collaboration. Therefore, external partners are motivated to intensively engage in 
the open innovation project. Relative to markets, we can think of partnerships as a 
set of governance modes with a more multidimensional and collaborative type of 
problem solving, providing richer communication channels between firms and 
their external partners (Ness, 2009). Thus, extensive knowledge sharing is 
supported by open innovation partnerships but at the same time the diversity of 
sources is limited. 
4.4.3 Open Innovation Platforms 
Open innovation platforms imply that firms tap into a large number of problem 
solvers who potentially have relevant know-how to solve the problem of the firm, 
usually via a call via the internet (Malhotra & Majchrzak, 2014). Open innovation 
platforms subsume governance modes labeled as innovation tournaments, 
contests, or competition. Some firms launch such platforms on their own. In some 
cases, however, they opt for open innovation service providers such as Ninesigma, 
which have access to a large pool of problem solvers. These service providers offer 
firms the ability to access the long-tail of possible solutions without having to 
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manage the overall problem solving process15. In open innovation platforms the 
control over IP is negotiable, and very often firms establish strong IP control over 
new solutions. Open innovation platforms imply a competitive situation among 
the problem solvers, who can range from creative individuals to specialists to 
start-up companies. Compared to markets and partnerships, the incentives to 
engage in the open innovation project are moderate. When using platforms, firms 
typically use incentive mechanisms such as prize money to compensate the 
participants who develop valuable solutions. Firms have a broad communication 
channel with a wide range of external partners in open innovation platforms but 
this communication channel does not provide for deep interactions. As a result, 
this mode supports access to a wide variety of external sources, but knowledge 
sharing is limited. 
4.4.4 Firm’s Own Open Innovation Community 
Firms set-up their own community to solve innovation problems in a collaborative 
manner with a group of individuals and organizations who share a common 
innovation vision (Dahlander & Piezunka, 2014). There are multiple motives for 
firms or individuals to participate in a firm’s sponsored open innovation 
community such as learning about new technologies or market trends, building 
reputation, or gaining efficiency benefits due to the sharing of innovation risks and 
costs (Füller, 2010). Control over IP is usually negotiated before the launch of the 
community and implemented with the help of legal terms and social norms and 
rules (Fauchart & Von Hippel, 2008). Overall, the incentives to engage in the open 
                                                        
15 http://www.ninesigma.com/(February, 2016) 
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innovation communities are high. Open innovation communities create a strong 
communication channel between the involved actors, making the process of 
problem solving highly interactive. Open innovation communities have the 
advantage of a high diversity of actors and communities support knowledge 
sharing among the diverse members. 
Also, the four open innovation modes differ in relation to the degree of support 
for solution search needs namely, (1) knowledge sharing, and (2) the diversity and 
number of actors involve (see Table 4.2) (Brunswicker at al., 2016). 
Table 4.2: Comparative Analysis of Open Innovation Modes with respect to Their 
Effect on  Solution Search  Needs   
Solution search 
needs 
Markets Partnerships Open 
Innovation 
Platforms 
Firm’s‎Open‎
Innovation 
Communities 
Knowledge 
Sharing 
Limited Strong Limited 
(Problem) 
 
Strong and 
multidimensional 
Diversity of 
sources 
involved 
Low Low High High 
4.5 About the Research: Design, Data, and Methods 
To furnish complete understanding of the interplay between problem attributes 
(i.e., complexity and hiddenness of knowledge) and open innovation modes, and 
to ensure well-founded conclusions, we combined a survey study with a case 
study analysis. In essence, our research method is both explorative and 
explanatory. 
126 | Page 
 
4.5.1 Survey Study 
First, we drew upon a survey database of 104 open innovation projects in large 
firms in Europe and the United States collected as a global open innovation 
executive survey between December 2014 and August 2015. Our sample includes 
large stock market listed firms with annual revenues of more than $250 million 
and more than 1,000 employees. First, the survey was sent to senior executives 
(e.g., Chief Executive Officers, Chief Technology Officers, R&D Director, Open 
Innovation Manager, etc.) as primary contacts at the firms’ headquarters. They 
were asked to select an open innovation projects that they have completed within 
the last two years. To make sure they selected an open innovation project, we 
provided them with a definition of open innovation16 at the beginning of the 
survey. To minimize key-informant bias, we asked our primary contacts to assign 
the most suitable respondent based on the selected open innovation project (e.g., 
project manager). This survey includes a set of measures at the project level for 
different problem attributes and different types of open innovation modes that 
improves previous survey-based researches on open innovation. Therefore, our 
empirical study significantly advances existing survey-based empirical 
examinations of open innovation modes, which are mostly concerned with the 
more traditional level of firm aggregated data (Faems, Van Looy, & Debackere, 
2005; Laursen & Salter, 2006). A number of statistical tests were conducted to 
assess non-response bias. The results showed that our sample was not 
significantly different from the sample frame in terms of revenue, number of 
employees, and firm age. We also compared early and late respondents on key 
                                                        
16 Open innovation implies that your organization makes purposive use of external know-how and 
capabilities and/or external paths to market, as your organization looks to accelerate internal 
innovation, and expand the markets for external use of internal innovation, respectively 
(Chesbrough, 2006). 
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variables of this study to test late-response bias. We found no significant 
differences, confirming there is no late-response bias. Perceptual measures were 
applied to operationalize the constructs based on their definition in this study, 
explicate in Table 4.4.  
We followed a three-step exploratory statistical analysis for the survey study to 
explore optimal fit between problem type and open innovation mode. First, we 
classified open innovation projects that have similar problem attributes (i.e., 
complexity and hiddenness of knowledge) into homogeneous clusters. Second, 
open innovation projects were clustered based on open innovation modes utilized 
on a specific project to develop homogenous groups of projects in terms of open 
innovation modes. Third, we examined how problem attributes relate to open 
innovation modes.   
4.5.2 Complementary Case Studies 
Secondly, to complement the quantitative analysis, we performed a case study 
analysis of six successful open innovation projects from our large survey sample. 
We conducted interviews with one or several project members via a semi-
structured interview protocol (lasting between 30 to 45 minutes) between June 
and October 201517. We also collected secondary data from company websites 
and other publically available information (such as documents provided by 
interviewees, press reports, company websites, etc.) to complement the primary 
data. All of interviews were recorded. We used a narrative interview technique to 
                                                        
17 Just for one case, we only relied on secondary data.  
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develop a deeper understanding about the nature of the problem attributes, the 
particularities of the open innovation mode in terms of the three governance 
dimensions (IP, communication channels, and incentives). We also probed the 
interviewees on the rationale behind choosing a particular mode for their project. 
Table 4.3: Case Information   
 Firm Name and Context of Project Data collection 
1 Clariant Chemical catalyst design: The project 
aimed to enrich Clariant’s portfolio of 
ActiSorb series of catalysts and 
adsorbents to help their customers 
achieve greater efficiency for the 
purification of hydrocarbon feedstock. 
 More than 100 pages of 
secondary information 
2 Bosch Non-electrochemical energy storage 
technology: The project had the 
objective to develop a new non-
electrochemical energy storage 
solution. 
 1 Interview 
 More than 50 pages of 
secondary information 
3 Pfizer Prefilled syringes:  The project was 
related to the design of a tech-enabled 
locker for prefilled syringes. 
 1 interview  
 Secondary information 
4 Eli Lilly Drug design: The project was related 
to discovering new chemical structures 
(compounds and molecules) with 
particular biological activity for 
developing new drugs. 
 1 interview 
 Secondary data 
5 Evonik Non-vacuum  process: for The 
objective was to develop a new 
technological solution for elimination 
of vacuum-based processes in the 
production of electronic devices. 
 2 interviews 
 Secondary data 
6 HP Labs Rendering movies technology: The 
project was related to developing a 
new technology for rendering movies. 
 2 Interviews  
 More than 100 pages of 
secondary information 
 
   
Table 4.4: Constructs, definition, and measures    
Construct Definition Measures Description 
Problem 
complexity 
It refers to the number of 
involved tasks, elements, or 
knowledge sets and the 
degree of interdependency 
among them. 
It involved a large number of highly 
interdependent tasks (they could not be 
completed independently) 
The respondents were asked to describe the problem 
being solved in the project based on these two 
measures on a seven point Likert scale (1, Strongly 
Disagree 7, Strongly Agree). Pearson correlation (0.55 
with P-value < 0.001) between these two items shows 
an adequate internal consistency which is higher than 
the cut-off value of 0.25 usually accepted. Thus, we 
calculated the mean score for these two items to have 
an overall score for the problem complexity. 
New tasks and interdependencies 
between them emerged unexpectedly 
Hiddenness 
of required 
knowledge 
It refers to the degree to 
which the sources or 
locations of knowledge 
deemed relevant are known 
for firms and project teams. 
We were able to identify the know-how 
required to solve the problem before we 
started interacting with external 
sources18. 
The respondents were asked to assess the project on a 
seven point Likert scale where 1 refers to “strongly 
disagree” and 7 refers to “strongly agree”. 
Open 
innovation 
modes 
It refers to mechanisms 
used to coordinate or 
govern the problem solving 
process with external 
partners
.
  
Contract/market Respondents were also asked to select the open 
innovation modes applied by the project team during 
problem solving (binary variable).  
 
Partnership 
Open innovation platforms (contests or 
open innovation intermediaries) 
Firm’s own open innovation communities 
                                                        
18 This item was used as a reverse item for measuring the hiddenness of required knowledge. 
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4.6 Findings 
First, we explain empirical evidence on problem types by introducing a typology of 
four problem types followed by evidence on open innovation modes applied by 
the project team. After that, we answer the question “how do problem types and 
open innovation modes interact?” 
4.6.1 A Typology of Project-Level Problem Types 
Our aim was to classify the problems addressed in the 104 open innovation 
projects. Thus, our first step was to identify distinct clusters of open innovation 
projects based on their problem attributes. On average, the 104 open innovation 
projects showed a relatively high complexity and moderate hiddenness of 
knowledge. The mean values for complexity and hiddenness of knowledge, both 
measured on a scale from 1-7, are 5.04 (standard deviation=1.47) and 3.49 
(standard deviation=1.82) respectively. These two variables (Pearson correlation 
coefficient = -0.038, P-value = 0.7) are not correlated, suggesting that complexity 
and hiddenness of knowledge are distinct problem attributes (Multicollinearity, 
which is a notable difficulty in cluster analysis and may overweight one of 
variables, is not an issue) (Punj & Stewart, 1983). 
Following Hair et al. (1998), we performed a two step procedure to cluster our 
projects using these two attributes. First, we conducted a hierarchical cluster 
analysis using the most commonly used Ward’s method, because this method 
provides the most homogenous results within a cluster and heterogonous results 
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across clusters, and the squared Euclidian distance measure. In addition to the 
Ward’s method, we also applied other methods for hierarchical clustering such as 
between-group and within-group linkage to check the degree of consistency 
between solutions (i.e., reliability). To decide upon the number of clusters, we 
relied on the agglomeration coefficients. We also inspected the dendogram. Based 
on the results, we took the seeds of the three-cluster, four-cluster, and five cluster 
solution to define a starting solution for the K-means clustering (Punj & Stewart, 
1983). After conducting the K-means clustering, we investigated the interrater 
reliability of three solutions between the hierarchical and the K-means clustering, 
using a Kappa test. We found a high degree of consistency for the four-cluster 
solution (with the highest Kappa coefficient of 0.86). The four-cluster solution was 
also interpretable and comparable in size. Thus, the four-cluster solution seemed 
to be the most appropriate number. To identify which clusters were significantly 
different based on involved variables to check the validity of the four-cluster 
solution, we applied the Analysis of variance (ANOVA) test and multiple two-
sample T-tests. Based on Analysis of variance (ANOVA), the two attributes showed 
significant differences at P-value < 0.001 between four clusters. Projects in cluster 
3 and 4 are significantly more complex than those in cluster 1 and 2. The required 
knowledge is more hidden (more unknown) for projects in cluster 2 and 4 
compared to those in cluster 1 and 3. We also checked the validity of the four-
cluster solution based on two external variables: (1) breadth of engaging with 
external sources in terms of the number of external sources, and (2) depth of 
engaging with external sources in terms of spending time to access or share know-
how which were not used for clustering (Ketchen & Shook, 1996). ANOVA test 
showed significant differences with respect to both breadth (P-value= 0.075) and 
depth (P-value= 0.049) across four clusters. In essence, we identified four distinct 
project types. Table 4.5 describes the four clusters with respect to the two 
problem attributes. 
132 | Page 
Table 4.5: Four Clusters of Open Innovation Projects based on Problem 
Attributes 
Problem 
Attributes 
(mean) 
C1: Simple 
Problem/ 
Known 
Knowledge 
(n=25) 
C2: Simple 
Problem/ 
Unknown 
Knowledge 
(n=13) 
C3: Complex 
Problem/ 
Known 
Knowledge 
(n=36) 
C4: Complex 
Problem/ 
Unknown 
Knowledge 
(n=30) 
ANOVA 
F-value 
(df=3) 
T-test 
t-value 
Complexity  
(5.04) 
3.46 3.27 6.03 5.93 88.973* 3, 4 > 1, 
2
**
 
Hiddenness 
(3.49) 
2.20 5.85 2.08 5.23 139.890
*
 2,4 > 1,3
**
 
      
2 > 4
*
 
Note: C = Cluster; n = Number of projects in each cluster * = P < 0.05  ** = P < 0.001 
Problem Type 1: Well-structured problems 
Cluster 1 (24% of the open innovation projects in our sample) describe projects 
that address a problem that is well-structured. The problem to be solved can be 
delineated from other problems and tasks. The problem can be well described, 
and translated into requirements, as the set of factors that influence the problem 
seem to be manageable. In type 1 problems, the project team has a clear 
understanding of the location of relevant knowledge for solving these problems. In 
essence, the solution know-how is not hidden but accessible. To illustrate this 
problem type, we turn to the Clariant chemical catalyst design project, one of six 
of our case study projects that we explored more deeply. In this project, Clariant, a 
world leader in specialty chemical manufacturing, wanted to complement its other 
ActiSorb adsorbent products to provide integrated solutions to meet the 
requirements of its clients for greater efficiency for the purification of 
hydrocarbon feedstocks 19 . Developing a new technology for purification of 
                                                        
19 <http://www.catalysts.clariant.com/bu/Catalysis/internet.nsf/023cfbb98594ad5bc12564e40055
5162/1f2fbe0521d9fc23c1257b1e0032460f?OpenDocument>. (February, 2016) 
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hydrocarbon feedstocks describes a well-structured problem as it did not relate to 
highly interdependent knowledge sets. Clariant understood the interdependencies 
among different parts of the technology very well. Moreover, they were aware of 
a fast and safe technology for removing mercury from natural gas that would 
provide a technical solution for the problem. This technology was developed by a 
team at Queen’s University in collaboration with Petronas, and is called “HycaPure 
Hg” technology20. The Petronas Vice President of the Technology and Engineering 
Division stated the technology was “already used at Petronas’s gas processing 
plants a few years and it demonstrated high adsorbent capacity and stable 
performance”21. 
Problem Type 2: ‘Holy grail’ problems 
Problems that fall in our cluster 2 (12.5% of the open innovation projects in our 
sample) are also relatively simple in a sense that the factors that describe the 
problem are not particularly interdependent. However, the location of relevant 
knowledge for solving them is not known and accessible for the internal 
stakeholders. Colloquially, companies refer to such problems as ‘holy grail’ 
problems, as they cannot identify the right solution knowledge even though they 
are able to describe the problem. One of our case projects that we explored 
deeper illustrates the nature of a ‘holy grail’ or a simple but obscure problem. In 
the non-electrochemical energy storage technology project, Bosch had a plan to 
develop a new non-electrochemical energy storage solution. Such a solution 
                                                        
20<http://www.rsc.org/chemistryworld/2015/03/mercury-removal-ionic-liquid-natural-gas>. 
(February, 2016) 
21  <http://www.chemanager-online.com/en/news-opinions/headlines/clariant-and-petronas-sign-
licensing-collaboration>. (February, 2016) 
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should maximize the use of renewable energy while ensuring lower cost and a 
more reliable electricity supply22. Before the launch of the open innovation 
project, Bosch was still relying on traditional electrochemical energy storage 
technology. With the emphasis of greater sustainability, their innovation goal was 
to identify an alternative technology that could substitute the existing electro-
chemical storage solution. Non-electrochemical technology was comprised of a 
limited number of technological areas and knowledge sets. Also, the 
interdependencies between different parts of technology that affect the success 
of the project were well-structured and understood. Moreover, at that time, new 
non-electrochemical technologies were already available and tested. As an open 
innovation manager at Bosch described it “we knew that there were technological 
[solutions] to fulfill our technical requirements” but we had no idea about the 
optimal and best solutions. Another project in our cases also falls into this 
category. In the Pfizer prefilled syringes project, Pfizer was focused on the design 
of a tech-enabled locker for prefilled syringes. “Essentially, this was a way that we 
could better understand when people are taking medication that's in a syringe - 
that they were actually adhering to [prescribed protocol doses],” mentioned the 
Open Innovation Manager at Pfizer. The design was relatively simple as it was 
relatively well defined and independent from other technical or market-related 
factors and challenges. However, this project required novel solution concepts and 
the optimal solution was unknown for Pfizer. Even though they have developed 
several designs before, they have not been successful in finding an effective 
solution. 
  
                                                        
22 <https://boschenergystoragesolutions.com/>. (February, 2016) 
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Problem Type 3: Complex Problems 
They (34.7% of the open innovation projects in our sample) are very complex 
problem as there are so many different factors that influence the overall problem, 
and these factors interact in a complex way. Despite this complexity, the internal 
open innovation team is aware of the location of relevant knowledge for solving 
this type of problem. The challenge lies in tackling the complexity of the problem 
space. The HP/DreamWorks rendering movies technology project, falls into this 
category. This complex open innovation project at HP labs was focused on the 
development of rendering technologies. Since 2003, HP was focused on 
developing a new technology for rendering movies. At that point in time, the 
technology was completely new to the market. The project was technologically 
complex because it required different parts and knowledge sets such as data 
storage computing, animation technologies, and animation and these technologies 
are particularly interdependent. However, HP had developed a significant level of 
understanding of the broader technological problem and was able to identify the 
technological area and also the leading expert in the field of animation. In short, 
they could easily identify the technology area and right partner that were of 
relevance for their innovation problem.   
Problem Type 4: Grand Challenges 
The projects that fall in category 4 (28.8% of the open innovation projects in our 
sample) are complex and at the same time the location of relevant technological 
know-how or solution potentials for solving the grand problems is not accessible. 
They represent truly ‘grand challenges’ for firms. Two of our case studies were 
related to such a grand challenge. In the Evonik Non-vacuum process project, 
Evonik focused on developing a new technology to eliminate vacuum-based 
processes in the production of electronic devices. Indeed, this technology is 
essential for applications such as flexible and printable electronic devices. It is a 
central emerging technology in the field of chemical materials and related to a 
very uncertain and emerging technological area. The technology field was very 
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novel and uncertain, and also customers’ requirements for the technology were 
not yet well-defined. Thus, there were multiple factors that influence the process 
of electronic device production that needed to be taken into consideration and 
made the problem complex. Further, the potential solution knowledge was 
beyond the current knowledge of Evonik’s scientists or its existing partners. The 
potentially relevant solution concepts were unknown for Evonik. The Eli Lilly drug 
design project also related to a grand challenge. The project was focused on drug 
discovery, which is a relatively complex process as the compounds and molecules 
interact in a complex and non-linear way.  Discovering new chemical structures for 
drugs implies a level of uncertainty in the potential biological interactions and 
activities of a compound. This makes the nature of this problem highly complex. 
Further, the ideal chemical structure for a desired pharmaceutical application is 
often unknown, and the network of scientists and researchers working on 
molecules for a wide range of applications is widespread. This makes assessing the 
location of the best solution very difficult. Figure 4.1 illustrates our problem 
typology and displays the case example projects used to illustrate the nature of 
the problem. 
Figure 4.1: Typology of Four Problem Types and Case Study Examples 
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4.6.2 Empirical Evidence on the Use of Different Open 
Innovation Modes 
Next, we focused on the categorization of our projects with respect to the 
dominant open innovation mode used to solve the project’s innovation problem. 
In essence, we explored how the 104 open innovation projects group together 
with respect to the open innovation modes adopted by the project team. To 
realize this, we conducted a two-step cluster analysis using a log-likelihood 
similarity measure. We applied a two-step method as our variables are binary 
(This method can cluster categorical variables as opposed to other methods of 
clustering such as hierarchical and non- hierarchical cluster analysis, which require 
continuous variables). To cluster our projects, we used binary variables measuring 
whether the project used a particular type of different open innovation method or 
not. Respondents were able to select multiple modes for a particular project. 
Based on the Silhouette measure of cohesion and separation, the four-cluster 
solution with cluster quality around 0.5 (considered as a good quality) were 
selected. The four-cluster solution provided us with interpretable clusters. Also, 
we checked the validity of the four-cluster solution based on three external 
variables (breadth of engaging with external sources, depth of engaging with 
external sources, and IP control) as it is the standard approach to validate clusters 
(Ketchen & Shook, 1996). ANOVA test showed significant differences in relation to 
the both breadth (P-value= 0.013) and depth (P-value= 0.015) across four clusters. 
The results showed that projects applying open innovation platforms and 
community had interaction with a wide variety of external sources (greater 
number of sources) compared to those projects with markets and partnerships 
mode. Also, Chi-square test revealed significant differences regarding the IP 
control over emerging technologies among four clusters (P-value=0.002). They 
support the validity of the four-cluster solution. Table 4.6 describes the four 
clusters of open innovation projects with respect to the clustering variables used. 
We also present which categories our case examples fall into in this classification
 Table 4.6: Four Clusters of Projects based on Open Innovation Modes 
Open Innovation Modes 
(Frequency in total sample) 
C1: Markets 
 (n=41) 
C2: Open Innovation 
Platforms (n=13) 
C3: Community 
(n=36) 
C4: Partnerships  
(n=14) 
 
Markets/Contracts (71.2%) Yes (100%) Yes (69.2%) Yes (66.7%) No (100%)  
Partnerships (51%) No (63.4%) No (69.2%) Yes (77.8%) Yes (11.3%)  
Firm’s Innovation Community 
(34.6%)  
No (100%) No (100%) Yes (100%) No (100%)  
Open Innovation Platforms 
(21.2%) 
No (100%) Yes (100%) No (75%) No (100%)  
Case example  Clariant chemical 
catalyst design 
Bosch non-
electrochemical  
energy storage 
technology 
Evonik  
non-vacuum  
 process 
HP/DreamWorks 
rendering movies 
technology 
 
   Pfizer Prefilled  
syringes 
Eli Lilly drug design   
Note: C = Cluster; n = Number of projects in each cluster 
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We will next describe each cluster in more detail. Each cluster represents a project 
category in which a certain open innovation mode is dominating: 
Cluster 1: Market   
Projects in cluster ‘market’ are dominated by a contractual transactional 
governance mode (39.4% of the open innovation projects in our sample are 
represented in this cluster). In comparison to the cluster two and three, projects in 
this cluster rarely rely on a community or an open innovation platform. In the case 
“Clariant chemical catalyst design”, we found the use of this mode. To access the 
required technology for their innovation problem, they negotiated a licensing 
agreement with Petronas by which Petronas’ technology, “HycaPure Hg” 
technology for removing mercury from natural gas, can be used by Clariant to 
complement its portfolio of ActiSorb series adsorbents23 to provide integrated 
solutions to meet the requirements of clients. The licensing agreement creates a 
strong incentive for the solution provider Petronas. It also offers Petronas with 
strong control over underlying intellectual property rights. 
Cluster 2: Open Innovation Platform 
The second cluster is labeled as Open Innovation Platform (12.5% of the open 
innovation projects in our sample are included in this cluster). Open innovation 
projects that fall into this category rely heavily on open innovation platforms, such 
as innovation contests and tournaments. These platforms make use of strong and 
powerful incentives to ignite the competition among the participants in the hopes 
to eventually have access to an innovative solution. The team of the open 
innovation project related to non-electrochemical energy storage technology run 
by Bosch falls into this category: They “used one of the existing internet based 
                                                        
23 <http://www.catalysts.clariant.com/C12576850036A6E9/2B45555E0DD48E3AC1257CA8002271
69/$FILE/clariant-and-petronas-sign-licensing-collaboration_en.pdf>. (February, 2016) 
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platforms for crowd sourcing” to find the most effective non-electrochemical 
energy storage solutions. They selected NineSigma as an open innovation 
intermediary24 due to their reputation as a leading open innovation service 
provider who offers end-to-end solutions for their clients. Bosch paid a service fee 
to NineSigma to launch a call for proposal among their network of scientists and 
researchers. Strong financial incentives motivated the participation in the call. The 
negotiation of IP right was essential in this case. Pfizer also relied on an open 
innovation platform to design a tech-enabled locker for prefilled syringes. They 
decided to work with IdeaConnection.com, an open innovation intermediary that 
offers to deliver their clients “brilliant”, timely, and cost-effective solutions in 
areas such as R&D-focused problem solving, idea generation, as well as tech-
scouting. Pfizer opted for an R&D focused problem solving service as the objective 
was to learn about already tested solutions that could be potentially 
implemented. In this case, IdeaConnection also established a competition 
situation among the participating problem solvers. Clear IP rights were essential to 
ignite the participation. In both cases, the sponsor needs to at least create the 
option to gain usage rights to the solution developed by the external problem 
solver. Both project were highly successful projects, and met the objectives of the 
sponsor in terms of firm benefits and costs. 
Cluster 3: Open Innovation Community 
This cluster is labeled as open innovation community. It includes 34.6% of the 
open innovation projects in our sample. These are open innovation projects that 
are dominated by a firm’s own innovation community. They do not make use of 
open innovation platforms such as contests, crowdsourcing, or open innovation 
                                                        
24 NineSigma is an open innovation intermediaries that connects firms with external sources of 
innovation and technology developers to facilitate innovation. 
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intermediaries. The Evonik case falls in this category. To find solution concepts to 
for the elimination of vacuum-based processes in the production of electronic 
devices, Evonik created their own community that integrated a diverse set of 
organizations and also individual experts. The community integrated potential 
customers in the electronics industry, universities and research centers, and 
equipment suppliers. In this community all partners interacted in a collaborative 
way, and exchanged knowledge to develop novel solutions. This community was 
created a joined common pool of knowledge in which social norms complemented 
legal mechanism (contracts) to facilitate the protection and sharing of know-how 
within the community. Our Eli Lilly drug design case example that deals with drug 
discovery also uses a collaborative virtual environment called the Open Innovation 
Drug Discovery (OIDD) platform that allows external problem solvers to share their 
new chemical designs with internal Lilly scientists. In this case, digital technologies 
facilitated the community members to both share as well as protect their sensitive 
information.  
Cluster 4: Open Innovation Partnerships 
The last cluster is labeled as Partnerships and included 13.5% of the open 
innovation projects in our sample. This cluster is dominated by partnerships, in 
which firms engage in collaborative arrangements with other organizations. Our 
HP/DreamWorks Animation case falls into this category. To develop a new 
technology for rendering films, HP strategically chose to partner with an animation 
technology leader (DreamWorks). The collaboration focused on mutual exchange 
rather than contractual and arm-length relationships. Face-to-face meetings but 
also virtual collaboration supported the bilateral collaboration. 
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4.6.3 The Interrelationship between Problem Types and 
Open Innovation Modes 
The most important question that needs to be answered next is: How do problem 
types and open innovation modes interact? Thus, we performed a Chi-square test 
to statistically explore whether there is a relationship between problem types and 
the open innovation modes chosen for a particular open innovation project. We 
applied the test to explore the preferred open innovation modes for different 
levels of complexity and hiddenness of knowledge. An overview of the results is 
summarized in Table 4.7. Also a summary of six complementary open innovation 
projects including the rationale for choosing particular open innovation mode is 
provided in Table 4.8. 
Table 4.7: Chi-square Test for Relationship between Problem Types and Open 
Innovation Modes 
 Open Innovation Modes 
Market 
 (n=41) 
Open 
Innovation 
Platform 
(n=13) 
Open Innovation 
Community 
(n=36) 
Open Innovation 
Partnerships 
(n=14) 
Problem 
types  
Well-
Structured 
Obs. 12 
Exp. 9.9 
 Obs. 6 
Exp. 3.1 
 Obs. 5  
Exp. 8.7 
Obs. 2  
Exp. 3.4 
Holy Grail Obs. 4 
Exp. 5.1 
 Obs. 4 
Exp. 1.6 
 Obs. 3  
Exp. 4.5 
Obs. 2  
Exp. 1.8 
Complex 
Problems 
Obs. 12 
Exp. 14.2 
 Obs. 1 
Exp. 4.5 
 Obs. 18  
Exp. 12.5 
Obs. 5  
Exp. 4.8 
Grand 
Challenges 
Obs. 13 
Exp. 11.8 
 Obs. 2 
Exp. 3.8 
 Obs. 10  
Exp. 10.4 
Obs. 5  
Exp. 4.0 
Chi square= 16.166, df=9, p-value=0.064 
Note: Obs. = Observed frequency of projects Exp: = Expected frequency of projects df = degree of 
freedom 
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The results reveal clear decision patterns and suggest that the problem type is 
associated with a particular open innovation mode. Indeed, the preferred open 
innovation mode is different across four different problem types. The Chi-squared 
test shows that the differences in adopting open innovation modes are statistically 
significant across four distinct problem types (Chi-square=16.166 with p-
value=0.064). We will discuss this along the four categorizations of problem types: 
Type 1 – Simple (well-structured) problems, Type 2 - Simple obscure problems 
(holy grail problems), Type 3 – Complex problems, and Type 4 – Grand Challenges.  
Well-structured problems tend to ease the decision to engage in a transactional 
relationship and use open innovation markets to access the external know-how 
(e.g. via licensing agreements). Such problem types are more frequently 
associated with markets. In the Clariant chemical catalyst design project, they did 
not need to have extensive sharing with external partners as the problem was 
simple and well-structured. And at the same time, they were aware of “HycaPure 
Hg technology” which allowed for Petronas to solve their problem. Thus, they 
negotiated a licensing agreement with Petronas. They had to create strong 
incentives for Petronas to grant an exclusive usage license. 
Type 2 problems - holy grail problems – are associated with open innovation 
platforms. These projects make use of open innovation contests or open 
innovation intermediaries to increase the diversity of the expertise and knowledge 
with the hopes to create truly novel ‘outlier’ solutions. Indeed, open innovation 
intermediaries such as Ninesigma, Innoconnection.com, or Inncentive propose to 
their clients, access to unique solutions that are beyond and outside of their 
existing area of expertise. In our case Bosch and Pfizer required access to a diverse 
set of technology providers to find appropriate technological solutions. Also, an 
extensive knowledge sharing between them and their external technology 
providers was not necessary as they had relatively simple and well-structured 
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problems to be solved. Interestingly, we find that firms also use this mode for 
problem type 1. Apparently, diversity of solution and access to an outsider 
perspective may have additional benefits such as external validation of the 
internally known solution. For simple problems (type 1 and 2), firms tend to adopt 
either markets or open innovation platforms as they support required incentives 
to motivate the external partners to engage in the problem solving process. The 
selection of an appropriate mode from these two modes is affected by different 
levels of hiddenness of knowledge. If the location of required knowledge is 
unknown for the project team, they need to access a wide variety of external 
sources to find a proper solution. Thus, they tend to engage in open innovation 
platforms. As a result, the selection of the open innovation modes is influenced 
not only by the separate mechanisms of complexity and hiddenness, but also by 
the interaction of the two attributes (Heiman & Nickerson, 2004).   
Problems type 3, complex problems, are associated with the choice of a firm 
sponsored open innovation community. This is a rather surprising finding as 
theoretically, one would expect that managers choose communities to solve grand 
challenges (Felin & Zenger, 2014). However, we also learn that firms opt for 
partnerships when trying to solve complex problems (type 3). In our 
HP/DreamWorks rendering technology project, HP was able to identify the 
required technological areas as well as the right partner to develop a new 
rendering technology (i.e., no need to access a wide set of external providers). 
Likewise, HP and DreamWorks needed to have extensive knowledge sharing to 
understand all aspects of required technological solutions such as animation 
technology and data storage and computing. Thus, HP decided to have a mutual 
collaboration instead of transactional relationships (i.e., contractual). Finally, we 
learn that a bilateral open innovation partnership is preferred for solving complex 
problems regardless of the hiddenness of knowledge. In sum, this suggests that 
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grand challenges present truly challenging problems. There is no clear pattern of a 
preferred open innovation mode for such kind of problems from our survey. 
However, in our case examples of Evonik and Eli Lilly, we found that they 
developed a collaborative community, integrating a diverse set of actors to 
support deep knowledge sharing with these actors to tackle not only complex 
problem but also unknown technological solutions. In these two cases, project 
teams had tendency to adopt open innovation partnerships or communities to 
support the required extensive knowledge sharing (as they had a complex 
problem). As the location of the required knowledge was unknown for them, they 
adopted an open innovation community to have access a diverse set of external 
sources. From these two cases, we learned that the selection of the open 
innovation modes is affected not only by each attribute, but also by the 
interaction of two attributes.               
4.7 Implications 
Our study makes several contributions to the lively discussion on how to open up 
in open innovation, both in research and in practice (Felin & Zenger, 2014). Our 
research advances the theoretical discussion on the governance of open 
innovation, but most importantly it has immediate practical implications. 
First, our explorative analysis provides empirical insights related to recent more 
theoretical but holistic and comparative discussion of different governance mode 
for open innovation (Felin & Zenger, 2014). We empirically show that open 
innovation projects fall in different categories of innovation problems. Open 
innovation is used in four types of problems that we classified: Well-structured 
problems, holy grail problems, complex problems, and also grand challenges.  
 Table 4.8: Summary of Six Complementary Open Innovation Projects 
Case  
Clariant 
chemical 
catalyst 
design 
Problem Type  Type 1: Well-structured 
 
Open Innovation 
Mode 
Market/contracts: licensing agreement  
Rationale: Why 
this mode?  
Extensive sharing with external partners was not necessarily. The problem was simple and they 
knew where to look for a solution: They were aware of a “HycaPure Hg” technology” that could 
help them solve their problem. So, they proposed licensing agreement to create incentive for 
Petronas to give permission of use it. 
Bosch non-
electrochemi
cal energy 
storage 
technology 
Problem Type  Type 2: Holy grail  
Open Innovation 
Mode 
Open Innovation Platform: using NineSigma as an open innovation intermediary 
Rationale: Why 
this mode?  
Extensive knowledge sharing between Bosch and external technology provider was not 
necessary since developing new non-electrochemical energy storage was relatively simple and 
well-structured. To increase the diversity and reach, they selected NineSigma to access a large 
pool of problem solvers. Diversity was key as they truly looked for an outlier solution that could 
challenge their internal solution concepts.  
Pfizer 
Prefilled 
syringes 
Problem Type  Type 2: Holy grail 
Open Innovation 
Mode 
Open Innovation Platform: using IdeaConnection.com as an Open Innovation Intermediary 
Rationale: Why 
this mode? 
Diversity and access to truly novel solution concepts was key issue for them. Working with 
IdeaConnection.com gave this opportunity to Pfizer to have access to a diverse number of 
problem solvers.   
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Evonik  
non-vacuum  
process 
Problem Type  Type 4: Grand challenges 
Open Innovation 
Mode 
Open Innovation Community: creating a diverse community that integrated a diverse set of 
actors 
Rationale: Why 
this mode? 
Evonik initiated the open innovation community support deep knowledge sharing with diverse 
set of actors to tackle not only complex problem but also unknown technological solutions.  The 
problem was way to complex to be solved with one partner only. More than 50 actors 
(including individuals) joined the community that started collaborating to develop a new 
technology solution for the production of electronic devises.  
Eli Lilly drug 
design 
Problem Type  Type 4: Grand challenges 
Open Innovation 
Mode 
Open Innovation Community: Developed a collaborative virtual environment, called Open 
Innovation Drug Discover platform (OIDD) 
Rationale: Why 
this mode? 
Drug discovery process requires extensive knowledge sharing across diverse set of scientists 
and researchers as the process is highly complex and the ideal chemical structure is often 
unknown. The OIDD as a collaborative virtual community allowed Lilly to access the long tail of 
problem solvers and to support sharing knowledge idea among them.   
HP/DreamW
orks 
rendering 
movies 
technology 
Problem Type  Type 3: Complex Problem 
Open Innovation 
Mode 
Open Innovation Partnerships: Partnership agreement through mutual exchange 
Rationale: Why 
this mode?  
HP was able to identify the right partner to develop a new rendering technology. HP and 
DreamWorks needed to have extensive knowledge sharing to understand all aspects of 
required technological solutions such as animation technology and data storage and 
computing. HP strategically chose to collaborate with DreamWorks through mutual exchange 
rather than contractual and arm-length relationships as it could support sharing truly 
complementary knowledge and expertise among them.  
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We also show that managers make use of different open innovation governance 
modes. We learned that more novel modes such as contests and communities are 
also of increasing relevance to firms, suggesting that firms have evolved from the 
early stages of markets and partnerships in open innovation. However, a closer 
look into the nature of the communities that firms sponsor and create, shows that 
they deviate from the user communities that follow the principles of OSS, and 
make their know-how publically available (often labeled as free revealing in the 
academic discussion). The communities we studied were truly collaborative, 
followed a joined common objective, and regularly also involved individuals and 
not just firms. However, despite the collaborative exchange of knowledge, the 
knowledge created within these communities was not turned into a public good. 
Clear rules and norms about knowledge sharing and protection guided these 
communities. 
Second, our comparative analysis reveals clear patterns of interrelationships 
between the nature of the problem to be solved and the open innovation mode 
chosen. There is a clear preference of a particular open innovation mode for 
problem type 1 (well-structured problems), problem type 2 (holy grail) and 
problem type 3 (complex problem). For these three problem types, managers do 
and should opt for open innovation markets, open innovation platforms, or open 
innovation partnerships respectively. The results of this study show that the 
selection of open innovation modes is affected by the interaction of the two 
attributes as well. For example, for simple problems (type 1 and 2) they can adopt 
either open innovation markets or open innovation platforms. But, open 
innovation market is preferred for problem type 1 as the location of knowledge for 
solving problem is known for project teams so that they can make a contract with 
external partners to solve their problem. By contrast, for problem type 2, project 
teams have no idea about the location of the required knowledge. As a result, they 
prefer to engage in open innovation platforms to access a wide range of potential 
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external sources. Two different open innovation modes are adopted for the simple 
problem based on the level of hiddenness. Thus, the two attributes should be 
considered at the same time (the interaction between them) to select the 
appropriate open innovation mode. This pattern is conforming to prior, more 
theoretical discussion on the problem fit of different open innovation modes. 
Interestingly, we found that managers also find alternative uses for open 
innovation platforms than one would have expected. They are also relevant for 
problem type 1, well-structured problems, for potential reasons such as external 
validation of an internal technology (in the sense of an external proof). Problem 
type 4 – grand challenges remain the most puzzling problem type. If a problem is 
complex and lacks access to potential solution know-how (hiddenness), we 
explore a tendency to opt for partnerships rather than – as one would have 
theoretically assumed – communities. However, at the same time, we do learn 
that firms make use of firm sponsored open innovation communities in alternative 
ways. They are used for complex problems rather than for grand challenges. This 
suggests that managers prefer bilateral interactions with a small group of partners 
if the problems are truly grant challenges with high complexity and high 
hiddenness of knowledge. Theoretically, both trial and error learning as well as 
theory-driven search is the ‘mechanisms’ that help tacking grant challenges. 
Diversity of the problem solvers as well as knowledge sharing among them may 
put these mechanisms to work. However, even though one would assume that 
communities make best use of both mechanisms, we learn that firms use both 
partnerships as well as communities to solve them. They even seem to prefer 
partnerships over communities. Apparently, using communities remains a 
challenge and requires managers to learn new capabilities to manage the 
knowledge integration among a large group of actors. Our two case studies on 
open innovation communities that tackle grant challenges give a first hint about 
these new capabilities. 
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Figure 4.2: Typology of Four Problem Types and Open Innovation Modes 
 
Our portfolio presented in Figure 4.2 presents a decision framework for managers 
when pondering about the appropriate open innovation mode. This matrix makes 
this managerial mode selection, which is itself complex because the selection is 
affected by the interaction of the two attributes, simple. Rather than providing a 
complex list of attributes and decision factors, this simple 2x2 matrix provides an 
opportunity for firms to make decision early in the project. Neither does it require 
an intensive analysis, nor a lot of costs. However, it is exactly that early stage 
decision that will have important implications for the success of the project, and 
also the resources spend at a later stage. Whether managers opt for a partnership 
or for a community requires a deeper analysis of the need for knowledge sharing 
and the ability of the firm to facilitate knowledge sharing among a community of 
innovators. 
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4.8 Conclusion and Future Opportunities 
Our paper took a first step into the discussion on the interrelationship between 
problem types and open innovation modes. It is the first empirical study that 
compares different open innovation modes and how they link to different problem 
types. There is much to learn, in particularly in the area of open innovation 
communities and ‘grand challenge’ problems. We hope that our framework will 
inspire both practitioners as well as scholars to experiment more within these 
different modes, and further sharpen our understanding of the best way to design 
intellectual property rights (IP), communication channels, and incentives 
structures for them. 
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Chapter 5: General Conclusions, Implications, and 
Future Research 
The final chapter of this dissertation is allocated to the discussion and integration 
of the findings of three articles. First, a brief overview of findings concluded from 
three articles is presented. After that, the major theoretical and practical 
implications of the findings are discussed. Then, a summary of the limitations of 
this dissertation is presented, followed by providing suggestions for the future 
research. 
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5.1 Main Findings 
The main aim of this study is to enhance our understanding of governance of open 
and collaborative innovation and the effect of governance on innovation successes 
by studying 1) dynamics of collaboration and their role in governance mechanisms, 
2) the knowledge sharing-protecting tension and how it can be regulated, and 3) 
the role of problem attributes in selection of governance mechanisms. 
Although the results show an extensive variability in the patterns of dynamics in 
open and collaborative projects, there is a clear difference in the collaboration 
dynamics between the successful and less successful collaborative projects. 
Successful projects have dynamic interactions that are more complex, tightly 
coupled, and dense than less successful cases. That is, with less successful cases, 
events seem to happen that are often unconnected to the remaining dynamic 
interactions, leading to changes in the collaborative projects that are left without 
an adaptive governance mechanism to respond to these changes. Learning from 
these changes to adapt governance mechanism is not supported in such a context.  
Moreover, the dynamic interactions among multiple project characteristics that 
happen involve fewer different characteristics, thus being less embedded in the 
institutional culture of the collaborative projects and thus adaptive governance as 
response to change seems easier to be ignored. In contrast, successful projects 
often have dynamic interactions that involve all the collaborative project 
characteristics, often with bilateral relationships and feedback loops between the 
characteristics. These complex dynamic interactions, including loops, facilitate 
learning for adapting governance mechanisms and embedding the adaptive 
governance into the institutional fabric of the projects.   
The results indicate that changes in interaction style (cooperation vs. competition) 
of partners are likely to be part of this complex dynamic pattern for collaborative 
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projects that are identified as successfully completing their objectives. This 
dynamic pattern begins with tensions caused by differences between the partners 
in priorities, cultures, interest, etc. which lead to conflicts. If the conflicts are 
effectively responded with increased use of team-based managerial decision 
making along with introducing new roles and processes (i.e., formality) then the 
interaction style between partners becomes increasingly cooperative, open 
information sharing, over time. 
Duality in changes in interaction style is found. That is, changes in interaction style 
over time are not always from an initial competitive style to a cooperative style. 
This duality can be explained based on the analysis of sources of dynamics. 
Between-partner tensions that are left unresolved create a tendency for the 
partners to evolve toward a competitive interaction style, while the shift from 
competitive to cooperative is caused by the introduction of procedural formality 
(introducing new roles, processes, routines, etc. into collaboration process) and 
with team-based decision making (involving more technical staffs for making 
decision about how work is organized or problem is solved). This result supports 
this argument that both communication and structural enhancement are critical to 
partner cooperation (Zeng & Chen, 2003). 
The findings of this study clearly supports this argument that the tension between 
cooperation (i.e., knowledge sharing) and competition (knowledge protection) in 
the collaborative projects needs to be regulated, otherwise the tension can slow 
down the collaboration in achieving its predefined objectives and even stop it 
prematurely (Bogers, 2011; Das & Teng, 2000; De Rond & Bouchikhi, 2004; Faems, 
Janssens, & Van Looy, 2010; Heiman & Nickerson, 2004; Jarvenpaa & Välikangas, 
2014; Zeng & Chen, 2003). Moreover, this study shows that the tension between 
cooperation and competition can be regulated by introducing formality into the 
collaboration process (i.e., joint technology development process), thereby having 
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successful outcomes. That is, to manage the knowledge sharing and protecting 
tension in collaboration process, introducing formality into joint technology 
development process has a positive effect on open and collaborative innovation 
project performance. This result of dissertation seems to support the hypothesis 
arguing that an alliance is likely to create more economic value as more partners 
adopt cooperative collaboration strategies (Kumar & Nti, 2004). Moreover, Kumar 
and Nti (2004) suggest that a cooperative mode of collaboration relied not only on 
the collaboration strategies of each partner, but also on the governance 
mechanism managing the alliance. 
Moreover, the results indicate that the positive effect of procedural formalization 
on projects outcomes gets stronger as the problem becomes more complex. This 
indicates that as the project increases its problem complexity, the critical role of 
process formality in creating successful innovation outcomes increases. Likewise, 
the problem attributes (i.e., complexity and hiddenness of required knowledge) 
affect selection of a particular governance mechanism for solving innovation 
problem via using knowledge of external partners. Market and contractual 
governance (such as licensing) is associated with simple problems for which the 
required solution knowledge can also be easily identified by firms. Open 
innovation platforms such as contests, intermediaries, tournaments are a proper 
mechanism in order to solve simple problems with an unknown required 
knowledge. In such cases, firms may use the crowd to identify hidden knowledge 
sources. Partnerships (such as alliances and joint ventures) seem to be appropriate 
governance for complex problems for which the required solution is known for 
firms. This result is consistent with the argument that the alliance is a proper 
governance mechanism for sharing complex knowledge among involved partners 
in collaborative projects (Parmigiani & Rivera-Santos, 2011). 
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5.2 Theoretical Implications 
First, the manner in which the analysis and reporting of the studies on the 
dynamics of IOCs are organized offers a framework providing direction for 
conducting future research on the IOC dynamics and selecting which aspects of 
the dynamics the study will focus on. Research is clearly needed on all aspects of 
the dynamics.  Are there other IOC characteristics that were not included that 
change over the course of the IOC?  Are there other sources that affect these IOC 
characteristics?  Are there other patterns of dynamic over time that surface?     
Also, the second theoretical contribution of this dissertation is for research on the 
dynamics of IOCs by finding the presence of dualities in IOC characteristics (such as 
interaction style between partners) in different forms of collaboration such as 
alliance, network, etc. This finding appears to support what De Rond and 
Bouchikhi (2004) refer to as dialectic tensions in alliance between cooperation and 
competition, individual autonomy and control and other characteristics. In some 
collaborative projects, for instance, partner firms simultaneously cooperate (i.e., 
open knowledge sharing) and compete (hiding knowledge) with each other. 
Bengtsson and Kock (2000) show that partners in coopetitive relationship tend to 
share and hide knowledge simultaneously. The two interaction styles seem to be 
needed to ensure effective knowledge sharing while maintaining alertness and 
visibility to potential partner opportunistic behavior. These dualities suggest 
dualism as an important descriptor of dynamics in collaborative projects that need 
to be examined so that critical issues on how partners govern collaboration are 
not lost (Vlaar, Van Den Bosch, & Volberda, 2007). 
Third, the findings of this dissertation have important theoretical contributions for 
coopetition literature (Bengtsson & Kock, 2000; Bengtsson, Wilson, Bengtsson, 
Eriksson, & Wincent, 2010; Raza-Ullah, Bengtsson, & Kock, 2014; Ritala & 
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Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009; Ritala & Hurmelinna‐Laukkanen, 2013), arguing the 
advantages of simultaneous cooperation and competition among partnering firms 
in collaborative project successes, if managed effectively. The findings of this 
dissertation suggest that the balance of cooperation and competition seems to be 
managed by relying more on team-based decision making (i.e., involving more 
technical workers from the partner firms in managerial decision making) and 
introducing procedural formality (i.e., introducing new roles, processes, and 
procedures to collaboration) in projects. 
Fourth, this dissertation has theoretical contributions for research on using 
external knowledge by suggesting that process formalization, virtually ignored in 
previous studies of engaging in open and collaborative projects, supports legal 
formalization around IP control to manage the concern over knowledge sharing 
and opportunistic risk in collaborative innovation projects (Cassiman & Veugelers, 
2002; Laursen & Salter, 2014) by reducing the ambiguity that individuals have in 
terms of what IP-related knowledge needs to be shared and what needs to be 
protected. The adopting of formal IP control may not address specific activities of 
individuals from the partnering firms, which can result in sharing IP-related 
knowledge that should not be shared during the course of interaction (Berends, 
van Burg, & van Raaij, 2011). Thus, future studies have to pay more attention to 
the procedural formality that firms need to make sure that open and collaborative 
projects using external knowledge are likely to have successful innovative 
outcomes without the loss of critical intellectual property. 
Fifth, the findings presented in this dissertation have important implications for 
interactive self-regulatory theory for sharing and protecting knowledge in IOCs, 
indicating the critical role that flexible collaboration process plays between 
interacting individuals who engage in daily sharing and protecting knowledge, in 
regulation of the sharing-protecting tension (Jarvenpaa & Majchrzak, 2016). This 
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study suggests that flexible interaction is primarily possible not because it implies 
informal self-organized decision making about knowledge sharing and protecting 
in an ad-hoc fashion, but instead asserts that decisions that are made based on 
formalized joint processes. The establishment of formal process makes flexible 
interaction between individuals from the partners more feasible because of clarity 
not only about what knowledge should be shared but also about what knowledge 
should be protected (Salter, Criscuolo, & Ter Wal, 2014).    
Sixth, the procedural formality presented in this study has theoretical implications 
for the literature on relational mechanisms in IOCs, putting great emphasis on the 
importance of informal elements in creating trust between partner firms to ensure 
collaboration success (Ring & Van de Ven, 1992, 1994). At first, it seems that there 
is a paradox between my findings, introducing formality into the collaboration 
process, and the importance of informality and trust based relationship between 
partner firms. I believe that, instead of a paradox, process formalization can help 
the parties manage distrust (particularly trust and distrust coexist between 
individuals in the collaboration), between individuals in collaboration process, by 
reducing opportunistic risk of knowledge sharing. 
Seventh, several authors have argued for the need for firms interested in IOC and 
OI to develop a dynamic capability for successful outcomes (Jarvenpaa & 
Majchrzak, 2016; Schepker, Oh, Martynov, & Poppo, 2014). This study can suggest 
what such a dynamic capability looks like, and how it is likely to evolve. For 
example, I introduce process formalization as a critical dynamic capability that 
needs to be in place for open and collaborative innovation projects to succeed, 
explaining how successfully an individual on the team is able to manage the 
tension between knowledge sharing and protecting in the flexible interactive 
collaboration. 
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Finally, this dissertation shows that there is a clear pattern of interrelationship 
between the attributes of the problem (i.e., complexity and hiddenness of 
required knowledge) to be solved and the governance mechanisms chosen for 
collaborative projects. This finding provides empirical insights related to recent 
conceptual comparative discussion of different governance mechanisms for open 
innovation (Felin & Zenger, 2014). Also, this finding has theoretical implications for 
literature on IOCs and OI in general and formalization of IOCs literature in 
particular with suggesting that for studying and building theory we have to 
consider not only industry and firm level characteristics, but also the role of 
projects attributes (Du, Leten, & Vanhaverbeke, 2014; West, Salter, Vanhaverbeke, 
& Chesbrough, 2014).  
5.3 Practical Implications  
The results of this dissertation have several major implications for open and 
collaborative innovation managers. Collaborative projects are often terminated 
prior to reaching their initially defined objectives (Ariño & De La Torre, 1998; 
Makino, Chan, Isobe, & Beamish, 2007; Park & Ungson, 2001). The results of this 
study provide suggestions to avoid unsuccessful collaborations. Complex dynamic 
interactions presented in this dissertation suggest that changes in collaborative 
process that require adaptive responses need to be monitored by managers. 
Learning acquired from changes needs to be deeply embedded in the fabric of the 
joint collaboration process to enable the project to adapt its governance to the 
changes to which it has been exposed. For example, this leaning process could 
become part of joint meetings between partnering firms to ensure that they apply 
these lessons learned. 
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This study shows that introducing formality into the joint technology development 
process reduces uncertainty about what knowledge should be shared and what 
knowledge should be protected. Therefore, the knowledge sharing-protecting 
tension is regulated, thereby reducing failures. Thus, managers need to allocate 
enough time, at the both the formation and execution phases of project, to specify 
technological activities and evaluation criteria, such as technological specifications 
to be followed by involved individuals from partnering firms developing the 
desired technology. As technical staffs involve in the daily sharing and protecting 
of knowledge during the course of collaboration, this study suggests that 
managers invite all individuals involved in the project to more efficiently specify 
the joint development technology process. Also, this helps individuals gain 
sufficient information about the technological activities, since they are already 
involved in the process of specification, therefore making the implementation of 
the formality easier.  
Moreover, this dissertation provides managers with guidelines that support the 
decision for the selection of the right governance for open and collaborative 
projects at the earliest stages of the project. First, this dissertation suggests that 
managers need to carefully analyze the project attributes (i.e., problem attributes) 
before deciding how to engage in open and collaborative innovation. Two 
attributes presented in this study help them to quickly position the project in the 
2x2 matrix (complexity and hiddenness). Then, managers need to choose a 
governance mechanism fits with the problem based on the proposed mechanisms 
in the 2x2 matrix.   
 
5.4 Limitations and Future Research  
This dissertation has some limitations. First, the relative dearth of studies in this 
research area suggests the need for more studies on dynamics with conducting 
longitudinal qualitative case study. Although my analysis and reporting of the 
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studies on dynamics offers a framework for conducting future research and 
selecting which aspects of dynamics the future studies will focus on, the findings 
of this study are an artifact of the state of the research in which relatively little 
detail about the dynamics on collaboration is provided. This suggests that if the 
dynamics of collaboration are to evolve our understanding of the governance 
mechanism of collaborative projects, more careful observations is needed.  
Second, the results of this study on dynamics are based on 22 collaborative 
projects using different collaboration mechanisms such as alliances, joint ventures, 
consortia, etc. that have distinct characteristics that can affect the dynamics 
collaboration over time. Moreover, the projects are from different industries and 
managed by different partners, with a variety of organizational structures, all 
affecting project outcomes. Thus, it was impossible to meet the call for “selection 
of an appropriate population, [cases of innovation collaborative projects] controls 
extraneous variation” to develop the findings on dynamics (Eisenhardt, 1989: 537). 
Thus, there is a need to conduct a nested-cases control study in which all 
collaborative projects have the same mechanism and come from the same 
partnering firms and the same industry, thus controlling for critical factors 
affecting the project outcomes25. 
Third, the findings related to the quantitative part of this dissertation are based on 
cross-sectional data. Thus, it is impossible to establish causality. Future research 
applying longitudinal and/or experimental designs can be helpful in establishing 
clear causality between problem attributes and governance mechanism. 
Moreover, I have a single respondent from each firm completed the survey. Thus, 
this study is vulnerable to common-method variance. Although some strategies 
are applied to avoid this problem when developing the questionnaire, to decrease 
                                                        
25 For example, please see (Faems, Janssens, Madhok, & Van Looy, 2008; Majchrzak, Cooper, & 
Neece, 2004) 
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potential common-method variance, a multi-source approach should be applied in 
the future studies. 
Finally, this dissertation did not study individual-level factors such as motivation 
affecting the project innovation performance (Clark & Fujimoto, 1991; Leiponen & 
Helfat, 2010). As a result, future research could study the role of individual level 
factors in the collaboration process to advance the findings of this study by 
addressing, for example, the moderation effect of these factors on the relationship 
between the degree of procedural formalization and project performance. 
5.5 Conclusion  
Using external knowledge through open and collaborative innovation projects with 
new partners has been recognized as a critical mechanism to successfully solve 
innovation problems, particularly under the increased dynamics of technological 
and market change (Browning, Beyer, & Shetler, 1995; Chesbrough, 2003; Foss, 
Laursen, & Pedersen, 2011; West & Bogers, 2014). The ability to manage the 
collaboration process with partners to have successful innovation outcomes is a 
crucial capability. This capability becomes particularly important when firms select 
a governance mechanism for their open and collaborative projects (Felin & Zenger, 
2014; van de Vrande, Vanhaverbeke, & Duysters, 2009), as well as regulate the 
knowledge sharing-protecting tension during the course of collaboration with 
external partners. This dissertation has enhanced our understanding of the 
governance of open and collaborative projects and the effect of governance on 
innovation successes showing that 1) the tension between knowledge sharing and 
knowledge protection in the collaborative projects needs to be managed, 
otherwise this tension can slow down the joint project in achieving its initially 
defined goals and even stop it prematurely 2) this tension (i.e., the tension 
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between sharing and protecting) can be regulated by introducing formality into 
the joint collaboration process (i.e., joint technology development process) which 
has a positive effect on open and collaborative innovation project performance 3) 
the positive effect of process formalization on project performance becomes 
stronger as the problem becomes more complex and 4) the two project attributes 
(complexity and hiddenness of knowledge) affect the selection of a right 
governance mechanism. Open and collaborative projects often fail due to 
selection of wrong governance mechanism and lack of ability to regulate the 
knowledge sharing and protecting tension (De Rond & Bouchikhi, 2004; Ness, 
2009). Avoiding failures needs better understanding of how the governance 
mechanism should be selected, as well as how the tension should be regulated. 
This dissertation is aimed at advancing this understanding.                
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